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This dissertation analyzes the contextual background, drafting history, text, 
original understanding, interpretive evolution, and contemporary judicial 
application of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.   The 
dissertation develops the argument that as originally understood, the Second 
Amendment protected a right to keep and bear arms closely linked to and 
dependent upon service in the lawfully established militia.   Two recent United 
States Supreme Court decisions, Heller v. District of Columbia and MacDonald v. 
City of Chicago, depart from this original understanding and recognize a 
constitutional right to weapons possession for purposes of purely private self-
defense – particularly self-defense in the home.  The dissertation recognizes that 
there are grounds for recognizing such a right, and that these include natural law, 
substantive due process, procedural due process, the Ninth Amendment, and 
emanations from particular provisions in the Bill of Rights including the Second 
Amendment.   At the same time, the dissertation develops the case that the original 
 public understanding mode of interpretation avowedly applied by the Supreme 
Court in its recent right to arms decisions relies on untenable “law office” history 
to justify results not dictated by the text, structure, or original understanding of the 
Constitution or by prior Supreme Court precedent.  
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE AND  
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
REFLECTIONS ON THE STATE OF NATURE, DEADLY DRONES, TRAYVON MARTIN, 
AND SOME UNSETTLED LEGAL QUESTIONS 
 
It is a long-established axiom among political theorists that when people leave the state of 
nature and enter into civil society, they accept the enforcement of limitations against some of 
their rights so as to protect and indeed maximize other personal and collective rights—including 
the right to security—to the greatest extent possible.1  In modern constitutional democracies, it is 
                                                     
1
 This proposition was central to the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, 
and William Blackstone, three of the English-speaking world’s foundational thinkers on 
governmental legitimacy.   
Thus, in endeavoring to convince his readers to accept the authority of the English 
Commonwealth after the execution of Charles I, Hobbes writes “[f]rom this fundamental law of 
nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law: that a man 
be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think 
it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against 
other men, as he would allow other men against himself.  For as long as every man holdeth this 
right, of doing anything he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war.  But if other men 
will not lay down their right, as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of 
his: for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose 
himself to peace.” THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XIV sec. 5, (1651), at 86 in Oxford 
World’s Classic Edition (1996) (1651). 
 According to Locke’s SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, written either to encourage 
overthrow of the government of James II in 1685 or to justify the newly established 
constitutional settlement after the Glorious Revolution in 1689, “wherever, therefore, any 
number of men so unite into one society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of 
Nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political or civil society. And this 
is done wherever any number of men, in the state of Nature, enter into society to make one 
people one body politic under one supreme government: or else when any one joins himself to, 
and incorporates with any government already made. For hereby he authorises the society, or 
which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him as the public good of the society 
shall require, to the execution whereof his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this 
puts men out of a state of Nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth 
with authority to determine all the controversies and redress the injuries that may happen to any 
member of the commonwealth, which judge is the legislative or magistrates appointed by it. And 
wherever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to 
appeal to, there they are still in the state of Nature.”  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON 
2 
 
generally accepted also that legislatures may legitimately adjust the balance among these rights 
to enforce popular preferences about the rights packages deemed most desirable by the 
citizenry.
2
 In a society in which courts enforce certain rights against legislative judgments, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
GOVERNMENT Bk. 2, Ch. 7, §89 (1689).  In a later passage in the SECOND TREATISE, Locke 
elaborates “If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his 
own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with 
his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control 
of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath 
such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of 
others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict 
observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, 
very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears 
and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in 
society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation 
of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.”  Id. at §123. 
 For Blackstone, writing to celebrate the firmly established constitutional order of the 
1760s some seven decades after its foundations in the Glorious Revolution, “every man, when he 
enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; 
and in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to 
conform to those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish.  And this species of 
legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more desirable than that wild and savage liberty 
which is sacrificed to obtain it.  For no man, that considers a moment, would wish to retain the 
absolute and uncontrolled power of doing whatever he pleases: the consequence of which is, that 
every other man would also have the same power; and then there would be no security to 
individuals in any of the enjoyments of life.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125 
(1765). 
 The contextual background to Leviathan is explored in QUENTIN SKINNER, HOBBES AND 
REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, 178-82, 198-208 (2008).  RICHARD ASCHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY 
POLITICS AND LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1986), follows Peter Laslett in arguing 
(entirely persuasively in my view) that John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government were 
published as a radical revolutionary manifesto prior to the Rye House Plot of 1683 rather than as 
an after the fact justification for the Glorious Revolution as earlier generations of scholars had 
assumed. Stanley Katz’s insightful introductory essay to the Chicago editions of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A 
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769 WITH AND INTRODUCTION BY STANLEY N. KATZ, 
x-xii (1979), explains that Blackstone’s sections on constitutional law and governmental 
legitimacy delicately balanced his perceived need to immunize the existing constitutional 
arrangement against any potential revolutionary challenge notwithstanding that order’s own 
revolutionary origins in 1688-89.  
2
 Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic 
Defects, IN CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, 39, 40-42 (Michael Rosenfeld ed., 1994); Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and 
3 
 
legislatures are of course limited in their capacity to adjust rights and balance them against other 
rights.
3
  Some rights (say the right against arbitrary deprivation of life by the state) are entirely 
beyond legislative discretion.  The legislature may infringe upon them only in very limited 
circumstances, in the case of the right to life, probably only for the purposes of facilitating self-
defense and defense of the society, and, in societies with legal orders that tolerate execution 
under the law, carrying out capital punishment pursuant to a lawful death sentence.
4
  Other less 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307 (2001); IAN LOVELAND, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 8-18 (2d ed. 2000). 
 
3
 See generally LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, 118-24 (1990); cf. Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Village, C.A. 6821/93, 49(4) 
P.D. 221 (1995), two foundational cases justifying judicial review of legislative acts for 
conformity with the United States Constitution and the Israeli Basic Laws, respectively.  Chief 
Justice Marshall relies essentially on compact theory to hold that the sovereign will of the people 
in ratifying the Constitution trumps the will of the people’s elected agents reduced to statutory 
law, while Chief Justice Barak holds that Basic Laws passed by the Knesset in its constitutive as 
distinct from legislative capacity have constitutional status that renders the Basic Laws superior 
to ordinary statutory law.  On the tension between popular democracy and judicial policing of 
constitutional sovereignty, see generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 
(Anders Wedberg trans., 1961), ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH 
JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000), RON HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: 
THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007), MARK TUSHNET: 
WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009). 
4
 Consider e.g., respecting the United States, the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eight Amendment, the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments the enormous body of constitutional jurisprudence on the 
death penalty they have spawned; and, in the European context, Articles 2 and Protocols Six and 
Thirteen to the European Convention on Human Rights first limiting and then eliminating the 
authority of governmental actors to impose capital sentences or otherwise deprive persons of life 
except when acting in necessary self-defense, defense of others, or to suppress a riot or 
insurrection.  The substance of the right is defined in Article 2 of the Convention as follows: 
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of 
a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
a. In defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
4 
 
fundamental rights (take the right to operate a motor vehicle) are clearly subject to legislative 
discretion, and their restraint is frequently permissible, perhaps for purposes such as criminal 
punishment, traffic safety, environmental protection, to preserve public order, to protect third 
parties and allow their indemnification, or to maximize social utility pursuant to the legislature’s 
policy preferences.
5
  Even strong libertarians generally concede that governmental restraint of 




In the United States, the question is hotly debated whether gun possession (and the right 
to use fire arms in self-defense) falls closer to the fundamental, inalienable end of the spectrum 
                                                                                                                                                                           
b. In order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
c. In action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.     
5
 See generally IAN LOVELAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION, at 8-
18 (2d ed. 2000) (introducing the study of British Constitutional Law from a comparative 
perspective, and contrasting the time honored Diceyian understanding of unbridled legislative 
discretion with American style judicial review and the post-Human Rights Act of 1998 British 
system subjecting Parliamentary statute making to judicial policing to ensure compatibility with 
fundamental European human rights norms).  
6
 John Stuart Mill’s famous harm principle holds that personal liberty may not be 
legitimately curtailed by government authority except in situations where an actor’s conduct 
harms or threatens harm to other persons.  In Mill’s original formulation, “the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any 
of their number, is self-protection.  That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.  He cannot rightfully 
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him 
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.  These are 
good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating 
him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise.  To 
justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil 
to someone else.  The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is 
that which concerns others.  In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of 
right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”  JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 18 (1859).  By referencing preventative self-defense, Mill appears to 
concede that government may intervene to prevent incipient harm, not just to punish wrongdoers 
after the fact.   
5 
 
(like the right against arbitrary deprivation of life), or nearer the relativistic, conditional, 
legislatively adjustable end of the spectrum (like the right to drive a car).
7
  A five-justice 
majority on the Supreme Court favors a position nearer the fundamental side.
8
  My view is 
different.
9
  This introductory essay briefly summarizes the reasons why, and then suggests 
several perspectives that may afford greater insight into the nature and limits of the right to self-
defense than does the originalist course embraced by the Supreme Court in Heller and 
McDonald, the two recent cases in which the Court read a private right to self-defense against 
potential attackers into the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.    
The body of the thesis consists of eleven different pieces (four encyclopedia entries, two 
book reviews, three law review articles, one critical essay, and one unpublished surreply to a 
leading academic critic of my work).  Collectively, these pieces summarize and critique Second 
                                                     
7
 On heated debate and cultural conflict over the twinned questions of gun rights and gun 
control, see generally DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003), SAUL 
CORNELL. A WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN 
CONTROL IN AMERICA (2007). 
8
 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago 
561 U.S. __ (2010).  Heller recognized a Second Amendment right to keep commonly held 
weapons for purposes of self-defense in the home, and marked the first time the Supreme Court 
had clearly acknowledged a Second Amendment right not connected to service in the lawfully 
established militia.  McDonald applied the substantive right described in Heller against state and 
municipal governments. 
9
 See, e.g., William G. Merkel, The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s 
Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV., 349 (2009) (arguing that Justice 
Scalia’s allegedly originalist opinion in Heller is historically unsupportable, and that the Second 
Amendment was not originally understood to stand in the way of legislative restrictions on gun 
use and possession); Heller as Hubris, and How McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change 
the Constitutional World as we Know it, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221 (2010) (arguing that 
there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment contemplated incorporation of  a private right to arms against the states, 
that Justice Alito’s opinion places far too much stock in the dubious historical claims relied on 
by Justice Scalia in Heller, and that state and municipal gun control provisions that do not offend 




Amendment scholarship, explain the Supreme Court’s holdings in Heller and McDonald, lay out 
my interpretation of the Second Amendment, explain why the Second Amendment as originally 
understood did not encompass a purely private right to self-defense, and why incorporation 
jurisprudence up until McDonald does not support application of a private right to self-defense 
against the states as a derivative of the Second Amendment right against the federal government. 
This introductory Chapter contextualizes the material that follows and explains the 
themes that tie together the thesis chapters, and then concludes by outlining questions to be 
explored in my future work.
10
  But before introducing the work that comprises the body of the 
thesis, I begin here by setting out some of the numerous questions left open by the Heller and 
McDonald decisions, and explain why originalism—the dominant mode of thought on the late 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts—is ill-suited to addressing the important self-defense related 
questions that the Court will confront in the coming years.
11
  In particular, I argue that ancestor 
worship provides an inadequate normative basis for judicial adjustment of legislatively 
determined rights, and that considerations of federalism and democratic experimentalism suggest 
the Supreme Court should hesitate to preempt legislative policy determinations by force-fitting 




While fictive original understanding of marginally related constitutional text provides a 
poor basis for evaluating claims premised on the right to self-defense, insights drawn from the 
international law of armed conflict offer a potentially useful and normatively cogent alternative 
matrix for analyzing the right of individuals to defend themselves against actual, imminent, or 
                                                     
10
 See pp. 35-40 infra. 
11
 See pp. 11-13 infra. 
12
 See pp. 13-17 infra. 
7 
 
potential armed attack, and the ancillary right to arm oneself to deter and repulse possible future 
attacks.
13
  In planned projects outlined at the end of this Chapter, I will focus particularly on 
general principles of the law of self-defense shared by diverse municipal systems and public 
international law to develop a framework for analyzing self-defense claims under American 
law
14
 that I hope will be both more intellectually honest and more principled than the rhetorically 
inflected Second Amendment-driven public discourse on self-defense that has erupted in 
response to the Trayvon Martin shooting and the Aurora, Colorado tragedy.
15
  For present 
purposes, in anticipation those future projects, the next section of this Chapter applies principles 
derived from the public international law of self-defense to Attorney General Holder’s defense of 
the United States’ targeted assassination of Al-Quaeda operatives by remote operated drones16 
and to George Zimmerman’s putative use of defensive force to kill Trayvon Martin.17  This 
analysis suggests relative advantages of comparative law over originalism in distinguishing 
between principled and abusive reliance on the right to self-defense.
18
  The introductory Chapter 
then concludes by outlining the remaining Chapters of the thesis (all but one of which have been 
published), explaining their over-arching themes and connections, and linking them to the 
questions I will explore in my future projects on the right to self-defense.   
 
Questions Left Open by Heller and McDonald 
                                                     
13
 See pp. 19-23 infra. 
14
 See pp. 23-28 infra. 
15
 See, e.g., http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/15/dave-mustaine-megadeth-
si_n_1784525.html, in which the lead singer of heavy metal band Megadeath maintains that 
Aurora was staged to provide a pretext for gun control; and http://gunowners.org/a7302012.html, 
maintaining that if George Zimmerman were in the Aurora movie theatre, he would have stopped 
the shooter.  
16
 See pp. 23-28 infra. 
17
 See pp. 28-32 infra. 
18
 See pp. 33-36 infra. 
8 
 
 The Supreme Court’s recent foray into the arena of armed self-defense has, as the well-
worn cliché would have it, opened more questions than it has answered.  Indeed, Heller and 
MacDonald actually answer very few questions concerning the scope of policy options 
permissible to national, state, and local legislatures and administrative bureaus.
19
  The holding in 
the two cases is that the Constitution protects “the individual right to possess and carry weapons 
in case of confrontation,”20 but that this right is subject to “reasonable regulation.”21  The Court’s 
binding legal instructions, then, are cast in very general terms.  We know after Heller and 
McDonald that neither national nor state government may render it all but impossible for an 
individual to keep and have access in the home to an operational handgun of a sort commonly 
owned by the general public for purposes of self-defense.
22
  We know that the same restrictions 
apply against national legislative authority as apply against the states and municipalities.
23
  And 
we know that, according to dicta uttered by Justice Scalia in Heller and echoed by Justice Alito 
in McDonald, laws relating to control and prohibition of unusual or particularly dangerous 
weapons, possession of weapons by convicted felons or the insane, and access to weapons in 
certain sensitive places such as schools and government buildings are presumptively unaffected 
by the constitutional right to arms.
24
  But that is probably the full extent of our knowledge.  
Neither legislators, administrators, nor the general public have yet been instructed by the 
Supreme Court as to how the newly recognized constitutional right to armed self-defense 
impacts laws concerning: 
                                                     
19
 Cf. Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second 
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012). 
20
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 592; McDonald, 130 S.Ct at 3050. 
21
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625; McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3047. 
22
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3050. 
23
 McDonald, 130 S.Ct. 3050. 
24
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3047. 
9 
 
1) Carrying weapons outside the home,   
2) Carrying weapons inside a vehicle, 
3) Self-defense outside the home or in vehicles, 
4) Limitations on the number of weapons individuals may own, 
5) Waiting periods, 
6) Conditioning gun ownership on psychological evaluation,  
7) Inspections of weapons, 
8) Taxation, 
9) Sport shooting, 
10) Hunting, 
11) Gun collecting, 
12) Licensure, 
13) Registration, 
14) Mandatory safety training, 
15) Restrictions on gun ownership arguably analogous to but not directly within the 
categories of presumptively permissible regulations listed by Justices Scalia and 
Alito, 
16) Weapons related to service in the lawfully established militia (there is some irony 




                                                     
25
 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), was the most important Supreme Court 
decision on the Second Amendment prior to Heller.  Miller was distinguished and not overturned 
in Heller, but for decades constitutionalists and Courts of Appeal had agreed nearly unanimously 
that Miller restricted the Second Amendment right to weapons linked to service in the lawfully 
established militia.  In Miller, Justice McReynolds wrote “In the absence of any evidence tending 
10 
 
In the nearly five years since the Heller decision, over 100 gun-rights-related cases have 
been docketed or decided in United States Courts of Appeals.
26
  All of the questions listed above 
and others linking Second Amendment-related claims to other constitutional values such as 
freedom of expression
27
 or freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
28
 are now being 
litigated, and in the absence of particular instructions from the Supreme Court, federal and state 
courts have applied varying standards of review ranging from permissive
29
 to differing iterations 
of intermediate scrutiny.
30
  So far, however, only one post-Heller federal Court of Appeals case 
has upheld a right to arms based challenge to government action.  The Seventh Circuit has issued 
a preliminary injunction against the City of Chicago, lifting a ban on firing ranges in the City of 
Chicago that rendered compliance with a hand gun licensing scheme requiring one hour of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in 
length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well 
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and 
bear such an instrument.”  Id. at 178. 
26
 List on file with author.  As of August, 2012, Federal Courts of Appeal have decided 
101 cases involving post-Heller Second Amendment claims.  See also Adam Winkler, Heller’s 
Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1565 (2009) (“By January 15, 2009, lower federal courts had 
decided over seventy-five different cases challenging gun control laws under the Second 
Amendment.”).   
27
 Nordyke v King, 664 F.3d 776, 793 (9
th
 Cir. 2011) (Court rejects gun rights claim 
premised on expressive conduct doctrine under First Amendment); cf. Darrel A. H. Miller, Guns 
as Smut; Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 
(2009)(exploring analogies between the Second Amendment right described in Heller and the 
First Amendment protected right to possess obscene materials in the home). 
28
 United States v. Derrick, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76540 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2012). 
29
 See, e.g., United States v. Vongxay, 594 F. 3d 1111, 1117 (9
th
 Cir. 2010). 
            
30
 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7
th
 Cir. 2010) (upholding 
prohibition on convicted felon possession of firearms in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as substantially 
related to an important government interest); United States v. Carter, 669 F. 3d 411 (4th Cir. 
2012) (upholding 18 U.S.C. 922 (g) as reasonably related to substantial government interest); 
United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that heightened scrutiny is 
triggered only where a regulation substantially burdens the Second Amendment right).  
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annual training burdensome, thereby vitiating the right to have a handgun to defend the home.
31
  
In reaching its decision to enjoin the firing range ban, the Court noted that Second Amendment 
standards are still emerging, making it difficult for trial courts to apply the still largely undefined 
right with precision.  In this light, understanding the theoretical underpinnings of the new right 
acquires considerable practical import.  I would like to suggest that going forward there must be 
better alternatives than originalism, especially originalism premised on patently false history. 
 
The Limits of Originalism 
 The original public meaning methodology expounded by the Heller and McDonald Court 
does not correlate well with the non-militia-linked right to armed private self-defense voted into 
life by a one justice majority in each case.
32
  The substantive right with which the Court was 
ultimately concerned—i.e. the right of individual persons to be armed in anticipation of the need 
to defend themselves against private aggression—was simply not discussed, or was discussed 
only marginally, when the young Republic took up the question of ratifying the Amendment.
33
  
Indeed, it is not far off the mark to reflect on two unrelated conversations that have little if any 
intersection.  One conversation, spanning the years 1788-91, concerned principally the virtues of 
the universal militia and the dangers of standing armies, while a separate conversation, playing 
itself out in our own time, concerns the liberty of individuals to guard against the criminal 
element.  It is more than passing strange that disputants in the second conversation should look 
                                                     
31
 See Ezell v. City of Chicago, CA 7 (2012) at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-
circuit/1573261.html. 
32
 Cf. Winkler, supra note 26, noting that even though Heller has been hailed by some as 
a triumph of originalism, the decision actually rests on current popular understanding of the right 
to arms, and suggesting that this logical inconsistency actually strengthens the opinion by 
making it more relevant and more likely to endure. 
33
 See detailed discussion in Chapters 9 and 10 below. 
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to the long gone participants in the first for validation and approval.   Perhaps there is even a hint 
of the tragic-comedic when present political actors appeal to past authority, claiming 
involvement in a conversation that logically cannot become real.
34
  And yet, as Professor Jamal 
Greene trenchantly argues, originalism is all too real to ignore, because it has political currency 
and appeal, and this insures it will to some measure shape law in a more or less democratic polity 
– or at least that it will do so as long as its political appeal endures.35 
 Originalism may be a false philosophy,
36
 yet it is anything but impotent.  The tragedy of 
orginalism then is of a different nature than Belshazzar’s appeal to gods of wood and iron or 
Canute’s imploring Wotan to command the North Sea to stand still.  For a false god, originalism 
has a lot of clout.  That power, though, has its limits.  As deployed in contemporary 
constitutional politics, originalist methodology is more concerned about dressing up and 
justifying intuitions than offering enlightenment or informing normative vision.  Not that 
“conversation” with the past need be a corrupt enterprise.  Efforts to “read,” “discover,” “dis-
cover,” “uncover,” “deconstruct,” “reconstruct,” or “enter” the founding era past have yielded 
rich enlightenment in the textual explorations of many non-originalist historians of the 
                                                     
34
 For a series of essays on originalism as comedy and farce, see DANIEL A. FARBER & 
SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). 
35
 Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009). 
36
 See, e.g., re. the dubious historical pretensions of original public meaning originalism, 
Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular 
Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J. OF L. AND HUMANITIES, 
295 (2011); Martin Flaherty, “History Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. 
L. REV. 523 (1995); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-
Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (1996).  See, e.g., re. the shortcomings of original intent-based 
model of originalism largely supplanted by the original public meaning school, Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.  L. REV. 204 (1980); Mark 
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); Michael Dorf & Lawrence Tribe, Levels of Generality in the 





  To be meaningful and transformative, however, excursions into bygone 
worlds require modesty, effort, study, and perspective if they are not to end up bogged down in 
the banal and narcissistic projections of presentist voyeurs.  There is a world of difference 
between the careful reconstructive archetechtonics of, say, Eric Slauter’s The State as a Work of 
Art, in which now dead metaphors reanimate as powerful leitmotifs,
38
 and Heller, in which 





The Limits of Ancestor Worship 
Apart from the problem of indeterminacy that bedevils original public meaning and 
original intent-based originalism alike, and the susceptibility of historical evidence to 
manipulation by advocates and results-oriented judges, and apart from normative questions 
associated with the dead hand of the democratically deficient past,
40
 there remain telling 
prudential reasons not to adhere slavishly to policy preferences of bygone days, even when 
clever jurists manage to articulate avowedly “neutral reasons” for doing just that.  A the risk of 
indelicacy, salient prudence-based reasons for shunning past practice focus on the problem that 
for those who accept the existence or even the possibility of human progress, the United States in 
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 See, e.g., ROBERT A. FERGUSON, READING THE EARLY REPUBLIC (2006); JAY 
FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, AND THE CULTURE 
OF PERFORMANCE (1993); PETER S. ONUF, JEFFERSON’S EMPIRE: THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICAN 
NATIONHOOD (2000). 
38
 ERIC SLAUTER, THE STATE AS A WORK OF ART: THE CULTURAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009). 
39
 The image of “standard model” Second Amendment enthusiasts as historical raiders is 
developed with telling acumen in Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest State of 
Originalism, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 103. 
40
 For more on these ills, consult FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 34. 
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which the Constitution was framed was infinitely more barbarous than the United States of 
today.
41
  As Jefferson reflected nearly 200 years ago,  
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But laws and 
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that 
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new 
truths discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of 
circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We 
might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as 




Jefferson appears to have contemplated less rigid adherence to the frozen norms of 
yesteryear than Justice Scalia had in mind in Heller.  Of course, Justice Scalia’s adherence to 
ancient values allegedly written into constitutional text is – at least nominally – conditional.  As 
he wrote in his United States v. Virginia dissent "to counterbalance the Court's criticism of our 
ancestors, let me say a word in their praise:  they left us free to change.”43  But the claim that 
norms discovered in two hundred year old constitutional text are immune to charges associated 
with the dead hand of the past because they are subject to alteration by the amendment process is 
quite problematic.  Writing that our fictive ancestors left “us” free to change presupposes that 
they had a capacity to bind “us” in the first place and that they might legitimately bind us not 
only to norms but to onerous procedures required to surmount those norms’ deep entrenchment.  
                                                     
41
 To contextualize the founding generation’s fascination with barbarism, modernity, and 
human progress, consider J.G.A. POCOCK, BARBARISM AND RELIGION (6 vols. 1999- ) (analyzing 
and situating EDWARD GIBBON’S DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (1776)). 
42
 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) (inscription at the 
Jefferson Memorial, Washington D.C.).  As the letter to Kercheval suggests, Jefferson’s 
characteristically enlightened faith in human progress endured well into the Age of 
Romanticism.  Consider also the following admonition against unthinking devotion to the ways 
of the past:  "When I contemplate the immense advances in science and discoveries in the arts 
which have been made within the period of my life, I look forward with confidence to equal 
advances by the present generation, and have no doubt they will consequently be as much wiser 
than we have been as we than our fathers were, and they than the burners of witches."  Thomas 
Jefferson, Letter to Benjamin Waterhouse, 1818.  PAUL LEICESTER FORD, WRITINGS OF 
JEFFERSON, MANUSCRIPT EDITION, 15:164.  
43
   United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Jefferson’s remarks on the dubiousness of authority from barbarous times thus adumbrate a 
larger problem about originalism:  The founders’ intent about intent is anything but clear.44  An 
original public meaning oriented originalist might glibly retort that intent is irrelevant (because 
the public meaning orginalist says only original public meaning matters).  Whatever the 
relevance of intent to modern constitutional understanding, it is not clear that the ratifying 
generation was any less skeptical about the normative capacity of their language to bind a future 
body politic in perpetuity than Jefferson was about the desirability of his generation visiting its 
political preferences on those not yet born.    
 
Federalism and Democratic Experimentalism 
Considerations of federalism and democratic experimentalism also caution against 
mapping out a future dependant on alleged original public understanding of a private right to 
arms.
45
  In a federal system like that of the United States, with numerous jurisdictions with 
substantial legislative authority, the best way to maximize the happiness of the largest number of 
persons may well be to allow local legislatures to experiment in the fashion suggested by Louis 
Brandeis
46
 and offer residents different packages of immunities, obligations, government 
services, and taxes.  Those who cherish guns will naturally gravitate towards gun friendly 
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  See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HAR. L. 
REV. 885 (1985). 
45
 On democratic experimentalism see generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).  
46
 “It is one of the happy incidents of a federal system that a single courageous state may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”  New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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jurisdictions, while those who believe public safety is better served by gun control will gravitate 
towards jurisdictions with substantial restrictions on gun ownership.
47
 
 My preferred option rests on two premises.  First, the Supreme Court’s view that 
constitutional text mandates a strong right to guns even outside the context of service in the 
lawfully established militia is not (as Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas insist it is) dictated by 
the original public meaning of the constitutional text when it was ratified.  In fact, as I explain in 
                                                     
47
 Pat Hubbard, my colleague at the University of South Carolina School of Law, has 
suggested a potentially serious reservation against the democratic experimentalism based 
argument that freedom of movement allows those who object to majority preferences to “vote 
with their feet” and move to another jurisdiction where majority preferences mirror their own.   
For Professor Hubbard, this argument is uncomfortably similar to the intolerant refrain of 
patriots during the era of the Vietnam War, who embraced the mantra “America – love it or leave 
it,” and urged those who objected to the war to forsake their citizenship on grounds of 
ideological impurity.  As Hubbard explains, leaving ones home is entirely too high a price to pay 
for the privilege of favoring policies not endorsed by the majority of voters in the jurisdiction.  I 
counter that minority or officious individual veto of majority-favored policies is not without 
enormous social and utilitarian costs in its own right.  When Officer Heller won his case, the 
results were hardly Pareto neutral, or even Kaldor Hicks efficient.  The majority of District of 
Columbia residents were not rendered more happy and content by the decision, and arguably 
public safety (or at least majority favored policies respecting public safety) were adversely 
impacted as well. 
Perhaps the most extreme variant of the voting with your feet modality of democratic-
experimentalism is that espoused by the radical U.S. expat academic Jonathon Moses who argues 
that freedom of migration across international borders will maximize civic contentment allowing 
all of humanity to participate in a global market for packages of government policies, services, 
and protections, JONATHAN W. MOSES, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: GLOBALISM’S LAST 
FRONTIER (2006).  I applaud Moses for being willing to pursue the principle to which he adheres 
to their ultimate limits.  But when I heard him make the case for open borders at a plenary 
session of the European Association of American Studies Conference at the University of Oslo in 
2008, the overwhelming sense among Northern hemisphere academics and policy makers 
attending seemed to be the severe free rider problems associated with immigrants seeking out 
advantageous benefit plans that they had not helped finance through a life-time of taxation would 
doom a world wide open borders strategy to the same sort of race to the bottom difficulties that 
vexed the United States in the early twentieth century prior to the establishment of the modern 
American regulatory state during the New Deal.  My more modest argument respecting the 
Second Amendment does not concern social and economic rights that require financing by 
means of onerous taxes.  Unlike Moses’ scheme, offering U.S. citizens different packages of gun 





 the original public meaning of the Second Amendment did not extend to arms 
possession outside the context of militia service at all, and, according to the careful quantitative 
research of historian Nathan Kozuskanich, well over ninety-five percent of uses of the phrase 
“bear arms” and its cognates surviving in pamphlets, journals, books, and recorded legislative 
debates in late colonial British North American and in the early Republic unambiguously refer to 
militia service or military duty.
49
  Second, contra to many strong libertarians, I do not assume 
that Pareto optimality is the touchstone of all legitimate government action.  According to Pareto, 
no government action is justified that leaves any single person worse off than he or she was 
before the government intervention.
50
  Thus, redistributive taxes would be illegitimate, because 
many wealthy persons object to paying higher taxes than poor persons. But Pareto optimality is 
too harsh a standard.  It is in fact an injunction against virtually all governmental action.  To take 
an extreme example, the Thirteenth Amendment is not Pareto optimal, because some plantation 
owners were unhappy after abolition of slavery.  Unlike strict disciples of Pareto, my general 
sense is that majority preferences can in many instances be legitimately enforced against a 
dissenting minority.  Federalism and Brandeisian experimentalism provide one safeguard against 
majority abuses.  After all, when it comes to guns, we can be fairly confident that a great many 
states in the U.S. will opt for permissive rules in the foreseeable future.  Many people (including 
of course Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas) believe that judicial enforcement of the Second 
Amendment provides another essential security.  I read the text of the Constitution differently, 
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 See Chapters 8 & 9, comprising Merkel, The District of Columbia v. Heller and 
Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. R. 349 (2009), and 
Merkel, Heller as Hubris and How McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change the 
Constitutional World as We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV.  1221 (2010). 
49
 Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right to Bear 
Arms, 29 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 585, 587 (2009). 
50
 See Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, 16-20 (8
th
 ed. 2011). 
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and I am convinced that most individuals would have shared my view when the text was enacted 
and ratified. 
Alleged plain meaning and original public understanding of constitutional text are not the 
only plausible claims in favor of allowing what Alexander Bickel called counter-majoritarian 
intervention by the judiciary.
51
  Before the rise of originalism, public choice theory as reflected 
in the work of John Hart Ely
52
 and still more famously in Carolene Products Footnote Four
53
 set 
out three criteria under which the normal default rule protecting legislative preferences against 
judicial intervention might yield.  The first paragraph of then Justice Stone’s famous Footnote 
invoked express prohibitions in constitutional text, the second paragraph spoke of unworkable 
impasses in the political process created by the corrupting influence of entrenched and 
unyielding power, and the third paragraph most famously of all described the case of discreet and 
insular minorities who might be targets of deliberate majority abuse.  If I am right about the text 
of the Second Amendment, the judicially created right to arms clearly falls outside Paragraph 
One of Carolene Products Footnote Four, because the text concerns only arms bearing in the 
militia. I am very much inclined to think that Paragraph Two of Footnote Four is likewise 
inadmissible as a special claim for judicial intervention on behalf of gun rights, because if 
anything, gun advocates have succeeded in rigging the local, state, and national political 
processes against gun control legislation.
54
  Paragraph Three may have some purchase on the 
local level in cosmopolitan urban settings, but it is by no means clear to me that officious 
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 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
52
 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
53
 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
54
 See, e.g., Sari Horwitz & James V. Grimaldi, NRA-led Gun Lobby Wields Powerful 
Influence Over ATF, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2010, but one installment of a long series of pieces 
by Horwitz and Grimaldi exploring the influence of the NRA in Washington.  
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intermeddlers from Montana or Alabama should enjoy veto power by judicial proxy over the 
decisions of elected legislatures in New York City or Chicago.
55
  When it comes to gun rights on 
the national plane, the Third Paragraph seems wholly inapplicable, seeing as gun enthusiasts are 
probably not a minority at all, they are certainly not discreet and insular, and thanks to 
Brandeisian experimentalism, they are always free to leave San Francisco or D.C. for more 
congenial climes. 
Another migration-related consideration (this one invoking Jonathan Moses’ global 
variation of Brandeisian experimentalism
56) gives me pause respecting the Supreme Court’s 
recent fabrication of a private right to weapons possession and its incorporation against the 
states.  As far as I know, a right to weapons possession is not considered fundamental in any 
legal system outside the United States.  I do not know of any international human rights 
instrument or any constitution in another society with a well-developed system of justice that 
protects a right to guns.  This causes me to wonder whether the right in question is really 
fundamental in character.  Perhaps it is merely an American idiosyncrasy.  That said, the right to 
self-defense, particularly the right to self-defense in contexts where government cannot or does 
not protect individuals claiming the right, is acknowledged around the world.
57
  This realization 
                                                     
55
 The problematic character of single person veto over policies favored by the majority is 
illustrated most poignantly in the case of eighteenth century Poland, where every aristocrat in the 
numerous hereditary upper house enjoyed the “liberum veto,” i.e. the capacity to block policy 
favored by the majority in both houses and the executive.  This rendered Poland incapable of 
responding to foreign aggression, leading ultimately to the state’s partition, annexation, and 
disappearance.  See http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/the-senate-becomes-a-polish-
joke/ (Paul Krugman op ed. exploring contemporary parallels) and NORMAN DAVIES, GOD’S 
PLAYGROUND: A HISTORY OF POLAND: VOL. 1 TO 1795 (1979) (leading English language study 
of eighteenth century Polish political history). 
56
 See MOSES, supra note 47. 
57
 In public international law, serious comparative reflection on the nature of self-defense 
in different municipal legal systems goes back at least to the time of the Suez Crisis, when D.W. 
Bowett developed the claim that an international legal right to (collective) self-defense 
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likewise causes me to think that it might be more sensible to discuss self-defense on its own 
merits even in our own country, rather than treat it as a legacy of constitutional language 
addressed to a militia system the nation abandoned long ago. 
 
Insights from the Law of War 
 I have argued that originalism offers inadequate normative guidance respecting the 
meaning of the right to self-defense in contemporary American law in large part because there is 
little substantive overlap between the founding era conversation respecting the meaning of the 
Second Amendment and current debates concerning the right to self-defense.  There is however a 
very substantial body of contemporary legal discourse that yields rich insights, attracts powerful 
contributions from around the world, and overlaps in substance to a very large degree with 
contemporary American concerns regarding self-defense as a fundamental right under municipal 
law.  This body of law is jus ad bellum, the international law governing the initial application of 
force that may or may not engender armed conflict.
58
 
As long ago as the Caroline Dispute of 1837-1842, involving British use of force against 
a ship used by American soldiers of fortune to assist insurgents in Canada, U.S. Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster and British Minster to the United States Lord Ashburton were able to agree 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(including anticipatory self-defense) was inherent in the general principles of international law 
because a municipal analogue existed in legal systems around the world.  See D. W. BOWETT, 
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958) (expanding arguments first set out in the British 
Year Book of International Law in 1955/56). 
58
 The municipal analogy, exploring self-defense under the law of armed conflict and 
self-defense in municipal law under to the same principles of analytic jurisprudence is developed 
powerfully in GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, 
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL – VOLUME ONE: FOUNDATIONS (2007) and GEORGE P. 




on the basic analytic outlines of justified self-defense in international law.
59
  The jurisprudence 
of the International Court of Justice has added precision and gloss (and at times, some confusion) 
to the legal regime explaining when defensive force is justified.  A state’s lawful resort to 
defense force must target an actual armed attack, and that attack must rise to the level of being 
“significant.”60  Whether the use of defensive force against an imminent but not yet executed 
attack is legal is hotly debated;
61
 the Bush Doctrine purporting to justify the use of force against 
mere potential (but not imminent) threats has been almost universally repudiated.
62
  The Court 
itself has never embraced the right to defend against anything other than an actual attack.  To act 
lawfully, the defending state must use force against the party responsible for the attack.
63
  Finally 
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 John E. Noyes, “The Caroline: International Law Limits on Resort to Force,” in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 263 (John E. Noyes, Laura Dickinson & Mark W. Janis eds., 
2007). 
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 Cf. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 29-35 (Dec. 15) (U.K. use of 
naval force to clear mines unlawful since the deployment did not serve the purpose of defending 
against an armed attack) and The Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14 (June 27)(Nicaragua’s sending of assistance to 
El Salvadoran rebels in the form of weapons and logistical support not a significant armed attack 
justifying the use of defense force by the intervening United States) . 
61
 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 357-363 (2d ed. 2005).  The I.C.J. has never 
expressly endorsed anticipatory self-defense, but state practice and publicists go both ways.  I 
find a terminological distinction between anticipatory self-defense against an imminent attack 
(consider Lord Ashburton’s formulation of instant and overwhelming necessity or the situation 
of Israel in 1967 when combined Egyptian/Syrian armies massed on the borders and President 
Nasser announced his intention to destroy Israel) and preemptive self-defense (consider the Bush 
doctrine purporting to justify strikes against potential threats) cogent and useful.  State practice 
suggests that at least some acts of anticipatory self-defense are not viewed as illegal.  In contrast, 
Bush Doctrine style preemptive self-defense has been endorsed by no authorities outside the 
United States.  
62
 W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of 
Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525 (2006). 
63
  Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6) (U.S. strikes on Iranian oil 
platforms unlawful where it was unclear whether prior attacks were carried out by Iranian or 
Iraqi forces), Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).  The controversial advisory opinion on 
the Wall has been read by some commentators including Professors George Fletcher and Jens 
Ohlin to permit the use of defensive force only against attacks by states, but if this is what the 
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and crucially, the defending state’s use of force must be necessary to repulse an actual attack, 
and it must be proportional in the sense of not exceeding the level of force required to effectively 
defend against that attack.
64
 
The I.C.J. is the principal judicial organ of the U.N., and its opinions on the use of force 
draw heavily on two specific provisions of the U.N. Charter, Article 2(4) prohibiting “the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and Article 51presrving “the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs.”  However there 
is nothing in the I.C.J.’s jurisprudence to suggest that the normative content of the law of self-
defense is depends primarily on the Charter text.  In fact, the Nicaragua Case, perhaps the I.C.J.’s 
most important decision on the use of force and the scope of lawful (collective) self-defense, 
relied on customary international law, not the U.N. Charter.
65
  It is fair to say then that the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
I.C.J. intended, the opinion in the Wall is inconsistent with prior opinions (Case Concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities) and reason.  Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell argues that 
the advisory opinion only speaks to the legitimate use of defensive force under the U.N. Charter, 
holding out the possibility that Israel might legally defend against non-state actors as long as the 
legal basis for that action is something other than the U.N. Charter – perhaps jus cogens, 
customary international law, natural law, or general principles of law.  But since Article 51 
speaks to the inherent right of self-defense, a more natural assumption is that the Charter 
provision on the use of defensive force merely incorporates existing international law, in which 
case O’Connell’s position becomes incoherent and the advisory opinion indefensible.   
64
 Oil Platforms (U.S. destruction of Iranian platforms neither necessary to defend against 
any attack or proportionate to the threat of imminent attack in the form of further missile 
launches), Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 1966 I.C.J. 266 
(July 8) (Use or threat of use of nuclear weapons exceedingly unlikely to satisfy necessity and 
proportionality requirements except in extreme case where survival of a state or people 
threatened).    
65
 The Vandenberg Amendment, attached by the United States Senate as a reservation to 
the Declaration acknowledging the compulsory ipso facto jurisdiction of the I.C.J,. precluded the 
Court from taking cases involving the U.S. where legal issues to be decided depended on 
construction of a multi-lateral treaty (including the U.N. Charter) unless all states parties to the 
treaty affected by the case were joined as parties.  The U.S. argued that its use of force against 
Nicaragua was justifiable as an exercise of collective self-defense on behalf of El Salvador, 
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I.C.J.’s jurisprudence of self-defense does far more than parse the text of the Charter, it draws 
also on customary international law and general principles of law to flush out the elements and 
contours of the international right to legitimate self-defense. 
It is precisely these insights from general principles of law and customary international 
law that I argue offer a principled alternative to originalism for those seeking to develop the 
newly acknowledged constitutional right to self-defense and apply it to pressing contemporary 
problems under municipal law.
66
  In this light, it is particularly worth noting that the legal 
principle that states have a right to self- defense implies that states have a right to be armed.  
Indeed Alfred Verdross, the earliest expositor of the foundational principle of modern 
international law that jus cogens rules may not yield to competing rules of lesser normative 
value, used treaties rendering a state unable to defend itself as a principal illustrative example of 
a rule-making forbidden by jus cogens.
67
  But to say states may be armed is hardly to say that 
they have an unlimited and immutable right to weaponry.  As the I.C.J.’s Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons reminds us, it has been a fundamental 
principle of Hague law for a century that the capacity to inflict suffering on an attacker or the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Honduras, and Costa Rica.  Since the latter three states were not parties to the case, issues under 
the Charter were not opposable against the U.S.  The Court decided the merits based on 
customary international law regarding the use of force, citing the U.N. Charter provisions on the 
use of force as evidence of customary international law.  The U.S. withdrew its Declaration 
recognizing the compulsory ipso facto jurisdiction of the I.C.J. to highlight its objects to the 
Court’s decision in the jurisdictional phase of the case prior to the decision on the merits.  
66
 Resort to foreign and international materials in the context of deciding U.S. cases is 
itself the subject of famous controversy among the justices of the Supreme Court.  It is perhaps 
not surprising that those committed to orginalism are most hostile to consideration of non-U.S. 
sources, even for purposes of developing general principles of law already inherent in American 
jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, A Conversation Between U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005). 
67
 Alfred von Verdrsoss, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 571 
(1937).  Verdross path-breaking article has an interesting double-edged quality in that it can be 
easily read to delegitimize both the punitive aspects of the Versailles Treaty and looming Nazi 
aggression against Austria and Czechoslovakia.  
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enemy is not unlimited.
68
  In the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 states consented to the 
first modern arms control limitations, and the global arms control regime now extends beyond 
bans on poison gases and exploding bullets to prohibitions and limitations respecting nuclear 
weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, landmines, and cluster munitions.
69
  To pursue 
the municipal analogy back to its foundations, consenting to these limitations reflects in real 
terms the same calculus among states that Hobbes, Locke, and Blackstone attribute to individuals 
at the formation of the social contract, that is, a decision to accept binding and enforceable 




Reflections on Drones and the Comments of Attorney General Eric Holder and President Carter 
 Reflecting on the most salient question currently confronting the United States under the 
international law of self-defense suggests provisional insights that might help us constructively 
rethink debates about the limits of self-defense under American municipal law brought to 
prominence by George Zimmerman’s shooting of Trayvon Martin.  Let me begin with some 
observations concerning the use of drones against Al Qaeda operatives. 
The deployment of unmanned drones for purposes (depending on one’s perspective) of 
precise military strikes or targeted assassinations
70
 has generated enormous controversy 
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 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996 I.C.J. 226 
(July 8). 
69
 See generally MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: 
CASES AND MATERIALS, 665-720 (2d ed. 2009). 
70
 The controversy surrounding targeted assassination in the context of the War on Terror 
extends well beyond issues directly tied to the use of drones.  A new book by a pseudonymous 
author claiming to be a Navy Seal involved in the U.S. military raid that killed Osama Bin Laden 
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worldwide controversy during the Obama presidency.
71
  In particular, Attorney General Eric 
Holder’s defense of drone attacks on terrorist targets in his speech on the national security policy 
of the United States delivered at Northwestern University on March 5, 2012 has provoked heated 
debate.
72
  Those whose sense of nationalism easily flares into febrile patriotic ire have expressed 
singular outrage at governmental policies targeting U.S. citizens for assassination.  In many 
instances, the underlying intuitive assumption of those offended by the Attorney General’s 
remarks appears to be that good government may do what it wishes to others, but it may not kill 
citizens except by lawful execution—by which means it may kill them in abundance.  But less 
jingoistic and violence prone thinkers have also condemned Holder’s remarks, and it is likely the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
in Abottobad, Pakistan holds out that the object of the mission was assassination, and that there 
were no plans to attempt to arrest or take Bin Laden prisoner.  See MARK OWEN, NO EASY DAY 
(2012).  
71
  Commentary and analysis—whether popular, political, and academic—on drone 
strikes, and more broadly, targeted assassinations, is voluminous.  See, e.g., The Public 
Committee Against Torture in Israel & Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights 
and the Environment v Government of Israel & Others (Supreme Court of Israel: Dec. 11, 2005); 
David Kretzmer, Targeted Killings of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial executions or 
Legitimate Means of Self-Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171 (2005); Richard Murphy & Asheen 
John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405 (2009); 
Speech of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser of U.S. Dept. of State, Address to the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington D.C., Mar. 25, 2010; Report 
of the Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Study on Targeted Killings (UN Doc. A/HRC/14/l4/Add. 6), May 28, 2010; Mary Ellen 
O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, Notre 
Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43 (July 2010); Robert Chesney, Who 
May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki As A Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of Legal 
Force, 13 Y.B. INT'L HUM. L. 3 (2010); Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of 
Targeted Killing, 1 HAR. NAT’L SEC. J. 145 (2010); Kenneth Anderson, "Targeted Killing and 
Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether there Is 'A Legal Geography of War'," 
Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2011-16; John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, 
Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. PENNUmbra 175 (2011); 
Tara Mckelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2011; Charlie Savage, Secret 
U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill A Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, October 8, 2011; David Cole, 
Killing Citizens in Secret, New York Review of Books Blog, Oct. 9, 2011; Justifying the Killing 
of An American, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011; David Cole, Killing Our Citizens Without Trial, 
New York Review of Books, Nov. 24, 2011; The Power to Kill, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2012. 
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 See http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html 
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national security strategy outlined by the Attorney General as much as the long train of abuses at 
Guantanamo that sparked President Carter’s New York Times op ed condemning the Obama 
Administration for continuing the dismal system of human rights violations first set in motion by 
a subcabinet Torture Team during the George W. Bush’s first term.73 
President Carter is of course correct that by the standards of international human rights 
and procedural fairness in criminal prosecution, targeted assassination is barbarous and wholly 
indefensible.  But everything depends on the selection of governing paradigm.  The claim that 
under the law of armed conflict necessary and proportionate force (including lethal force) may be 
used to prevent an imminent armed attack or thwart an ongoing attack by an actor who happens 
to be a citizen is not terribly shocking.  It is in fact an entirely orthodox understanding of the jus 
ad bellum as articulated as long ago as the Caroline Affair.  Admittedly, contemporary 
authorities are split on the legality of anticipatory self-defense in the case of an attack that is 
imminent but not yet actual, but since 1967 at least the trend among publicists and in state 
practice has been towards acknowledging the rightfulness of acting once an aggressor is poised 
to launch an imminent strike.  And for present purposes, it is not analytically necessary to 
premise a coherent argument in favor of the use of defense force against Al Qaeda on the 
imminence of any future attacks, for Al Qaeda openly acknowledges that it has attacked the U.S. 
and that its conflict against the U.S. continues unabated.  If a state of armed conflict continues to 
exist between the U.S. and Al Qaeda, then members of Al Qaeda, U.S. nationals included, are 
presumably not civilians but legitimate military targets of the U.S. subject to the restrictions 
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 Jimmy Carter’s New York Times op ed “A Cruel and Unusual Record” appeared June 
24, 1012 and is available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/opinion/americas-shameful-
human-rights-record.html?_r=4.  On the Bush era origins of the policies Carter critiques see 
PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: THE WHISTLE-BLOWING ACCOUNT OF HOW BUSH AND BLAIR 
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imposed by the jus in bello as elucidated by the Attorney General.  In other words, if armed 
conflict exists, the U.S. may target Al Qaeda members whether or not they are attacking or about 
to attack the U.S. or U.S. nationals. 
That said, several things disturb me profoundly about the Attorney General's comments at 
Northwestern.  First, there is the assumption that the Fifth Amendment applies only or 
principally to US citizens, which makes no sense textually, since the rights it protects are those 
of "persons."
74
  If text does not support limiting the Fifth Amendment to citizens, what does?  Is 
it suspicious that "Americans" form a master race, or that "non Americans," in words that might 
come from Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott, have no rights that the US government is bound to 
respect?  Secondly, I wonder what purpose other than pandering to jingoists is served by 
extraneous invocations of originalism.  What the founding fathers thought about the applicability 
of the law of armed conflict to US action against US citizens is not obviously relevant, but rather 
more obviously something about which Holder does not know very much.  Finally, there is 
(especially towards the end) a nod to American exceptionalism, which likewise serves no legally 
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 Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), where Chief Justice 
Rehnquist reasoned that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the warrantless seizure of 
evidence found in the home of a Mexican national in Mexico by U.S. agents, since the Fourth 
Amendment protects the “right of the people” of the Untied States.  This reasoning was rejected 
in vigorous dissents by Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) and Justice Blackmun, who 
maintained that constitutional restraints on governmental abuse apply to all action by U.S. and 
state officers anywhere in the world.  This universal and non-racist approach to judicial 
enforcement of individual rights echoed Justice Murphy’s classic dissent in Yamashita v. Styer. 
327 U.S. 1, 66 (1946).  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on the Fourth Amendment’s textual 
linkage to “people” suggests that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rights of persons may 
apply globally against abuse by U.S. and state governmental actors, while the Second 
Amendment guarantee, like the Fourth, applies only in favor of “the people” of the United States.   
This line of reasoning leads to incongruous consequences respecting the constitutional right to 
arms, which under might Verdugo Urquidez could protect non-U.S. nationals against abuse by 
state governmental actors since by the terms of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment it is incorporated in favor of any “person,” but leave non-U.S. citizens unprotected 




analytic purpose, and which I am also inclined to write off to pandering.  But I will say this:  In 
accepting the binding and outcome determinative character of international law, Holder has 
conceded much more than his predecessors in the Bush administration would have been likely to 
do, and on that score at least, the speech represents a salubrious development.
75
  Still, as George 
Fletcher pointed out a decade ago in the immediate aftermath of September 11, the U.S. 
government’s blending of the law enforcement and armed conflict legal regimes not only leads to 
analytically unclear thinking, but easily promotes miscarriages of justice and warping of norms 
that may have pernicious consequences in other contexts as well.
76
  One could say much the 
same about the government’s assumption that there is a watered down version of the Constitution 
that applies in wartime respecting U.S. governmental action against non-citizens.  This is not the 
written Constitution with which I am familiar.  It is, to draw on Justice Jackson’s cautionary 
admonitions in his dissent in Korematsu, a shadow constitution that paves the way for executive 
primacy that left unchecked will grow into tyranny.
77
  The abusive powers kindly governmental 
actors wield against bad people today will form precedents for less kindly governmental actors to 
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 Consider by way of contrast the stance of John R. Bolton, United States Ambassador to 
the United Nations from 2005-2006, whose open hostility to international law was so severe that 
he routinely placed the phrase itself in quotation marks to signify his contempt.  See, e.g., John 
R. Bolton, Clinton Meets “International Law” in Kosovo, WALL ST. J., April 5, 1999 at A23.  
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Reflections on The Trayvon Martin Case and the Barbarism of Sea Slugs 
Populists on the right bewail the government’s targeted assassination of U.S. citizens.  It 
does not seem matter to them, that under the law of war, the lethal application of government 
force to an Al Qaeda fighter of U.S. nationality is analytically indistinguishable from Union 
targeting of Confederate forces during the Civil War.  Or, less charitably, it is perhaps the very 
applicability of that analogy that saps government action of legitimacy in the eyes of some 
radical antinomian populists.  For some, there is with the possible exception of the New Deal no 
clearer paradigmatic case of the federal government going too far than its forceful suppression of 
the War of Rebellion between April, 1861 and May, 1865.
79
  Perhaps I should not use the phrase 
“going too far.”  There is an ascendant strain in American libertarian thought that would hold 
any governmental action illegitimate precisely because it is governmental in character. 
But populists lament not only the government’s application of force.  They seem to resent 
even more the government’s interference with private applications of force.  Enter George 
Zimmerman, or, more to the point, many of his defenders, and champions of Stand Your Ground 
laws and citizen arrest statutes.  Max Weber’s famous aphorism that the government has a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force
80
 may not command majority assent in contemporary 
America.  Stand Your Ground laws, citizen arrest statutes, and the evisceration of the common 
law rule that the exercise lawful self-defense required the actor to retreat to a wall or ditch, 
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 See Daniel Feller, Libertarians in the Attic, or A Tale of Two Narratives, 32 REVIEWS 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 184 (2004), reviewing pseudo-historical and propagandistic neo-
Confederate writings, and TONY HORWITZ, CONFEDERATES IN THE ATTIC: DISPATCHES FROM THE 
UNFINISHED CIVIL WAR (1999), a perhaps far too sympathetic memoir of a well known 
journalist’s year-long journey among the unreconstructed.  
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 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, Lecture to the Free Students Union of Munich 
University (January 1919) (available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/ethos/Weber-
vocation.pdf).  In Weber’s words “Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
a given territory.“  (translated from the German). 
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bespeak an antinomian reversion to first principles and a severe fraying of the social fabric.  It is 
one thing to acknowledge that the police cannot be everywhere to defend the populace, and that 
it might not be desirable to live in a state where government agents where sufficiently numerous 
and officious to be just about everywhere to respond in case of emergency real or contrived.  
This suggests private self-defense as a fall back option.  It is another to prefer the state of nature 
as a matter of course, and private self-defense as the governing paradigm of human relations.
81
    
To return to the analogy between municipal and international law, the question is whether Article 
51 presents an exception to Article 2(4) or whether it swallows Article 2(4) and the international 
order of which it is a principal bulwark whole. 
The vigilante figures prominently in popular fantasy, and, perhaps, though the facts in the 
public sphere are very murky indeed, in George Zimmerman’s fantastical self-image.82  
Deciphering the complex events leading to the death of Trayvon Martin requires hard work and 
measured judgment.  So does sorting through the Florida Stand Your Ground Law and the small 
number of Florida Supreme Court cases offering guidance as to its meaning, and the perhaps 
conflicting commands of Florida’s generally applicable self-defense statute partially supplanted 
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 In extremis, this world is quite literally barbarous, or even subhuman.  An analogy 
from discourse concerning the law of nations is instructive.  Consider the noted literary critic 
Edmund Wilson’s musings on resort to armed conflict absent a coherent jus ad bellum:  “In a 
recent . . . film showing life at the bottom of the sea, a primitive organism called a sea slug is 
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Quoted in MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS, 60 (4th ed. 2006).   
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 In a different factual and statutory context, an eerily similar case captured the nation’s 
imagination in the 1980s when “subway vigilante” Bernard Goetz acted in anticipation of an 
expected attack and shot four youths who appeared menacing.  Like the shooting of Trayvon 
Martin, the Bernard Goetz case was racially inflected on the ground, in the media, and in the 
popular imagination.  See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNARD GOETZ 
AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1990).  
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by the Stand Your Ground Law.
83
  Read together, the statutes and the limited body of related 
Florida Supreme Court case law establish an incompletely theorized set of rules respecting 
partial and conditional forfeiture of the right to self-defense by initial aggressors.
84
  While parts 
of the Florida Code originate in the Model Penal Code, Florida criminal law in its current state is 
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 The “Stand Your Ground Law,” FLA. CODE ANN. § 776.013(3), states “A person who is 
not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a 
right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with 
force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prvent 
death or great bodily harm to himself or herself.”  FLA. CODE ANN. § 776.041(2) provides “The 
justification [of self-defense] is not available to a person who . . . initially provokes the use of 
force against himself or herself.”  
84
 The theoretical importance of distinguishing between claims to exercise defensive 
force asserted by someone defending the status quo, on the one hand, and an initial aggressor 
who has unsettled a previously existing state of affairs on the other, is famously associated with 
Immanuel Kant’s analysis of the case of a shipwrecked sailor attempting to dislodge another 
sailor from a floating plank that will support only one man.  See discussion in FLETCHER, 
GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 58 at 49-55.  By contrast to the muddled state of 
affairs under Florida law, consider the more highly theorized account in the German Federal 
Court’s (BGH) appellate decision of November 22, 2000 – 3 StR 331/00 reported in 
Juristenzeitung 2001, 664, with accompanying commentary by Professor Claus Roxin (author’s 
translation on file and available for consultation).  The case involves the question of whether 
lethal force was justifiable self-defense in the case of a would-be assailant who found the tables 
turned against him.  The initial aggressor, intending revenge for injuries suffered in an earlier 
incident, arranged an illegal cigarette smuggling deal with the eventual victim as a pretext for 
luring him into a forest so that he could be shot.  When the eventual victim realized that the 
initial aggressor intended to assault him, the victim struck the aggressor with a club before the 
aggressor had a chance to pull out his weapon.  At this point, the victim formed the resolution to 
kill the aggressor by means of a further club strike.  The aggressor defended himself by 
discharging a lethal double-barreled shotgun blast into the victim.  Thus, the aggressor entered 
the stage intending criminal assault.  He ultimately acted with defensive force.  The Appellate 
Court ruled that on these facts, the aggressor was guilty of criminally negligent homicide, 
because he could have foreseen that the use of deadly force might become necessary to defend 
his own life as a result of his contemplated assault.  Professor Roxin disagreed, reasoning that “a 
provocateur surprised by a life-threatening attack should not be left defenseless.  In the first 
place, the interests of the attacked person take precedence, as his life must be valued more highly 
than the readily understandable desire for retaliation on the part of the attacker.  Secondly, if the 
State did not offer adequate protection against private acts of revenge, if would foster lynch law, 
which runs counter to the purposes of the criminal law.  Admittedly, in cases of severe 
provocation, every other means to extricate oneself from the attack without injury, including 
even acceptance of definable risks, must be ruled out [before the resort to deadly force is 
justified.]”  Professor Roxin would have acquitted on homicide and convicted for attempted 
grievous bodily harm.    
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not a theoretically coherent in the continental European sense, with a General Part and a Special 
Part, few inconsistencies, and overarching conceptual purposes.  The Stand Your Ground Law is 
one of many appendages cobbled on to a doctrinal body that consists to a significant degree of 
accretions, relics, exceptions, vestiges, and sops to animated constituencies. 
I do not mean to disparage lawmaking by democratic means, or even to suggest that law 
in the United States is deficient in that statutes and codes originate in legislative committees and 
in the work of lobbyists rather than in the work of academic philosophers appointed by a 
Napoleon or Bismarck.  Indeed, I argue throughout the thesis that some burden rests on courts to 
explain with especial cogency their decisions unsettling the policies written into law by 
democratically accountable agents.  But in this country, high courts have never shied away from 
theoretical reflection.  Even Oliver Wendell Holmes’ aphorism that the common law is a 
reflection of experience reflects a high level of theoretical abstraction and a detached, studied, 
systematic, perspective.
85
  In that spirit, the Supreme Court of the United States might have done 
better than recognize a constitutional right to self-defense based on historical fantasy.  And the 
Supreme Court of Florida, when it reviews the Stand Your Ground Law, would be well served to 
avoid consulting Anglo-Floridian origin myths embodied in the aggressively genocidal ghosts of 
Andrew Jackson and William Worth about the scope of legitimate self-defense.
86
  It appears to 
me far more cogent to reflect, once facts are settled to the degree that the evidence admits, on 
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 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
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 Jackson, rightly or wrongly, is widely “credited” with originating the genocidal 
observation that “the only good Indian is a dead Indian.”  As a rogue General, he conquered 
Spanish Florida and offered it to the United States for annexation; as President, his signature 
helped make the Indian Removal Act of 1830 law.  Worth pursued liquidation policies during the 
Seminole War that “pacified” peninsular Florida and opened it to Anglo-American settlement.  
See RUSSELL WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 137-138, 162-63 (1984); BEN 
KIERNAN: BLOOD AND SOIL: A WORLD HISTORY OF GENOCIDE AND EXTERMINATION FROM 
SPARTA TO DARFUR, 330-34 (2007).   
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whether George Zimmerman acted preemptively, or in anticipatory self-defense, or in actual self-
defense, and whether his conduct and relevant provisions of the Florida Code are consistent with 
coherent criteria for delimiting the boundary between impermissible preemptive assassination 
and permissible, necessary, proportionate self-defense against an actual (or imminent?) attack.   
These inquiries are not the stuff of orginalism, but of general principles of law gleaned from 
comparative study and analytic reflection. 
 
The Way Forward 
Admittedly, to a hard-headed observer, there may seem little realistic chance that the 
Supreme Court of the United States or a high court in one of the several states stands poised to 
cast off parochial reflections on allegedly exceptional American origins in favor of investigations 
into transnational principles of justice any time soon.  In the context of the politically freighted 
issues of self-defense, gun control, and individual reliance on a Weberian public order, there is 
every reason to expect American jurists – who seldom swing too far from popular opinion – will 
remain beholden to popular beliefs in American exceptionalism and the continuing allure of 
foundation mythology.  After all, when Justices Breyer and Scalia meet on the lecture circuit to 
rejoin the debate over the legitimacy of judicial consultation of foreign and international sources, 
even Justice Breyer suggests only occasional and modest borrowings from persuasive but not 
binding transnational sources.
87
  In the sober words of Jeremy Waldron, “[w]e do not live in an 
age in which uttering magic words like “ius gentium” is sufficient to license the practice of 
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basing American legal conclusions on non-American premises.”88  And yet, on closer reflection, 
it may be that this most charged of political arenas pitting the antinomian and anarchic 
champions of an unbridled right to armed self-defense against the statist rear guard urging 
measured restrictions on resort to force and access to arms is the ideal forum in which to push 
serious judicial forays towards internationally inflected principles-based analysis of conflicts and 
claims.  I suggest two reasons for this counterintuitive nod in an optimistic direction.   First—and 
this is the burden of the Chapters below—the originalist account of the right to armed self-
defense is objectively absurd and facially dishonest.  If the Miltonian, Jeffersonian, Madisonian, 
Holmesian, and Brandeisian faith in the Market Place of Ideas has any substance at all, in the 
long run, the orginalist celebration of the cult of guns and violence will collapse under its own 
weight.  Second, there is a highly coherent and jurisprudentially sound theory readily available to 
take its place.  That theory is the analytic jurisprudence of self-defense founded in comparative 
study, cogently expounded in the works of George Fletcher, for current purposes most saliently 
in The Grammar of Criminal Law, which upon completion will run to three volumes covering 
American, Comparative, and International Criminal Law.
89
  
My thesis, then, represents my efforts to contribute towards the first phase of a three-
stage process aimed at dismantling the originalist jurisprudence of the right to self-defense and 
replacing it with something better.  The “something better” is already extant, and might be called 
the “Fletcher School,” founded on general principles of the law of self-defense.  The criminal 
theorists and comparists working on elaborating these general principles of criminal law are in 
the process of completing the second phase of the process I envision.  My future work in this 
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field will focus on the third stage in the process, namely attempting to import insights from 
general principles of law into the American jurisprudence of armed self-defense with a view to 
supplanting the now ascendant but untenable originalist approach.  In the federal courts, 
windows onto this general principles based discourse might open via substantive due process, 
privileges and immunities, the Ninth Amendment, emanations from specific provisions of the 
Bill of Rights including the Second Amendment, or frank invocation of natural law.  My task 
going forward will be to help make the case that these pathways are more legitimate than the 
originalist course I urge forsaking.  An enormous challenge lies ahead for those intending (as I 
do) to make the affirmative case for opening doors long closed, shuttered, and posted with labels 
warning that entry leads to values-inflected judging and to substitution of judicial will for 
legislative preferences.  But honest confrontation with the jurisprudential substance underlying 
the debates on the legitimate use of guns ultimately involves the general principles of law, not 
historical fantasies about settlers and bears, or historical realities about civic republican fondness 
for the militia and distrust of the Army.     
Outline of Thesis Chapters  
The eleven Chapters that follow describe and critique the evolution of Second 
Amendment jurisprudence and related doctrine and theory up to the point at which the Supreme 
Court decided McDonald v. City of Chicago in 2010.  Each Chapter is summarized below.  All 
but one have been published.  Four are encyclopedia entries, two are book reviews, three are law 
review articles, one is a critical essay, and one is an unpublished surreply to Randy Barnett, the 
leading academic critic of my work, whose strange conduct leading to the publication of his ofte-
cited Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned in Service in an Organized Militia? 83 
TEXAS LAW REVIEW 237 is detailed below.  The three law review articles (Chapters 3, 9, and 10) 
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comprise the heart of the thesis.  A reader pressed for time might decide to skip or skim the other 
matter, although Chapters 2 and 5 raise significant theoretical questions about social expectations 
translating into constitutional rights and about academic honesty. 
1) The Second Amendment, MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (2008). 
This entry in one of the leading reference works on the Supreme Court describes the state 
of Second Amendment theory and doctrine up to the spring of 2008, when the District of 
Columbia v. Heller was docketed but not yet decided by the Supreme Court. 
 
 
2) Mandatory Gun Ownership, the Militia Census of 1806, and Background Assumptions 
Concerning the Early American Right to Arms:  A Cautious Response to Robert 
Churchill, 25 LAW AND HISTORY REVIEW, 187 (2007). 
This essay in a peer reviewed specialty journal appeared as part of a forum analyzing the 
provocative work of historian Robert Churchill, perhaps the academic who has engaged 
most deeply in a Second Amendment context the relationship between popular behavior 
and practice and putative constitutional immunity from governmental regulation and 
prohibition.  My essay takes a skeptical view of the empirical and theoretical premises 
behind the argument that widespread gun usage informed a judicially cognizable sense of 
constitutional protection for gun ownership in the young United States.    
 
 
3) A Cultural Turn: Reflections on Recent Historical and Legal Writing on the Second 
Amendment, 17 STANFORD LAW AND POLICY REVIEW, 671 (2006). 
This article contributed to an important symposium on the Second Amendment explores 
legal academic and historical writing on the Second Amendment through the year 2006 
while paying particular attention to culturally inflected popular constitutionalism during 
the millennial period.  It outlines six principal schools of Second Amendment thought, 
makes the case that the constitutional text is best read to couple the right to arms to 
service in the lawfully established militia, and expresses skepticism towards ascendant 
claims that the Amendment as originally understood protected a right to weapons 
possession for purposes of private self-defense.  The article concludes by exploring 








This Encyclopedia entry explores the power of the federal government to raise armies.  
Understanding the evolution of the federal power to raise a substantial military 
contextualizes the decline of the militia, and with it the morphing of the once militia-
focused constitutional right to arms into a private right to self-defense that goes far 
beyond the dominant original understanding of the constitutional text.    
 
 
5) Unpublished Excerpts Responding to Randy Barnett originally submitted by H. Richard 
Uviller and William G. Merkel as part of The Authors’ Reply to Commentaries on, And 
Criticisms of The Militia and the Right to Arms, Or How the Second Amendment Fell 
Silent, 12 WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL 357 (2004). 
Professor Randy Barnett exercises profound influence on the rapidly changing American 
constitutional landscape.  His successful linkage of a libertarian vision of a minimalist 
federal government and to an alleged original public meaning that mirrors his political 
preferences now resonates widely among jurists, pundits, and wide swaths of the 
populace.  Barnett’s cramped version of the Interstate Commerce Clause perhaps figured 
more powerfully than any other constitutional theory in the campaign to convince the 
Supreme Court to torpedo the Affordable Health Care Act in 2012.  Barnett’s first major 
constitutional victory in the Supreme Court came with Justice Scalia’s opinion for the 
five justice majority in Heller, which relied heavily on Barnett’s Was the Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms Conditioned in Service in an Organized Militia? 83 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 
237.  From my admittedly interested perspective, the peculiar provenance of this 
influential piece merits note.  The short form citation that appears in Justice Scalia’s 
opinion is entirely consistent with the dictates of the BLUEBOOK, but masks the piece’s 
overarching context captured in the long form title Book Review Essay: Was the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia? The Militia and 
the Right to Arms, or, How the Second Amendment Fell Silent, by H. Richard Uviller and 
William G. Merkel.  Professor Barnett’s book review originated as his submission to a 
2003 symposium at William and Mary Law School focused on the book on the Second 
Amendment then just authored by the late Professor Richard Uviller and myself.  
Contributions to the symposium were slated for publication in the WILLIAM AND MARY 
BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL.  Per the terms of the symposium agreement (and it is perhaps 
worth noting that all of us were paid an honorarium in advance), Professor Uviller and I 
reviewed Randy’s initial submission, and returned our reply to his comments to the 
JOURNAL for inclusion in the symposium edition.  Moving beyond the terms of the 
agreement among the symposium contributors and the JOURNAL, Randy reviewed our 
reply prior to publication, and rather than offering a sur-reply, reworked his comments to 
take account of our response and retailer and remove those components of his initial 
argument that we had most effectively rebutted.  Although somewhat taken aback by this 
move, Richard and I decided to leave our original answer intact, and add a new after-
word responded to Randy’s amended complaint.  Once he reviewed our new answer to 
his amended complaint, Randy decided to pull his contribution to the WILLIAM AND 
MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL altogether, and publish it elsewhere.  Shortly thereafter it 
appeared in the form ultimately relied on by Justice Scalia in the TEXAS LAW REVIEW.    
Thus, Professor Barnett’s soon to be influential article had the benefit of being twice 
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reviewed prior to publication by the authors whose work it condemned, and being twice 
revised subsequent thereto with a view to purging some of its more ludicrous assertions.    
It also appeared in a forum that did not admit of answer, standing alone, rather than as 
part of a debate.  Since Professor Barnett did not appear in print in the WILLIAM AND 
MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL, Richard did not deem it appropriate that our response to 
his pulled contribution be included either.  Those retracted sections, appear here for the 
first time since 2004, when they were removed from SSRN by someone (not Richard and 
not me).  Professor Uviller and I co-authored the first segment.  The After-Word on 
Professor Barnett’s Amended Critique and the Conclusion are almost wholly my own.   
Perhaps Professor Barnett was particularly chagrined by what I wrote in Footnote 67.  It 
points to Professor Barnett’s shoddy research and unsupported claims regarding an 
alleged revival of the citizen militia in our times.  These claims and the evidence behind 
them are in my view as dubious as the controversial and since defrocked historian 
Michael Bellesiles’ claims about arms ownership and probate records that lead to 
Columbia University’s decision to retract his Bancroft Prize in 2002. 
 
 
6) Book Review:  Saul Cornell.  A Well Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the 
Origins of Gun Control in America, 112 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 842 (2007). 
This short review essay endorses constitutional historian Saul Cornell’s nuanced analysis 
of the evolution of four distinct veins of popular and professional legal thinking regarding 
the Second Amendment right since the founding period.  The four strains of thought – a 
civic republican militia focused right, an antinomian right against government, a state 
right against an overbearing federal government, and finally a private right against 
private aggression – have not always been appreciated as conceptually distinct by 
commentators or theorists.  This confusion has lead not only to thinking that is sloppy in 
an abstract sense, but to gross misconceptualization of the relationship between private 
violence and constitutional authority during Reconstruction and to illogical responses to 
popularly endorsed and democratically sanctioned gun control measures in our own time.    
The review also affords an opportunity for me to suggest the relative virtues inherent in 
the essential pragmatic constitutional jurisprudence of Chief Justice Warren, who 
repeatedly shunned the alleged teachings of originalism on grounds of indeterminacy and 
dubious relevance to modern problems.  
 
 
7) Book Review: Stephen P. Halbrook.  The Founders Second Amendment: Origins of the 
Right to Bear Arms, 114 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 1074 (2009). 
 
This book review essay engages perhaps the most popularly influential theorist and 
advocate for the constitutional right to self-defense, Stephen Halbrook, who places gun 
rights and an unbridled liberty to defend oneself against attack and potential attack at the 
center of the American constitutional narrative.  Halbrook, who holds a PhD in 
philosophy, is also a distinguished Supreme Court litigator who argued Printz and 
authored much-cited amicus briefs in Heller and McDonald.  The review acknowledges 
that Halbrook has discovered and mustered more evidence in support of an individual-
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rights-oriented reading of the original public understanding of the Second Amendment 
than any other authority on the subject, but stresses the continuing marginality of that 
evidence in the light of quantitative studies of usages of arms bearing and its cognates 
during the era in which the Second Amendment was ratified.  Perhaps more importantly, 
the review highlights the tendentious character of Halbrook’s meta-narrative, in which 
guns cease to be mere tools in the service of rights holding human actors but instead 
become the summum bonum of the constitutional order.  
 
 
8) The District of Columbia v. Heller, GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW, (2012). 
This extended entry in a peer reviewed three volume encyclopedia describes, analyzes, 
and contextualizes Justice Scalia’s opinion for the five justice majority and the dissents 
by Justices Breyer and Stevens in the hotly contested Heller case recognizing a 
constitutional right to keep a handgun in the home for purposes of self-defense not related 
to service in the militia.  
 
 
9) The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 
13 LEWIS AND CLARK LAW REVIEW, 349 (2009). 
This article weighs Justice Scalia's Heller opinion in the balance, and finds it wanting. 
Rather than being a garden-variety case of originalism manqué, i.e. an effort to pin point 
a single original understanding when in fact meaning was hotly contested at the time 
constitutional text was created, Heller emerges as an act of (self?)-deception or conscious 
fraud.  Few of the historical assumptions that underlie Justice Scalia's analysis withstand 
scrutiny.  The majority holding-that the Second Amendment was originally understood to 
protect the right to possess any commonly held weapon for purposes unrelated to militia 
service such as self-defense and hunting-requires misreading, misunderstanding, or 
ignoring the bulk of relevant evidence such as the debates on the pending Amendment in 
the House of Representatives and the common meaning accorded bearing arms in 
newspapers and pamphlets of the day.  Rather than using historical source material to 
inform his analysis, Justice Scalia operates with the faith-based assumption that the 
framers must have intended to protect a private right to gun possession, and then 
manipulates outlying evidence to dress up his claim in ill-fitting pseudo academic garb. 
In the process he demonstrates conclusively that the originalist methodology he 
trumpeted in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION as the surest remedy against judicial 
injection of subjective values into constitutional adjudication is in fact nothing more than 
a harrow sham. 
 
 
10) Heller as Hubris, And How McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change the 
Constitutional World as We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW, 1221 (2010). 
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This article anticipated the likely application against the states and municipalities of 
Heller’s newly minted right to arms for purposes of private self-defense.  McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, was heard by the Supreme Court in the spring of 2010, but had not yet 
been decided when this article appeared.  I argue here that the original understanding of 
the Second and Fourteenth Amendments cannot easily be reconciled with a judicially 
enforceable right to weapons possession unrelated to service in the lawfully established 
militia.  The article pays particular attention to the differing moral claims of the Second 
and Fourteenth Amendment’s on posterity, and revisits old questions about the 
constitutional warrant for incorporation which McDonald brought back to prominence 
some forty years after the process of judicial application of provisions of the Bill of 
Rights to the states had seemingly run its course.  In so doing, the article calls into 
question glib popular and judicial assumptions believed to legitimize judicial review, and 
suggests that judicial veto of legislatively determined policy choices requires a far more 
cogent theoretical foundation than that provided by Justice Scalia's fetishistic and 
idolatrous adherence to caricatured visions of an "original public meaning” that allegedly 
held sway when constitutional text was proposed and ratified. 
 
 
11) McDonald v. City of Chicago, GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW, (2012). 
 
This encyclopedia entry explains and analyzes the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in 
McDonald to apply against states and municipalities the limited right to armed self-
defense recognized against the federal government and federal enclaves in Heller two 
years earlier.  This entry parses the justices’ differing approaches to the meaning of 
Second Amendment and the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment in applying the 
Second Amendment right against the states and arguably altering its substantive scope.  
In addressing these questions, the five justices who wrote opinions (Alito, Thomas, 
Scalia, Stevens, and Breyer) expounded their underlying theories of judicial review, 
incorporation, and enforcement of rights not specified in the text of the Constitution.  In 
particular, McDonald afforded the retiring Justice Stevens and his long-time sparring 
partner on the Bench Justice Scalia a final opportunity to debate the relative merits of 
legal process theory and pragmatism, on the one hand, and original public meaning 
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The fourth of twelve amendments proposed by the First Congress and forwarded to the 
states in 1789, the Second Amendment numbered second among the ten amendments ratified by 
the requisite nine states by 1791 to form the Bill of Rights.  The short text of the Second 
Amendment is not without complexity and possibly ambiguity:   “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not 
be infringed.”  This is the only provision of the Bill of Rights linking a rights guarantee to a 
textually articulated purpose, and one of only two provisions in the entire Constitution (the 
Copyright Clause being the other) to couple operative language directly to a specified objective.   
(The Preamble states purposes, but those purposes are not immediately connected to specific 
operative clauses). 
 
United States v. Miller 
 
The Second Amendment has rarely been interpreted by the Supreme Court, which last 
ruled directly on a Second Amendment question in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, in 
1939.  In that case, the Court, on direct appeal, overturned a decision of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Arkansas quashing an indictment under Section 1132(d) of the 
National Firearms Act of 1934 that charged Jack Miller and Frank Layton with transporting an 
unlicensed double-barreled sawed-off shotgun across state lines.  The trial Court had ruled that 
Section 11 of the Firearms Act violated the Second Amendment, but the Supreme Court, in an 8-
0 decision by Justice McReynolds, disagreed, holding that:  
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In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a “shotgun 
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length” at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say 
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.   
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary 
military equipment, or that its use could contribute to the common defense. 
 
 
Recent Court of Appeals Decisions 
 
For many years, United States Courts of Appeal uniformly read Miller to link the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms to membership in the organized militia.  As recently as 
2002 in Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F. 3d 1052, a three judge panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the right to arms was a “collective right” protecting state 
militia units against federal disarmament.  But in United States v. Emerson, 270 F. 3d 203 
(2001), a Fifth Circuit panel construed Miller to hold that the Second Amendment protected 
possession of weapons of types that could be used in militia service.  In so doing, the Fifth 
Circuit rejected the government’s claim that under Miller the Second Amendment protected the 
right to arms only in the context of actual militia service.  According to the Emerson Court, the 
United States had pressed a similar argument in Miller, but the Supreme Court had adopted a 
narrower ruling, focused on the character of the weapon at issue rather than the claimants’ 
membership vel non in the lawfully established militia.  Emerson was echoed by the D.C. Circuit 
in 2007 in Parker, __ F 3d. ___, which stressed more emphatically the broad character of the 
right to arms it read into Miller and into the Second Amendment itself.  According to the three-
judge panel in Parker, the Constitution protects a right to own and carry any weapon suitable for 
militia service, even if the claimant is not a militia member.  Moreover, the right extends to non-
militia related purposes such as hunting and self-defense.  As of this writing, the District of 
Columbia is seeking review of Parker in the Supreme Court, and many commentators expect the 
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High Court to grant certiorari in order to address the split in the circuits, clarify Miller, and 




While the Supreme Court has been relatively silent respecting the Second Amendment, 
academic comment and advocacy pieces respecting the meaning of the constitutional right to 
arms have proliferated in recent decades.  Second Amendment writing has frequently been 
polemical, at times even sensationalist.  Adherents of various schools and sub-schools of Second 
Amendment thought have sought to differentiate their interpretive models from those of their 
opponents, and participants in the Second Amendment debates as well as judges on United States 
Courts of Appeal have attached great weight to labeling the various Second Amendment schools.   
The argument that the constitutional right to arms protects state militia units against federal 
disarmament is frequently called the collective rights position.  This argument generally stresses 
the importance the first part of the Amendment’s text, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State . . . .”  This part of the Amendment is also emphasized by those 
who argue that the Amendment does protect an individual right to arms, but only to the extent 
that the right is related to service in the lawfully established militia.  This second argument is 
sometimes labeled the “sophisticated collective rights argument,” chiefly by those who do not 
agree with it.  A third argument—that the Second Amendment protects a right to arms for 
purposes far beyond those related to militia service, including hunting and personal self-
defense—is generally called the “individual rights” theory, even though its focus on individual as 
opposed to corporate rights alone does not differentiate it from the so called “sophisticated 
collective rights approach.”  Rather, an emphasis on private as well as corporate purposes, and a 
focus on the second part of the Amendment’s text “the right of the people to keep and bear arms, 
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shall not be infringed,” clearly differentiates the private, individual rights approach from those 
stressing the primacy of the militia. 
The Second Amendment and Reconstruction 
 
Several leading constitutional theorists (Akhil Amar, Robert Cottrol, Sanford Levinson, 
and William Van Alstyne among them) have argued that the right enshrined in the Second 
Amendment in 1791 was fundamentally recast by the Civil War, Reconstruction, and, especially, 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.  While conceding that the framers of the 
Bill of Rights may have been concerned with appeasing the Anti-Federalists’ concerns to 
preserve the militia as an alternative or counterweight to a potentially dangerous federal military 
establishment including a large standing army, Amar in particular has argued that the framers of 
the Reconstruction Amendments wished to facilitate the ability of Southern blacks and other 
Republican sympathizers to defend themselves against the Ku Klux Klan and likeminded agents 
of violent reaction.  In the process, Amar maintains, the Fourteenth Amendment decoupled the 
right to arms from its militia foundations, recognizing a remodeled right to own guns for 
purposes of individual self-defense.  It is however entirely unclear that this desire to enhance to 
the capacity of Reconstruction supporters to defend themselves would have been better served by 
private action than organization into militia units recognized by the Republican governments in 
the South, and whether the supporters of Reconstruction in fact had private as opposed to state 
sponsored defense in mind.  In the post Slaughter-House era the Supreme Court twice addressed 
the relationship of the right to arms to the Fourteenth Amendment, holding in both United States 
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 452 (1876), and Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), that the Second 
Amendment limits the authority of the federal government, but not state or private actors.  
Cruikshank involved federal prosecution of white supremacists in Louisiana who participated in 
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the Colfax Massacre of 1873, in which members of the White League and Ku Klux Klan battled 
black militia units loyal to the Republican Party outside a polling station during a hotly contested 
election.  The Supreme Court declined to uphold conviction of the supremacists under the 
Enforcement Act of 1870, on the grounds that the defendants had not interfered with any 
constitutionally protected rights, holding in the process that the Second Amendment did not 
reach private or state sponsored efforts to disarm black militia members.  In Presser, the Court 
rejected a Second Amendment claim regarding state denial of permission for a private militia 
unit to participate in a parade while bearing arms, again on the grounds that the Second 
Amendment reached only federal action.  The Supreme Court has not revisited Second 
Amendment claims against state actors since the wave of incorporation decisions of the mid-
twentieth century applying various provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Indeed, the right to arms remains one of 




Scholarly debate and lower court litigation in recent years has honed in even more closely 
on questions surrounding the original meaning of the right to arms at the time the Second 
Amendment was ratified than on the possible impact of Reconstruction on the right to arms.  
Many supporters of a broad right to arms for purposes other than militia service have advanced 
originalist arguments stressing the individualistic, liberal ethos of the American Revolution.   
Historian Joyce Lee Malcolm has focused on the origins of American right to arms in the English 
Bill of Rights of 1689 (Article 7 of which proclaims “Subjects, which are Protestants, may have 
Arms for their Defence suitable to their Condition, and as allowed by Law”) as the basis for her 
contention that an Anglo-American personal right to weapons possession once recognized at 
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common law has abated in England but endures in entrenched form in the American Bill of 
Rights.  This argument finds favor with champions of a vigorous right to self-defense, who 
maintain that the Second Amendment encompasses far more than a right to fulfill a legal 
obligation in the statutory militia.  Among academic historians whose work focuses on 
eighteenth century American political thought, however, this is a minority position.  Saul 
Cornell, Paul Finkelman, David Konig, Jack Rakove, Lois Schwoerer, and Robert Shalhope, 
among others, have focused on the anti-army trope in revolutionary rhetoric, and a centuries old 
suspicion of standing armies often associated with the civic republican readings of eighteenth 
century American politics of Bernard Bailyn, J.G.A. Pocock, and (a younger) Gordon Wood.    
In this reading, Anti-Federalist pamphleteers and tract writers who elicited from James Madison 
and other conciliation-minded members of the First Congress a promise to move amendments in 
hopes of augmenting the coalition in favor of the constitutional settlement were not particularly 
concerned with rights to hunt or protect private homes which they did not consider to be under 
threat, but rather feared the prospect that a larger, professional federal army established under the 
new Constitution would imperil individual liberties, local autonomy and the ability of states to 
function as quasi-sovereign political entities.  Anti-Federalists desired—and to a limited degree 
the framers of the Second Amendment conceded—a hortatory constitutional commitment to 
place primary reliance on the militia rather than the federal Army for defensive purposes.   
Unlike the Army, the militia answered to state command when not summoned to federal duty, 
and unlike the Army, the militia was composed of citizens and civilians, not mercenaries and 
hirelings.  The militia, therefore, was considered a bulwark of liberty, rather than a potential tool 
for tyrants.  In this reading, the Second Amendment guarantee against disarmament coupled to 
the Article 1 Section 8 clause 16 power of Congress to arm and organize the militia represented a 
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constitutional hedge against the oppressive taxes and foreign wars of empire associated with 
large military establishments and executive supremacy. 
 
The federal Militia Act of 1792 cemented the Congressional commitment to national 
reliance on militia, by requiring non-exempted white males between the ages of 18 and 45 to arm 
themselves with standardized weapons and equipment required for militia duty.  Considerable 
controversy attaches to the question of compliance with these mandates and the level of arms 
ownership in the early Republic.  Historian Robert Churchill has argued that wide arms 
ownership translated into a sense of legal entitlement and immunity against confiscation and 
aggressive regulation that inflected the Second Amendment, but his claims have been disputed 
by Cornell and Konig.  It is clear at least that the general, universal militia envisioned by the 
framers disappeared in the early decades of the nineteenth century, giving way by mid-century to 
a patch work system of state licensed privately organized units in which a relatively small 
segment of the population was enrolled.  The modern National Guard, ushered in by the Dick 
Act in 1903, differentiates between organized militia and unorganized militia, and it is now the 
subject of heated debate in gun policy circles whether membership in either organized or 
unorganized militia is a predicate for exercise of Second Amendment rights.    
 
Comments by Individual Justices 
 
Despite the paucity of Supreme Court case law construing the Second Amendment 
directly, several past and current justices have commented individually on the meaning of the 
Amendment.  Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, embraced a militia-focused 
view, and lamented the passing of the universal militia of the Revolutionary era as a signal of the 
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impending demise of an important institutional check against aspirant tyranny.  According to 
Story, 
 
[t]he right of citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered the 
palladium of liberties of a republic, since it offers a strong moral check against the 
usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers . . . . [I]t cannot be disguised that among 
the American people, there is a growing indifference to any system of militia 
discipline, and a strong disposition from a sense of its burthens, to be rid of all 
regulations.  How it is practicable to keep the people armed without some 
organization, it is difficult to see.  There is certainly no small danger that 
indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt, and thus gradually 
undermine all the protection intended by this clause of the national bill of rights.   
 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Sec. 1896 
pp. 607-608 (2d ed. 1851).  In the years since, Justice Douglas (the single sitting justice who 
did not participate in Miller) and Chief Justice Burger have expressed strong contempt for 
private rights readings of the right to arms, while Justices Scalia and Thomas (the latter 
relying on an incomplete and misleading quotation from Story) have suggested affinity for 
the private rights reading.  Moreover, the Bush administration has reversed a century of 
Department of Justice practice by endorsing a private rights reading of the Second 
Amendment, albeit one subject to limitation by reasonable regulations.  In a related vein, 
many level-headed commentators including Erwin Chemerinsky, Michael Dorf, and Adam 
Winkler suggest that for purposes of testing the constitutionality of gun control legislation, 
the question of standard of review or level of scrutiny that the Supreme Court attaches to the 
Second Amendment right will prove almost as important as the questions of whether the 
right protects individual claims to possess weapons for private purposes, and whether it has 
been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to limit the powers of the states as 
well as the federal government.  It is entirely conceivable that law and order minded justices 
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might recognize a Second Amendment right that extends beyond the militia, but allow its 
curtailment under statute for purposes of achieving reasonable law enforcement objectives. 
Further Reading: 
2000. Symposium on the Second Amendment: Fresh Looks, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 76: 2-
600; Amar, Akhil Reed. 1998, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction.  New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press; Cornell, Saul. 2006. A Well Regulated Militia: The Founding 
Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in America.  New York: Oxford University Press; 
Halbrook, Stephen P. Freedmen, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to Bear Arms, 1866-
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MANDATORY GUN OWNERSHIP,  
THE MILITIA CENSUS OF 1806, AND  
BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING  
THE EARLY AMERICAN RIGHT TO ARMS:  
A CAUTIOUS RESPONSE TO ROBERT CHURCHILL 
 
 
In "Gun Ownership in Early America," published in the William and Mary Quarterly in 
2003,
1
 Robert Churchill drew on probate inventories and militia records to make the case that 
arms ownership was pervasive in late colonial, revolutionary, and early national America. 
Churchill concluded with the observation that "[i]t is time to ponder what these guns meant to 
their owners and how that meaning changed over time."
2
  In his substantial contribution to this 
volume of Law and History Review,
3
 Churchill takes up that challenge himself and advances the 
claim that widespread arms ownership engendered a sense of possessory entitlement, and that 
this notion of right informed constitutional sensibilities respecting guns and the Second 
Amendment.  He acknowledges that a civic republican understanding focused on the militia was 
central to the framers' conception of the right to arms, but urges that another stream of 
discourse—individualistic, personal, and divorced from militia linked obligations—was present 
from the beginning.  By the early nineteenth century, Churchill argues, this purely private view 
of the right to arms had become ascendant. 
Churchill's most intriguing claim is that arms possession (in large measure because of its 
alleged ubiquity) acquired an aura of immunity against at least some assertions of government 
                                                     
1
 Robert H. Churchill, "Gun Ownership in Early America: A Survey of Manuscript 
Militia Returns," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 60 (2003): 615. 
2
 Id. at 642. 
3
 Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep 
Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, LAW AND HIST. REV. 
25, 139-75 (2007). 
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power during the period in which the Constitution and Bill of Rights were drafted and ratified.  
In colonial times, says Churchill, provincial and imperial military authority extended to seizure 
of guns for purposes of arming militia and ensuring security, but by the 1780s, these statist 
claims against privately held weapons were abating, never to return.  The police power still 
allowed civil authorities to regulate firearms usage to preserve safety in towns and on public 
roads, promote public decorum, and protect the population of game, but assertions of 
governmental power to seize (rather than merely regulate) guns rapidly petered out in the new 
nation.  Perhaps like other royal prerogatives that died a death of desuetude in the Whigish 
narrative of English history, the abeyance of governmental authority to confiscate arms begat a 
negative liberty against gun seizure, and this liberty soon took up a prideful place in the orthodox 
(or at least popular) understanding of constitutional rights.  Churchill's argument is interesting, in 
several respects novel, and in many ways enlightening.  But it is by no means clear that he 
accurately captures all the evidence on which he relies, or that his thesis can fully account for 
some important evidence that he glosses over or ignores.  In fact, vital material Churchill 
misreads or omits points squarely back to the civic-republican focused reading of the 
constitutional right to arms he aims to play down or read away. 
Consider, for instance, Congressional inquiry into the arming of the militia.  On April2, 
1806, Joseph Varnum, then a six-term Republican Congressman from Massachusetts and major 
general in the Commonwealth's militia, presented a report from the "committee instructed to 
inquire what measures are necessary to be adopted to complete the arming of the militia of the 
United States" to the House of Representatives.
4
  The report, partly reprinted below, is difficult 
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 American State Papers, 5, Military Affairs, 1:198-99.  For information on Varnum, see 
the entry in American National Biography 22:278-79 by Edward W. Hanson of the 
Massachusetts Historical Society. 
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to reconcile with Churchill's findings concerning gun ownership among militia members in the 
revolutionary and early national periods, on which his argument that the Second Amendment 
protected a private as well as a militia-focused right to arms largely depends.  Congressman 
Varnum drew on data familiar to the committee and reprinted in the Militia Census of 1806, a 
document officially communicated to Congress by the president nine days later on April 11, 
1806.
5
  The results of that census, and the question of how they square with Churchill's account, 
are taken up next. In the report itself, Varnum's committee informed Congress 
[t]hat, by the laws of the United States, each citizen enrolled in the militia is put 
under obligations to provide himself with a good musket or rifle, and all the other 
military equipments prescribed by law. From the best estimate which the 
committee have been able to form, there is upwards of 250,000 fire arms and 
rifles in the hands of the militia, which have, a few instances excepted, been 
provided by, and are the property of, the individuals who hold them. It is highly 
probable, that many more of the militia would have provided themselves with fire 
arms in the same way, if they had been for sale in those parts of the United States 
where the deficiencies have happened; but the wars in Europe have had a 
tendency to prevent the importation of fire arms from thence into the United 
States, which, together with the limited establishments for the manufacture of that 





The committee went on to say that the number of stands of public arms in the arsenals of 
the various states had not been ascertained, that there were about 120,000 fire arms fit for use 
and 12,000 in need of repair in the magazines of the United States, and that the committee was of 
the opinion that further public monies ($62,100 to be exact) should be set aside for manufacture 
of fire arms in the armories of the United States "to provide for the exigency of war."
7
 
The Militia Census listed the total numbers of men enrolled for each state rank by rank 
and the total numbers of rifles and muskets each state reported.  Assuming that privates and 
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noncommissioned officers but not officers were expected to carry long guns as required by the 
Militia Act of 1792, the percentages of militia members each state reported as armed with rifles 
or muskets are as follows:
8
 
New Hampshire Infantry:  19,100 privates and 1,108 sergeants, 12,500 muskets; or 61.9 
percent armed. 
Massachusetts Infantry:  53,316 privates and l,108 sergeants, 46,218 muskets and 397 
rifles; or 85.7 percent armed. 
Rhode Island Infantry:  4,414 privates and 302 sergeants, 3,052 muskets; or 64.7 percent 
armed. 
Connecticut Infantry:  13,952 privates, 1,144 corporals, 1,293 sergeants, 15,085 muskets; 
or 92.0 percent armed. 
Vermont Infantry:  13,708 privates, 1,011 sergeants, 8,824 muskets; or 59.9 percent 
armed. 
New York Infantry:  63,744 privates, 3,885 sergeants, 39,919 muskets and 1,928 rifles; or 
61.9 percent armed. 
New Jersey Infantry:  21,742 privates, 1,142 sergeants, 12,423 muskets and 86 rifles; or 
54.7 percent armed. 
Pennsylvania Infantry and Riflemen:  80,061 privates, 2,881 sergeants, 3,352 riflemen, 
20,000 muskets, 3,352 rifles; or 27.1 percent armed. 
Delaware, not reporting.  
Maryland, not reporting. 
Virginia Infantry:  61,962 privates, 3,388 sergeants, 10,490 muskets, 2,734 rifles; or 21.3 
percent armed. 
North Carolina Infantry:  37,871 privates, 1,774 sergeants, 16,571 muskets, 2,343 rifles; 
or 47.7 percent armed. 
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 These are my rough calculations; I have left out sergeant majors and quartermaster 
sergeants because of their insignificant numbers and my uncertainty as to whether they were 
expected to muster with long guns.  I have also omitted the reports for the District of Columbia, 
Mississippi Territory, and Indiana Territory, whose militia were few in number.  The Orleans 
and Louisiana territories did not report. For the raw numbers see American State Papers, 5, 
Military Affairs, 1:202-3.  For Churchill's important reservations about reading too much into 
these numbers see Churchill, "Gun Ownership in Early America."  Churchill makes the case that 
the census should not be taken at face value; instead, he maintains, it is important to look at the 
documents generated at the brigade level on which the census was based.  By failing to do so, 
Churchill cautions that historians will be mislead because the census undercounts by measuring 
guns brought to muster, not guns held at home.  But if this were a serious problem, one would 
expect Major General Varnum, with thirty years militia experience, to have been aware of it. He 
reported "upwards of 250,000 firearms and rifles in the hands of the militia”; the census lists by 
my count some 204,200 muskets and 52,900 rifles, suggesting strongly that it provided the basis 
of Varnum’s figures.  If Varnum knew of systemic undercounting, he failed to tell Congress, and 
mislead his colleagues in the process.  See American State Papers, 5, Military Affairs, 1:199. 
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South Carolina Infantry, Riflemen, and Light Infantry:  29,082 privates and rank and file, 
245 pioneers, 165 corporals, 1,245 sergeants, 5,916 muskets, 5,731 rifles; or 37.9 
percent armed. 
Georgia Infantry and Riflemen:  16,650 infantry and rank and file, 835 sergeants, 1,782 
muskets, 1,955 rifles; or 21.4 percent armed. 
Kentucky Infantry:  29,386 privates, 1,679 sergeants, 3,966 muskets, 15,567 rifles; or 
62.9 percent armed. 
Tennessee Infantry:  14,285 privates, 308 corporals, 308 sergeants, 4,647 muskets; or 
31.2 percent armed. 
Ohio Infantry:  8,031 privates, 456 sergeants, 277 muskets, 3,238 rifles; or 41.4 percent 
armed. 
 
Varnum's report points to the committee's concerns over a national militia less than fully 
armed and then proposes to rectify this problem by Congressional spending on arms production 
in federal arsenals for distribution (via the market? state purchase and resale? loan? Outright 
grant?) to unarmed militia members.  As the numbers above make clear, the census he and the 
committee consulted in reaching this decision indicated the New England militia was 
substantially armed and that the middle state militia (except in Pennsylvania, home to large 
populations of Quakers and other conscientious objectors) was above half armed. But serious 
problems arose in the South and West (excepting Kentucky), and these problems were nowhere 
as acute as in Virginia.  Churchill, however, argues that that disarmament there was more 
apparent than real.  The census, he claims, counted only state owned arms (and not privately 
owned arms) in Virginia and several other states.  Yet the committee reported that it did not 
know how many arms were held in the arsenals of the states, and this is very hard to incorporate 
into Churchill's interpretation of the census, unless his point is that Virginians who had been 
issued state owned arms kept them at home and brought them to muster where these guns (unlike 
the guns still in the arsenals) were counted. 
Churchill's main thrust on this issue is that most Virginia militia members actually owned 
their own guns (why would they have so many fewer than their northern compatriots?), but 
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refused to bring them to muster in large measure because of a state history of confiscation.  Here 
again Churchill's thesis stumbles over its own inconsistencies.  The claim that Virginians were 
still influenced by expectations of confiscation in 1806 is not wholly in harmony with Churchill's 
larger argument that the power to seize atrophied in the 1780s even as a sense of immunity 
against confiscation took hold in the popular mind. 
Varnum's report and the census finding of low armament in Virginia is troubling for the 
Churchill thesis in at least one other sense as well.  If Churchill is right that Virginians had guns 
but did not bring them to muster, it becomes necessary to explain why a Jeffersonian controlled 
Congress closely tied to the Virginian president was unaware of this issue.  This holds 
particularly for Major General Varnum himself, given his life-long service with Massachusetts 
citizen soldiery, his national responsibilities for militia oversight, and his personal relations with 
the president-he became Jefferson's candidate for Speaker of the House in the next Congress and 
won appointment when former Speaker John Randolph's faction broke with the administration.  
If the cause of the Virginia militia's seeming unreadiness was as Churchill supposes, it stands to 
reason that Jefferson's Virginia connections, including the state's three most recent governors-
James Monroe (1799-1802), John Page (1802-1805), and William Cabell (1805-1808)—all 
Jefferson loyalists—would have informed the president, and that Jefferson would have passed to 
word to Varnum, one of his leading New England lieutenants in the House and chair of the 
committee responsible for supervising arming of the militia.  Churchill's assumption is equally 
hard to square with then Governor Monroe's behavior six years earlier in 1800, when he was 
called on to consider the Virginia militia's potential effectiveness as a potential counter-weight to 
a Hamiltonian army unwilling to yield the presidency in the event of a Republican victory in the 
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national elections.  Monroe made it a point to order arms from overseas, not to order Virginians 
to bring their arms out of hiding.
9
 
In a cordial email to this reviewer, Churchill has stressed that the assumption of 
widespread arms ownership that underlies his thesis is the product of his detailed research into a 
variety of sources, including probate records, and the local militia rolls, which he found formed 
the basis of state figures included  in federal  militia censuses.  In truth, my disagreements with 
Churchill have less to do with the prevalence of guns in early national culture (my sense is that 
the Census of 1806 is about right, his studied retort is that it substantially undercounts) than with 
the purpose and meaning that Americans attached to their ownership of guns, and the question of 
how that fed into their thinking (such as there was on this point) about the Second Amendment. 
And in this respect, Churchill's argument appears based on an oddly ambiguous set of 
assumptions about statutory compliance.  His reasoning relies on two premises.  First, Americans 
complied willingly and broadly with colonial and state level militia-linked requirements to 
acquire guns.  Second, they later followed the federal Militia Act's command that white men of 
arms-bearing years obtain a musket or a rifle.  But he builds on these assumptions to argue that 
once Americans came into compliance, and became accustomed to a culture of arms bearing, the 
statutory purposes behind their acquisition of guns were subordinated.  Ownership of guns took 
on an individualistic valence says Churchill, with hostility to gun confiscation reflecting less and 
less solicitude for the communitarian militia, and more and more a property-focused sense of 
private immunity.  This understanding in turn became imbued with qualities perhaps more 
readily associated with modern Takings Clause jurisprudence (and its late eighteenth-century 
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 See William G. Merkel, “To See Oneself as a Target of a Justified Revolution: Thomas 
Jefferson and Gabriel’s Rebellion,” American Nineteenth Century History 4.1 (2003): 1-31. 
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precursors), and the sort of "Lockean" rhetoric Locke may not have recognized, than with the 
anti-army trappings of old Commonwealth Whiggery. 
I believe that Churchill reads too much libertarianism and too little republicanism into the 
problem, and that along the way he smoothes over some important ambiguities that his evidence, 
fairly read, will not resolve.  Once more, the Varnum report is instructive.  Varnum suggests that 
most militia eligible Americans wanted to comply with the Militia Act's requirement of arming 
themselves, but that many were unable to do so because guns were scarce.  Whether Varnum was 
too charitable respecting the causes of widespread non-compliance (lack of guns as opposed to 
lack of will), the fact remains that, unless Churchill's largely conclusory surmise that many 
southerners and westerners were hiding their guns is true, nearly half the militia eligible 
population was non-compliant.  Non-compliance was not an uncommon theme in recent 
American history.  Churchill himself claims that non-compliance with the Act of 1792 (failure to 
appear armed on muster day) actually explains the alleged undercounting of guns in Virginia.  
Far more famously, the Sugar Act, Stamp Act, Townsend Duties, and Tea Act come to mind as 
late colonial statutes generating less than optimal compliance, as do the Whiskey Tax and 
Window Tax from the Federalist period.  To be sure, these were imperial or at least national as 
opposed to provincial or state laws such as those Churchill cites to support his claim for a wide 
distribution of arms.  But other provincial or state laws, including prohibitions against unlicensed 
preaching and absenting oneself from the established church in a manner not contemplated in the 
Toleration Act, were notoriously under enforced or unenforceable as well.
10
  If Americans were 
as widely out of compliance with late colonial militia-linked mandatory arming laws as their 
successors were with the U.S. Act of 1792, then serious problems arise at the beginning of 
                                                     
10
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Churchill's chronological chain linking the presumption of wide spread gun possession (required 
by statute) to familiarity to possessory impulses to claims of right to assertions of immunity to 
constitutionalization.  And it is in the earlier period, where Churchill insists the discourse that 
ripened into rights talk began, that he relies most strongly on unadorned assumptions of statutory 
compliance, for the evidence from probate inventories and censuses becomes thicker only as the 
colonial period ends.  If late colonial Americans were as non-compliant in regard to gun 
ownership as they were respecting tax payment and religious establishment, perhaps they were 
less obsessed with clinging to guns they did not have for individualistic property-focused 
purposes than they were animated with pro-militia and anti-army rhetoric for civic and 
republican ends. 
Churchill's essay is problematic not simply for evidentiary reasons.  His argument builds 
principally on the theoretical distinction between military authority to seize and police power to 
regulate guns, but this theoretical distinction may require substantial rethinking.  It is premised at 
least in part on the assumption that measures relying on military authority were extraordinary 
and rare, while exercises of the police power were quotidian and norm defining.  Even if this 
were true, however, it would in no way undermine the theory that fears of the standing armies 
and executive usurpation were central to the Second Amendment, for it was in extraordinary 
times of crises real or imagined or pre-textual that efforts to disarm the militia and set up a 
corrupt regime buttressed by the army were most to be expected.  Churchill's underlying 
assumption, however, is in fact not true for the generation that experienced the Revolution and 
the constitutional crisis.  As Alan Taylor among others reminds us, imperial wars between 
Britain and France were more common than not in the late colonial period, and those wars 
increasingly focused on the North American theater and increasingly mobilized the North 
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American population.  A native-born American aged fifty when the new national government 
convened in 1789 had known more years of war than peace.
11
  The great imperial and national 
political debates of that person's lifetime had focused on war, taxes to fund war, and the dangers 
of a government capable of enacting and enforcing the tax regime required to finance war or hold 
together a country sufficiently powerful to avoid war. 
If war, or fear of war, or the need to pay for or avoid war was the norm for the founding 
generation, perhaps this does not so much undermine Churchill's principal claim as suggest that 
national attitudes were bound to change.  Fears of undue assertions of military authority subsided 
in the decades that followed the revolutionary period, with a clearly civilian-controlled 
Jeffersonian system of governance firmly in place in the substantially demilitarized nation that 
became the antebellum republic.  But this does not get Churchill wholly off the hook.  His 
premises remain problematic for the earlier period in which he roots his analysis, and for colonial 
times, his terminological distinction between military powers and police powers in some respects 
is itself anachronistic. 
The sharp distinction between military and police powers makes much more sense under 
the system of federalism and separation of powers adopted in the U.S. Constitution of 1788 than 
it does for the colonial system of governance.  The national Constitution conveyed certain 
specified powers to the United States Congress (such as the power to raise and support armies), 
rested the Commander-in-Chief power in the federal presidency, and reserved the bulk of 
unspecified powers to the states, the latter including the general authority inherent in their quasi 
sovereign status and partly confirmed in the Tenth Amendment to make general policy 
respecting health, safety, and morals.  Whether the distinction between military and police 
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powers will bear as much weight as Churchill would load on it in colonial times is a more 
doubtful proposition.  The constitutional settlement reached during the Glorious Revolution in 
England left intact the royal prerogatives that Prince William insisted on keeping to make the 
Crown worthwhile, including those related to war and peace and command of the military.  In 
the eighteenth century, however, these devolved in practice to the cabinet and the prime minister. 
From 1689, military funding was required to flow from Parliament, and the Bill of Rights spoke 
of allowing protestant subjects such arms as were allowed by law.
12
 
On an ad hoc and imperfect basis, each colony's government of provincial assembly, 
governor, and council mirrored the British system, and during war time (which was, as 
mentioned above, as normal as not) military relations between colonial and royal government 
frequently became complicated and confused by the presence of regulars responsible directly to 
the Crown under whose commanders colonial militia sometimes served.  How meaningful it is in 
this context to attempt to label weapons seizures for purposes of militia arming (often carried out 
under imperial pressure to get more local troops in the field) exercises of either police or military 




The authority behind confiscation appears to have been sometimes 
imperial, sometimes local, sometimes prerogative, sometimes statutory, and sometimes a matter 
of ad hoc necessity.  It is likewise open to question whether the coming of independence marked 
any conceptual sharpening of the distinctions between police and military powers respecting the 
issue of guns, so much as it did a general heightening of the popular preference for militia over 
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regulars, and realization by the revolutionary leadership that regulars were as necessary during 
war as they were dangerous to peace and to republican principles. 
Churchill's essay is engaging and thought provoking throughout.  His central insight that 
power to regulate and power to confiscate are not one and the same is of crucial importance, both 
to understanding the meaning of the American right to arms at its origins, and to understanding 
the fevered politics that envelop that right in our own times.  I have doubts, however, that 
Churchill's distinction between authority under police and military powers offers a complete and 
accurate account of changing attitudes towards the militia and the right to arms in the founding 
and early national periods.  In his contribution to this volume, Saul Cornell has pointed to grave 
problems concerning Churchill's use of evidence from the constitutional period and from the 
nineteenth century.
14
  My own concerns focus on Churchill’s extrapolations from assumptions 
perhaps too hastily drawn about the meaning of arms ownership to Americans in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  While Churchill has raised interesting questions and 
offered intriguing insights, he has also made generalizations that his evidence is not strong 
enough to support.  In the end, I remain convinced that David Konig, Saul Cornell, and my late 
friend and mentor Richard Uviller and I were correct to stress the civic, militia-focused meaning 
of the right to arms that dominated discussion at the time of the Second Amendment's framing, 
and (as Cornell ably shows in this forum) continued to predominate long into the nineteenth 
century.  There were, to be sure, countervailing voices.  To ignore them would be false to the 
historical record and would wrongly deprive many enthusiastic supporters of a broad right to 
own guns of a sense of provenance to which they attach much meaning.  Churchill is right to 
take those voices seriously.  But in the article discussed here, Churchill exaggerates their 
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A CULTURAL TURN: REFLECTIONS ON  
RECENT HISTORICAL AND LEGAL  
WRITING ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
 
 
If commentators on the Second Amendment agree about anything at all, it is only that 
disputants parsing the meaning and importance of the constitutional right to arms cannot avoid 
involvement in a larger cultural war (and this is the term almost everyone employs)
1
 over the 
meaning and importance (vel non) of gun ownership to the American psyche and soul.  Almost 
every scholar discussed in this short, inexhaustive review of recent literature calls for reasoned 
moderation (the other calls for well armed chaos),
2
 but most writers in the field, including this 
one, and including those who neither own nor wish the government to seize guns find it all but 
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 See, e.g., DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: 
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th
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impossible to avoid being swept up (sometimes against their will) in the impassioned fray pitting 
the gun culture against the culture of would be “gun grabbers.”3  
 Disputes over the Second Amendment have taken a cultural turn—or indeed, have been 
in large measure culturally inspired, or even culturally determined from the beginning.
4
  This 
observation holds whether we trace the onset of controversy to the origins of the Amendment 
itself during the late eighteenth century, or to debates over federal gun policy in the late 1960s, 
or to the more recent upsurge in scholarly publication on the Amendment, first chiefly in the 
form of essays by advocates in the 1980s, and then, starting around 1989, in think pieces and 
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monographs authored by established and budding legal and historical academics.
5
  But to the 
extent that writing on the Second Amendment is not a special animal wholly apart and distinct 
from other species of constitutional scholarship,
6
 the pronounced cultural dimension to Second 
Amendment studies may actually suggest that reflection on the right to arms should take and is 
taking a prominent place in the academic mainstream, both in departments of history and schools 
of law.  In terms of becoming a hot topic and a paradigm shaper, the culturally inflected Second 
Amendment’s academic hour may be at hand in large part because culturally informed and 
culturally situated constitutional narratives of every stripe and every time period are fast 
becoming the order of the day for constitutionalists in both law and history faculties.  (I am not 
well enough acquainted with goings on in political science departments and schools of 
government to say whether this holds there as well, but I would hardly be surprised if it did.) 
Among historians, intellectual history of the constitutional era now embraces not just the 
writings of lawyers and political leaders, but the opinions of the people out of doors and the man 
and woman on the streets, the latter sort perhaps even holding pride of place over their more 
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powerful and privileged contemporaries.
7
  These historical inquiries could quite naturally map 
onto the original understanding queries of judicial interpretivists of an Antonin Scalia stripe, 
whose quest for legitimizing constitutional meaning prompts them to seek out the significance 
the ratifiers attached to constitutional text at its origins, at the moment We The People delegated 
our collective, sovereign authority to our constitutionally appointed agents.
8
  But, alas (for the 
popular cultural historian of constitutional thought craving direct contemporary relevance), 
Justice Scalia prefers dictionaries of the times and well known and widely distributed elite 
writings such as The Federalist Papers and Blackstone’s Commentaries as sources of 
enlightenment respecting open-ended phrases and ambiguous terms whose meaning does not 
plainly emerge from the constitutional text itself.
9
  Instead, culturally focused Second 
Amendment musings relate to the constitutional mainstream in the legal academy because 
emphasis on social movements and cultural evolution (probably most famously and 
paradigmatically in the work of Bruce Ackerman)
10
 dominate recent articulations of the 
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DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA 1788-1828 (1999); LARRY D. KRAMER, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE: WRITING THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
(Sandra F. VanBurkleo et al. eds., 2002) (including contributions by David Thomas Konig, 
Robert J. Kaczorowski, William M. Wiecek, G. Edward White, Henry N. and Jane L. Scheiber, 
Cynthia Harrison, Michael R. Belknap, John W. Johnson, Kermit L. Hall, VanBurkleo, Mark 
Tushnet, and Norman L. Rosenberg); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).  To take an extreme example, Peter 
Thompson, author of RUM, PUNCH AND REVOLUTION, TAVERNGOING AND PUBLIC LIFE IN 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHILADELPHIA (1998) and authority on drinking in Philadelphia pubs, 
recently informed me with no sense of irony that his investigations into pub culture amounted to 
real history (some would counter they amount to abuse of mind and body), whereas my parsing 
and contextualizing (in a national political sense) of judicial opinions did not. 
8
 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(1997). 
9
 Id. at 38, 130. 
10
 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991), and ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).   But see Eric Foner, The Strange Career of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, 108 YALE L.J. 2003 (1998) (making the point that Ackerman’s 
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constitutional narrative, especially in so far as that narrative strives to situate an account of 
constitutional change not just within the shifting ideological fashions of the lawyerly and judicial 
elite, but within the far broader evolution of thought within the democratic polity.
11
 
 In this comment, I will survey a select few of the most recent culturally inspired accounts 
of the Second Amendment’s origins and meanings that have appeared since the late Richard 
Uviller and I published our principal Second Amendment thoughts in a short monograph in late 
2002.
12
  As Richard would have said, disowning the textualist’s maxim inclusio unius est 
exclusio alterius, no slight is intended to those pieces not discussed, and I mean not to imply that 
they are less important or interesting than those that are.  But the field is not just burgeoning, it is 
exploding into lavish bloom, and keeping up with the literature has become as well-nigh 
impossible as keeping pace with recent writings in the other scholarly area that has occupied me 
most of the past decade, that of Jefferson and slavery.   Then, too, there is the problem that much 
of the literature in the Second Amendment field is repetitive, pugnacious, and—to myself as 
much as to persons at other ends of the cultural spectrum—ideologically distasteful, making 
many pieces less than inviting to engage.
13
  The pieces considered here, a monograph by David 
                                                                                                                                                                           
“popular” history actually relies mainly on inside Washington sources and that his interpretation 
of constitutional change during the Civil War and Reconstruction is seriously flawed in its 
neglect of the abolitionist movement’s transformative impact on constitutional thought). 
11
 See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2003), containing 
contributions by Stephen Ansolabehere, R. Richard Banks, David E. Bernstein, Ashutosh A. 
Bhagwat, Vincent Blasi, Jim Chen, Dorf, Christopher Eisgruber, Garret Epps, Daniel Farber, 
Lucinda M. Finley, Michael J. Gerhardt, Neil Gotanda, Cheryl I. Harris, Samuel Issacharoff, 
Michael W. McConnell, Seana V. Shiffrin, and Mark V. Tushnet.  
12
 H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, 
OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002). 
13
 On Second Amendment writing’s frequently vitriolic and unscholarly character, even 
in (legal) academic journals, see, e.g., Cornell, supra note 4; Saul A. Cornell, “Don’t Know 
Much About History:” The Current Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 
657 (2002); Rakove, supra note 4; Spitzer, History, Politics, or Theory, supra note 5; Spitzer, 





 a pseudonymous (and hilarious) satire by Jim Chen under the name Gil 
Grantmore,
15
 several contributions to a 2004 Fordham Law Review symposium, short comments 
by Jonathan Simon,
16
 and an incorporation related essay by Akhil Amar
17
 (building on his own
18
 
and Robert Cottol & David Diamond’s19 more detailed earlier work in the area), pave the way 
for my closing thoughts on the cultural significance (to Americans generally, to African 
Americans past and present, and to gays and lesbians) of an incorporated or unincorporated right 
to arms in an America where yesterday’s “out” culture now has friends in high and powerful 
places. 
Back in 1989, in a piece that helped make the Second Amendment a respectable topic for 
academic discussion at academic institutions, Sandy Levinson poignantly mapped out the 
cultural conflict over gun ownership and regulation even as he called for academics to think 
more seriously about the merits of the NRA’s individualistic reading of the right to arms.20  The 
conflict was well-defined then and has only intensified since, with no signs of abatement on the 
horizon.  Scholarly writing on the Second Amendment during 1990s was certainly inspired and 
shaped by the gun culture wars, and the two opposing cultural camps each had an allied school of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Second Amendment scholarship has actually become less savage and more thoughtful, with 
more academics joining advocates in the arena, and those academics devoting more serious and 
nuanced reflection to the subject than scholars did in the 1990s.  That said, the Second 
Amendment game is still unusually brutal, and, apparently, uncommonly attractive to hacks and 
charlatans of various stripes. 
14
 WILLIAMS, supra note 1.  
15
 Grantmore, supra note 2. 
16
 Jonathan Simon, Gun Rights and the Constitutional Significance of Violent Crime, 12 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 335 (2004). 
17
 Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 890 (2001). 
18
 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998). 
19
 Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991). 
20
 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, YALE L. J. 637 (1989).  
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Second Amendment interpreters:  the individual rights writers (arguing that the Amendment 
protected a private right to arms for a broad array of purposes not necessarily linked to militia 
service) embraced by the gun culture, and the states’ rights theorists (arguing that the 
Amendment protected state militia against federal disarmament) endorsed by the anti-gun 
culture.
21
  Yet published analysis of the right to arms during that period did not dwell heavily on 
cultural concerns as such, but rather engaged the subject on grounds of textualism and 
originalism.
22
  In terms of sheer numbers of publications and volume of print, the individual 
rights school (partly financed by generous grants from the NRA)
23
 opened up a substantial lead, 
but by the beginning of the new century the states right school (partly financed by generous 
grants from at least one organization that did not share the NRA’s ideals) was closing the gap, 
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 The most prolific gun friendly Second Amendment writers in the 1990s included Don 
B. Kates, Stephen Halbrook, Brannon Denning, and David B. Kopel; prominent voices in the 
outnumbered regulation friendly camp included Dennis Henigan, Carl Bogus, and David 
Williams. See Spitzer, Lost and Found, supra note 5, at 392-401.  
22
 See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 309 (1998); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. 
U.L. REV. 107 (1991); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 
GA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Glen H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. 
L. REV. 461 (1995); Van Alstyne, supra note 4. 
23
 See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A 
Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 14-15 (2000). 
24
 Ten contributions critical of the individual rights interpretation of the Second 
Amendment appeared in Symposium on the Second Amendment: Fresh Looks in 76 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. (2000); presentation and publication of the papers was supported by the Joyce Foundation. 
See Bogus, supra note 23, at 14-15.  Historians critical of the thesis that the Amendment was 
intended to protect a wholly private right unconnected to militia service include Saul Cornell, 
Paul Finkelman, David Konig, Jack Rakove, Lois Schwoerer, and Robert Shalhope (who 
formerly endorsed the private rights view); among historians less skeptical of the private rights 
view are Robert Churchill and James Henretta; and those fully supportive of the individualistic 
reading include Robert Cottrol and Leonard Levy.   
70 
 
 Today, it would be an oversimplification to describe Second Amendment scholarship as 
bifurcated between states rights and individual rights enthusiasts.  There is an emerging middle 
ground, popular particularly among historians.  David Thomas Konig, Saul Cornell, Richard 
Primus, as well as Richard Uviller and I, have urged acceptance of a centrist position, 
acknowledging that the right to arms was intended to attach to individuals, but stressing that it 
was also understood to serve overwhelmingly public purposes rather than private ones such a 
personal self-defense or the needs of hunters.
25
  If truth be told, however, while all of the just 
named individuals have urged abandonment of both the states’ rights and private rights models, 
each of us has generally reserved the greater part of his critique and condemnation for the private 
rights interpretation of the Amendment.  Indeed, in attacking the private rights model, we 
frequently cite Jack Rakove, Carl Bogus, Paul Finkelman, and other scholars who remain more 
or less firmly attached to the familiar states’ rights reading.26  More clearly neutral in his 
embrace of “a third way” is David C. Williams, whose recent Mythic Meanings of the Second 
Amendment is discussed shortly.
27
  Williams, like Uviller and Merkel, stresses the republican 
roots of the Second Amendment;
28
 Saul Cornell and Dave Konig have aptly labeled the right a 
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 RICHARD PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF RIGHTS, 102-103 (1999); UVILLER AND 
MERKEL, supra note 12; Saul A. Cornell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 22 L. & 
HIST. REV. 161 (2004); David T. Konig, The Persistance of Resistance: Civic Rights, Natural 
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Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (2000); Rakove, supra 
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 See Williams, supra note 1, at 133.  
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 See, e.g., David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The 
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David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and the Second Amendment: Conjuring with the 
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 thereby capturing the same public purposes quality of the right that Williams, Lois 
Schwoerer, and I would link to its ideological origins, pointedly adopting an idiom no longer 
quite so fashionable as it was twenty or thirty years ago.
30
 
 In addition to the growing camp in the middle of the Second Amendment field, there is 
now much fissuring and flowering at the fertile and fascinating margins.  Without too much 
straining, one could fairly easily tally up at least six variants of Second Amendment thought 
prominently debated in recent literature.  The familiar two models of states’ rights and private 
rights and the emerging centrist path describing a personal liberty that has meaning and 
substance only in the social context of civic obligation carried out within a public organization 
have at least three rivals.  There is the highly significant variant of the states right model put 
forward by Carl Bogus, in which the right to arms is tainted by its linkage to slavery and the 
“hidden” purpose of protecting the slave patrols of the South against Federal disarmament.31  
The private rights reading, for its part, may or may not emphasize a right to insurrection 
allegedly attendant to the right to arms.  (As discussed below respecting David Williams’ recent 
work, the same holds for the centrist model.)  And finally, several interesting attempts have been 
made to explore the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the Second Amendment, including, 
most prominently, Akhil Reed Amar’s argument that the individualistic Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment severed the right to arms from its communal 
roots in the militia, thereby creating a purely private right designed to allow the freed people of 
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 UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 12, at 248-52. 
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 See WILLIAMS, supra note 1; Lois Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English 
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the South to protect themselves against racist reprisals by discontented ex-Confederates 
reorganized into the Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups.
32
    
 Like Second Amendment writing of the early and mid nineties, much of the work just 
described focuses on originalist concerns.  But the overall emphasis is clearly shifting from 
textualist orginalism to purposivist originalism, and hence from dictionaries to cultural context, 
from parsing constitutional language to pondering cultural sources of meaning and even purpose.  
No recent scholar of the Second Amendment has taken so pointedly a cultural perspective as 
David C. Williams.  In this respect, Williams was very much ahead of the curve, focusing on the 
cultural context of the Amendment at its origins and in its operation in modern times in a series 
of law review pieces he authored in the nineties while most commentators in the field were still 
busily milking familiar parcels of original source material with dogged determinism and stoic 
disregard for their own historical ignorance.
33
  But his major monograph of 2003 does much 
more than sum up and reiterate his earlier work.  Mythic Meanings of the Second Amendment 
develops the premise that national constitutions do more than create structures and enumerate 
rights and powers, they also embody the foundation mythology of the constitutional orders they 
establish.  Especially in the United States, the Constitution is a constitutive element not just of 
organic law, but of organic nationhood.  And when definitions of nationhood are contested as 
they are in the United States today, rival constitutional mythologies join battle in a struggle to 
define cultural legitimacy.  Bedrock America, largely conservative and anti-cosmopolitan, places 
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an individualistic Second Amendment at the center of its foundation narrative of self-reliance; 
elite America, blind and often hostile to provincial ways, relegates armed individualism to an 
atavistic past that constitutional democracy was designed to overcome.
34
 
                                                     
34
 See WILLIAMS, supra note 1.  Bedrock America’s attitudes on this front are captured 
starkly in Hank Williams Jr.’s 1981 recording, A Country Boy Can Survive: 
 
The preacher man says its the end of time 
and the Mississippi River she's a going dry. 
The interest is up and the stock markets down 
and you only get mugged if you go downtown. 
I live back in the woods you see, 
my woman, and the kids and the dogs and me. 
I got a shotgun and a rifle and a four wheel drive 
and a country boy can survive. Country folks can survive. 
 
I can plow a field all day long, 
I can catch catfish from dusk till dawn. 
Make our own whiskey and our own smoke too 
ain't too many things these boys can't do. 
We grow good old tomatoes and homemade wine 
and country boy can survive, country folk can survive. 
 
Because you can't stomp us out and you can't make us run, 
cause we're them ole boys raised on shotguns. 
We say grace and we say mam 
and if you ain't into that we don't give a damn. 
We came from the West Virginia coal mines 
and the Rocky Mountains and the Western skies 
and we can skin a buck, we can run a trout line 
and a country boy can survive, country folks can survive. 
 
I had a good friend in New York City 
he never called me by my name just hillbilly. 
My Grandpa taught me how to live off the land 
and his taught him to be a business man 
He used to send me pictures of the Broadway Nights 
and I would send him some homemade wine 
but he was killed by a man with a switchblade knife, 
for forty three dollars my friend lost his life. 
I'd love to spit some beechnut in that dudes eyes 
and shoot him with my ole forty-five 




 With this focus on the role of contesting visions of the Second Amendment’s meaning, 
purpose, and importance always in mind, David Williams analyzes in piercing detail how various 
subgroups within cosmopolitan and bedrock America have come to see subgroups on the 
opposite side of the great cultural divide as illegitimate and dangerous, even as un-American and 
outside the pale.  This, to Williams, is particularly troubling, because in his analysis the Second 
Amendment was not in its origins about self-defense or even about federalism, but 
fundamentally about the right and the power to revolt against corrupt government.  Williams 
rejects the notion that the founders and framers believed that they were creating a system of 
governance that could endure for all ages.  In the back of their minds was the grim realization 
that every previous republic had failed.
35
  Nor, says Williams, should we today complacently 
assume that over two centuries of constitutional success augurs eternal grace and infallibility.   
Tyranny is always possible, and woe unto a people that is without remedy.  The Second 
Amendment, in this calculus, securing an armed populace acting communally in organized 




                                                                                                                                                                           
 
'Cause you can't stomp us out and you can't make us run, 
and we're them ole boys raised on shotguns. 
We say grace, we say mam, 
if you ain't into that we don't give a damn. 
We're from North California and South Alabam' 
and little towns all around this land. 
We can skin a buck, and run a trout line 
and a country boy can survive, 
country folks can survive . . . . 
HANK WILLIAMS JR., A Country Boy Can Survive, on THE PRESSURE IS ON (Warner Brothers 
1981).  
35
 See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 22-26.  
36
 See id. at  121-28. 
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 The problem with this realization, as Williams emphasizes, is that the concept of a united 
American people, if ever there was one, is no longer tenable.
37
  Modern society is hopelessly (or 
beneficially) pluralistic and factional.  It is fragmented along regional, economic, and ethnic 
lines.  Women and men, straight and gay, rural and urban, black and white, new immigrants and 
old, may form separate and at time irreconcilable interests.  Each of those groups, in turn, is itself 
divided and subdivided.  Visions of a single people, rising up against oppression, inform the 
Second Amendment, but today we do not see ourselves as a single people.  And a rising by a part 
against the whole—even if the part views itself as the only legitimate claimant to true 
nationhood—is not a revolution against remote and oppressive government, but a factional revolt 
against the nation.
38
  Williams can end only with a plea for understanding, love, and 
reconciliation.  Can’t we all get along?  Let us not rise against each other, but watch over the 
government, so that we can rise together, as the Second Amendment intended, if ever our agents 
in Washington go over to wielding the powers of government to deliver unbearable oppression to 
the people they are charged to serve.
39
 
 Williams’ analysis is so interesting in part because it dwells on the right to revolution to 
the exclusion of all other considerations.  But it is also one-sided.  In our book, Richard Uviller 
and I may have understated the revolutionary purpose of the right to arms, but surely, David 
Williams overstates it in his.  Williams and I would agree that the Amendment is not at its core 
about hunting, or defending the home against burglars, but about enabling the militia, and the 
individuals who comprise the militia.  Williams, however, hones in only on the final purpose of 
the militia in the event all else fails and the constitutional order itself collapses, leaving no other 
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remedies to an aggrieved people but to turn against the government.  And doubtless there are, 
even today, eager souls attending watchfully for the fateful moment when just such a scenario 
comes true, so that they may strike a hero’s pose in the final chapter of the American 
constitutional saga.  But such was not the vision of the Philadelphia conventioneers who wove 
our constitutional fabric. 
To be sure, the founders saw the power to raise and maintain a standing army as a 
necessary evil, and this of all powers they would not leave unchecked.
40
  Many of the founders, 
and more of the Anti-Federalists, who agitated for a Bill of Rights,
41
 preferred that the nation 
place its first reliance on local citizen militia rather than professional soldiery.  What they 
stressed, and what Williams plays down, is that the very presence of a useful militia made 
tyranny less likely.  With a militia available to provide initial defense, and the new nation 
protected by a vast ocean separating it from the major powers of the day, there was little reason 
to maintain a professional army large enough to tempt an aspiring tyrant in the capital into 
moving against the legislature, the states, or the people.  And so long as the nation stayed out of 
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 See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 12, at 76-78. 
41
 See id. at 78-91. Williams may lay too much stock in the utterances of Anti-Federalists 
as he assesses the original meaning of the Second Amendment.  As Paul Finkelman insightfully 
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 See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 12, at 77-78, 109-24. 
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Armies, moreover, were dangerous not just because a hopelessly fallen executive might 
turn them on the people.  They were dangerous in the first place because (unlike militias) they 
were expensive, and required taxes, placemen, and contractors to keep them up.  Short of 
ultimate collapse into unconstitutional rule, it was deficit spending that made the military so 
potentially enervating on the body politic.  There was a long, long slippery slope descending into 
a sea of horribles associated with abandonment of the militia in favor of an army, and, contra 
Williams, the numerous dreadful stopping points along that shore (taxes, deficits, corruption, 
centralization, empire, foreign wars, pressing and conscription) were as much feared as the 
ultimate abyss of dictatorship and attending revolution and civil war.
43
  In fact, the horrible of 
horribles upon which Williams dwells often went unmentioned, for reasons not just of prudence, 
but because of faith that checks and balances and safety valves less drastic than armed revolution 
against the president would forestall constitutional crisis before the collapse of the constitutional 
order itself.  Indeed, there is something faintly illogical about Williams’ faith that if the 
constitutional system collapses into full-fledged extra-constitutional tyranny, a constitutionally 
specified mechanism will remain in place to afford a remedy.
44
  For once the Constitution is 
dead, appeals will lie not to the Bill of Rights, but to natural law, and to Heaven.
45
   
From the time he fist turned his attention to the Second Amendment, Williams has 
developed fascinating arguments concerning the difficulty and desirability of applying (and 
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 To his credit, William admits as much himself, but argues that those values of the old 
order enshrined in the Second Amendment – nationhood, civic consciousness, preference for 
civilian rule to military dictatorship – would live on and help channel the behavior of well-
meaning members of the new revolutionary order seeking to stabilize and legitimize a new 
constitutional state by reference to the most cherished values of the old.  On a less rarefied plane, 
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grave danger of failing to apply) the civic-republican inspired text of the amendment in a 
decidedly post-virtuous, now indelibly liberal, and deeply divided society.
46
  His main theme in 
Mythic Meanings is that reconstituting the people by forging a new consensus around core 
constitutional values will facilitate, if not unity, at least sufficient solidarity to allow the people 
to resist the government in case of grave oppression.  And that moment, Williams is sure, will 
come and must come in the fullness of time.
47
 
There is however another strategy for reanimating the civic culture so much desired by 
the framers of the Second Amendment, and Williams hints at it in his coda and explores it more 
fully in his earlier writing.  Militia-equivalent mandatory public service might not stave off 
tyranny, but it would engender popular engagement with common concerns, and this would 
foster a culture less likely to empower or tolerate political leaders likely to become usurpers.
48
  
But there is another, and perhaps more powerful, Second-Amendment-style remedy to the 
nation’s arguable ills, and this plank of a civic restoration agenda Williams does not pursue.  I 
have in mind forsaking what the framers of the Second Amendment viewed as the core evils to 
be contrasted with the republican militia.  These baneful things include the overlarge standing 
army and all its corollary perils—the army contractors, the heavy taxes to pay them and support 
the soldiers, the deficit spending, the civilian officials too beholden to the army’s bidding, the 
temptation to empire, glory, and overseas adventures, the officer corps eager to push the cause 
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for intervention and engagement.
49
  To be overly enthusiastic about the Army (or an army, 
before we were reconciled to the Army)—and certainly to be inspired by the prospect of the 
Army’s overseas deployment—was once highly suspect, dare I say, conspiratorial, monarchical, 
un-Jeffersonian, almost un-American.  Times have surely changed. 
Ultimately, Williams and I both acknowledge that the passing of the culture of the 
framers makes this oddest of Amendments difficult to apply in modern times.  But we 
profoundly differ over what it is that fundamentally differentiates our society from the culture 
that spawned the constitutional right to arms.  Williams points to greater pluralism.  I counter 
that the real difference is that today we are enamored of the standing army.  As a people, we 
prefer power to virtue.  We have grown to like military contractors and overseas military 
adventures and to live with high taxes and huge deficits.  We want military bases in our 
neighborhoods.  We fight to keep them from closing just as New Englanders of 1775 fought to 
shut them down.  Williams and I concur only in so far as we both recognize that deep down, the 
Second Amendment speaks somehow to profound changes in this nation’s culture; we differ over 
what those relevant changes are, and over what remedies the second article of the Bill of Rights 
inspires. 
To Jim Chen, the Second Amendment illustrates not so much that American culture on 
the whole has lost its moorings, but that legal academic culture is profoundly out of whack.  We 
split into camps and reason in isolation, divorced from the social reality that the law reform we 
debate might one day shape.  Writing as Gil Grantmore, Chen satirizes the Second Amendment 
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disputes in the legal academy to brilliant effect in his article The Phages of American Law.
50
   
Apart from playing on Grant Gilmore’s Ages of American Law,51 the cryptic title suggests that 
the Second Amendment is operating like a virus of illogic to eat up what remains of reason 
within the legal academy.  His point is trenchant.  It’s also very funny, and quite humbling.  This 
admittedly gullible writer worked his way two-thirds through the piece with mounting 
frustration, making copious notes in the margins attacking this point or that on grounds of 
alleged overstatement, before the veil dropped and I reconciled myself to the experience of a 
most enjoyable satire.  But Chen writes not just to amuse; he raises at least two substantive issues 
about the Second Amendment that merit serious reflection here.
52
  
First, Chen emphasizes that gun enthusiasts champion the Second Amendment right to 
arms, often stressing the universal character of the militia.  But in the process, he reminds us, 
they forget all about the militia powers—which could have sweeping effects, if gun rights 
ideology premised on the universality of the militia obligation were carried to its logical ends.
53
  
Under Article I Section 8 clause 15, Congress can make provision for the President to call on the 
services of militia members, and under Article I Section 8 clause 16, Congress regulate their 
conduct while they train and carry out their duty.  Militia members, if called out to serve or train, 
would in turn become subject to martial discipline, and suffer grave restrictions of their Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights in the process.
54
  Since even the Emerson Court allows that 
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 Chen developed other intriguing insights in his presentation at the Standard conference 
that I will not take up in detail in this comment. Perhaps most notable among them is the novel 
and ingenious argument that the Fourteenth Amendment not only does not incorporate a private 
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the Second Amendment right is subject to searching regulation,
55
 the benefits attendant to a 
revitalization of the militia appear costly indeed, given the severe diminution in autonomy 
freedom-loving Americans would suffer in exchange for a limited right to own and carry 
firearms.  “Minutemen” offering their services as self-appointed border vigilantes might 
accordingly wish to think twice before convincing congresspersons or state legislators that their 
labors really amount to militia duty contemplated in the rubric of the Second Amendment.
56
 
Second, Chen savages John Lott’s More Guns, Less Crime57 hypothesis, by undertaking a 
detailed investigation of the comprehensive system of laws banning passengers from carrying 
firearms on commercial aircraft.  These laws, Chen demonstrates, have made airplanes and 
airports statistically two of the safest places in the country, even after all the tragic deaths of 
September 11, 2001 are factored into the equation.
58
  Randy Barnett of course is certain that we 
would be safer still on planes if the right to carry guns on board were vouched safe to the general 
militia—that is, in his reckoning, the entire population, or at least that large swath of the 
population Congress defines as members of the unorganized militia (on whose services it has not 
called since the Civil War).
59
  As Chen suggests, this is debatable.
60
 
Indeed, there are probably a great many people who would not think of getting on a plane 
if commercial airliners became the gun culture’s Elysium.  My own intuitions are that for every 
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would-be terrorist thwarted by decent red-blooded travelers, there would be hundreds if not 
thousands of random victims of high-strung, officious, air-born gun slingers.  Every one of us 
would be at risk of becoming the next nervous Brazilian on the London Underground who over 
staid his student visa and paid the ultimate price for society’s frayed nerves.61  As a former 
insurance lawyer, I would certainly counsel against underwriting coverage for any South Asian 
or Arab-looking person seeking to fly if Professor Barnett’s vision were implemented.  And as a 
pragmatic objection to his proposed constitutionally mandated reform, there remains the 
technical problem illustrated by the unforgettable image of Goldfinger being sucked out the 
window of the plane he had just shot out with his gold-handled gun in the third Bond film.
62
   
With pilots any less skilled than Pussy Galore at the helm, otherwise innocent libertarians who 
had defiantly unbuckled their seat belts might well suffer defenestration of truly Praguean 
moment just because the strapped militia man in the next row took exception to a fellow 
passenger of Muslim countenance.
63
  
Chen’s lampoon of methodologies should be widely read for its salubrious effect on legal 
thinking.  My encounter with Chen’s wit caused me to revisit my objections to a peculiar species 
of speciousness long rife in the legal academic community, plain meaning style textualism.  Few 
legal tropes escape Chen’s incisive critique, but, in truth, he (like the ever charitable David 
Williams) goes far too easy on the casual, untenable history that underlies much Second 
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 Having discussed this issue with physicist and engineering friends from my graduate 
school days, I have been reassured that the more likely hazards associated with the discharge of 
firearms onboard commercial airliners include (i) the uncontrolled combustion of airline fuel 
resulting in a catastrophic explosion, (ii) the rapid loss of cabin pressure causing suffocation (as 
opposed to defenestration), (iii) and sudden cooling leading to fatal hypothermia (as recently 
occurred in a disaster over Greece). Thus, my unscientific poll of (two) scientists suggested a 
solid consensus that use of firearms on passenger jets would be ill advised.  
83 
 
Amendment writing.  The legal academy perhaps conditions its members to lay more stock on 
cleverness than empirical accuracy.  And the cultural history now in fashion is by its nature less 
verifiable than document-based political or intellectual history.  Still, much of the history that 
supplies the allegedly empirical basis for Second Amendment theorizing cannot be taken 
seriously on its own terms, and would be censured in any vigorous undergraduate program even 
in an educational milieu otherwise committed to positive reinforcement.  Nowhere is this more 
true than in the case of textualist investigations which resort to historical materials wrested from 
context only to illustrate the “plain meaning” of isolated terms not adequately elucidated by Dr. 
Johnson or Noah Webster.
64
  
  Granted, historical truth in non-ascertainable.  And granted too that multiple 
perspectives have their validity.  But demonstrable historical falsehood is a recognizable beast, 
and one of its favorite stomping grounds is textualist inspired Second Amendment theory.   If 
originalism is to have a greater claim to legitimacy than the parlor game of naked textualism with 
its dictionaries and offhand references to the Federalist and Blackstone merits on its own,
65
 if 
inquiry into meaning and purpose is more than a semantic exercise for arm chair (as opposed to 
laboring)
66
 philosophers, if fidelity to constituted text involves some duty to attempt to come 
close to figuring out what the originators and ratifiers of that text actually thought they were 
doing, then there is a need to call out implausible and preposterous historical assertions premised 
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on a-contextual and misinformed readings of documentary fragments by persons lacking any 
perspective and grounding in the thinking of the founding period. 
I do not mean to imply hereby that it is necessarily a good thing to live under a two 
centuries old constitution, or that living under a constitution of that vintage, one must read it 
entirely in the light in which it was originally understood.  My claim here is much narrower.  It is 
simply that those who call themselves originalists (or even textualists), those who base the 
legitimacy of the interpretation they offer on its alleged fidelity to a past understanding, place 
themselves under an obligation to advance an account of that past understanding that is not 
demonstrably counter-factual, naive, or absurd, and that this holds whether one’s perspective is 
essentially elitist (framer-focused) or popular (We the People focused).  Holding originalists to a 
standard of accuracy (or non-inaccuracy, to be more precise) is very probably a task more suited 
to constitutional historians than theorists, which brings me to consideration of several intriguing 
paper presented at Fordham in 2004 by historians and others much concerned with the Second 
Amendment. 
From Erwin Chemerinsky’s keynote address through panels on historical, legal, public 
policy, and cultural perspectives, the Fordham symposium on the Second Amendment was 
dominated by consciousness of the cultural situation in which gun rights-related discourse has 
been articulated.
67
  For constitutional historians working in history faculties, and constitutional 
theorists and doctrinalists working in law schools, this reflects a remarkable shift in emphasis 
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from elite to popular perspectives that has radically transformed both professions in the last 
generation, and, more particularly, in the last decade.  Yet this transition from elite-focused to 
popular and culturally inflected constitutional history should not serve as a license to invent 
narratives the record will not bear, at least as long as the root purpose of the inquiry remains a 
quest for legitimacy beginning in some form of original meaning and understanding.  Unlike 
much Second Amendment literature, each of the three historical papers offered at Fordham—by 
Saul Cornell and Nathan DeDino, James A. Henretta, and David Thomas Konig (none of whom, 
to my knowledge, is a committed originalist)—demonstrate painstaking and admirable efforts to 
remain faithful to the past.    
 Cornell and DeDino took aim squarely at untenable and a-contextual historical assertions 
common in the Second Amendment writings of individual rights theorists including Randy 
Barnett and Don B. Kates, Eugene Volokh, Joyce Lee Malcolm, David I. Caplan, and David B. 
Kopel.
68
  In endeavoring to resurrect the statutory context and cultural assumptions that 
enveloped the right to arms written into the Second Amendment, Cornell and DeDino stress the 
point that “the ideal of liberty at the root of militia was not part of a radical individualist and 
anti-statist ideology.”69  Instead, the right to arms found expression in a world much more deeply 
committed to communal, civic obligations than our own, in which liberties and duties 
intertwined in a fashion difficult for adherents of postmodern radical individualism to accept.  
Cornell and DeDino pay close attention to the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776, 
which contains the first American reference to the right to arms and is often cited by 
individualists to support a private rights interpretation.  Article XIII of the Declaration provided 
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that “the people have a right to bear arms for defence of themselves and the state,” but adjoining 
passages in that Article and other passages in Article VIII illuminate the civic, corporate context 
in which this right was asserted.  Not only was the language just quoted from Article XIII 
coupled to an admonition not to keep up standing armies and to maintain civilian supremacy 
over the military, but Article VIII also set out an obligation of civilian military service to the 
state and a conscientious objector proviso, pointedly stressing the connection between civic 
obligation and arms bearing.
70
 
 One of the most intriguing points Cornell and Dedino made at Fordham concerns the 
pervasiveness of regulations pertaining to gun use and ownership in colonial, revolutionary, and 
early national periods.  James Madison, principal draftsman of the Second Amendment, favored 
toughening Virginia’s game laws to increase penalties for using guns for nonmilitary purposes 
outside of ones own enclosed grounds.
71
  A popular founding-era guidebook for sheriffs, 
constables, and justices of the peace contained detailed procedures for disarming individuals who 
broke the peace.
72
  Militia regulations concerning arms were extensive, reaching confiscation of 
weapons belonging to persons who declined to take loyalty oaths to the new American 
governments.
73
  Gun powder storage was closely policed in the eighteenth century, and by the 
early nineteenth century, local and state laws prohibited carrying concealed weapons.
74
  Other 
laws of the early national period banned shooting in cities and along public roads.
75
 
To contemporaries and near contemporaries of the framers and ratifiers of the Second 
Amendment, the right to arms was thus not only more civic than privatistic, it also happily 
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existed alongside a wide array of regulations and restrictions pertaining to arms possession and 
use.  But perhaps this is not the whole story, and it may be that Cornell and DeDino will not have 
the last word in this never-ending dispute.  As Robert Churchill maintains in an upcoming article 
in Law and History Review, regulation is one thing, and prohibition—and especially prohibition 
reaching loyal, law-abiding white citizens—another.76  And as James Henretta (anticipating 
Churchill) pointed out in rebuttal to Cornell and DeDino at Fordham, some voices celebrated a 
mixed private/public and perhaps in some cases purely private right to arms in the eighteenth 
century, and their chorus quickened (or so the argument goes) as the new nation expanded.
77
  
Then again, as David Thomas Konig trenchantly remarked closing out the historical discussion at 
Fordham, not every strain of radical, populist, agrarian, anti-statist, and indeed anti-legal thought 
that at various times gained currency on the eighteenth or nineteenth century American periphery 
ripened into accepted constitutional principle.  Antinomian gun wielding was in fact not elevated 
to sanctity in higher law by good faith participants in the constitutional process, because they, 
like Locke and Jefferson, realized that those rare revolutionary reversions to the state of nature 
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brought on by extraordinary oppression must give way quickly to constituted and ordered liberty, 
and not become recipes for eternal, fatal disorder.
78
 
 Another insightful perspective of the violence-inflected Second Amendment is Jonathan 
Simon’s, which, since it was articulated as a brief comment reviewing a book by other authors, 
may not have attracted the attention it deserves.
79
  Professor Simon looks not to the role of arms 
bearing at the time of the framing, but to fears of lawlessness and brutality in our own times.  He 
believes with Bruce Ackerman that Article V does not offer an exclusive definition of means for 
amending the Constitution.  For Ackerman and Simon, constitutional crisis, ratifying election, 
and judicial reinterpretation can legitimize changed meaning of constitutional language 
according to the paradigm established during the New Deal, when the Commerce Clause was 
reinterpreted to give Congress plenary authority to enact economic and social regulations.  Since 
at least the 1960s, Simon argues, growing numbers of Americans have seen the militia rather 
differently than did their militia-focused ancestors.  In large part, Simon suggests, this changed 
perception reflects the nation’s contemporary fixation with the danger of violent crime, and the 
perceived need of citizens to defend themselves privately when and where the police cannot or 
will not do so.  For many for whom these concerns loom most important, the Second 
Amendment has become a cherished icon of self-empowerment and liberty against violent 
attack.  The militia-focused reading of the Amendment the Supreme Court issued in United 
States v. Miller in 1939
80
 does not comport with their demand that the Constitution protect their 
right to self-defense by the means they deem necessary and most effective, and so they demand 
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that the Court revisit, correct, and clarify its understanding of the right to arms.  In this reading, 
an Ackermanian moment is at hand, and a constitutional sea change is in the offing. 
 
The Right to Arms and the Fourteenth Amendment 
  Of all the recent contributions to Second Amendment scholarship discussed so far, only 
those by Jim Chen (a.k.a. Gil Grantmore) and the team of Saul Cornell and Nathan DeDino have 
engaged in detail Akhil Amar’s intriguing thesis that the framers of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the right to arms as a fundamental right 
inherent in national citizenship that they and the ratifiers of the Amendment intended to apply 
against the states to facilitate self-defense of freepersons and Southern Republicans threatened by 
the Ku Klux Klan.  The right to arms, Amar has argued, was liberated from its textual linkage to 
the now discredited militia during Reconstruction, and reborn as a private, individual liberty. 
 Inspired in part by Robert Cottrol and Raymond Diamond’s call for an Afro-centrist 
reconsideration of the right to arms,
81
 Amar first articulated his argument in two articles in the 
Yale Law Journal in the early 1990s,
82
 and then, in synthesized form in his book The Bill of 
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction in 1998.  Richard Uviller (with some minor contributions 
from me) engaged Amar’s central themes in our book, The Militia and the Right to Arms, in 
2002.
83
  I was not yet aware when we submitted our book manuscript that Professor Amar had 
offered up an even more refined version of Fourteenth Amendment take on the right to arms.  In 
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a lecture delivered in Salt Lake City and reprinted in the Utah Law Review in 2001,
84
 Amar 
incorporated new angles and turns into his original theory which are at once fascinating and 
ingenious.  But Amar’s revised version of the refined right depends on three gigantic leaps of 
faith, all of which may be misguided, and only two of which have been tentatively embraced by 
jurists other than Justice Thomas and academicians other than Amar himself.   
 The first of these bold premises is that the framers and ratifiers intended total 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights via the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  The second asserts 
that the framers and ratifiers also intended to sever the Second Amendment right to arms from its 
textual linkage to the militia in the process.  The third is that the process of selective 
incorporation via the Due Process Clause slowly embraced by the Court through the twentieth 
century (well, beginning in 1897 actually)
85
 was misguided and unwarranted, and should be 
disowned.  Amar’s case for all three propositions is essentially originalist.  But he has little 
constitutional text to go on as he builds his argument—except the open ended Privileges and 
Immunities Clause itself—for the framers did not write into the Amendment “apply the first 
eight (or nine) amendments to the states, privatize the right to arms, and do so via privileges and 
immunities, not due process.”  Therefore, he relies chiefly on evidence from the Congressional 
debates on the Amendment and other contemporary expression concerning the policies of 
Reconstruction. 
 The case he builds is the same case Justice Black asserted in favor of total incorporation 
in Adamson in the face of Justice Frankfurter’s argument in favor of a go-slow approach, 
premised on a Due Process inquiry into what rights and principles were fundamental to ordered 
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  That is, it is almost the same argument.  It lacks Black’s normative claim that 
Frankfurter’s formula was dressed-up natural law, and a recipe for judicial law making.  It relies 
entirely on Black’s originalism side of the argument, on the claim that total incorporation via 
Privileges and Immunities is what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment (and I don’t think 
Black was much concerned with the ratifiers) intended.  The problem with this argument, as 
Charles Fairman showed nearly sixty years ago,
87
 and as Raoul Berger demonstrated again and 
again until his 95th year,
88
 is that it simply cannot accommodate a floodtide of countervailing 
evidence, notwithstanding the ingenious and alluring advocacy by luminaries like Justice Black, 
W.W. Crosskey, Michael Kent Curtis, Robert Cottrol, and Akhil Amar.
89
  To be sure, they have 
ample evidence to support a claim that many members of Congress and the public were thinking 
along lines of selective incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole or the Due 
Process Clause.  However, let us not forget that is not their claim, but that of their opponents.  
Amar’s central point is that there was a constitutional majority behind sub silentio total 
incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and this the evidence will not bear. 
Principal problems with Amar’s major premise include these: 
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1. Even as they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, several states implemented 
plans to initiate prosecution by information and abolish indictment by grand jury in criminal 
cases, or require grand jury indictments only for the most serious cases.  No one noted an 
inconsistency or a budding constitutional problem respecting a provision that according to the 




2. The Slaughter-House Court parsimoniously construed the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause in 1873 to reach only a narrow class of rights attendant to national 
citizenship.  Neither Justice Miller’s opinion nor the dissents of Field and Bradley took up any 
claim that the Bill of Rights applied against the states, and it does not appear from the published 
opinions that plaintiffs’ briefs made such a claim.  Some commentators insist that the dissenting 
Justice Bradley, who heard the case as a lower federal judge before being elevated to the 
Supreme Court in 1870, had held for the lower court that the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporated the Bill of Rights, but what he actually wrote is that it incorporated the Civil Rights 
Act.  In any case, in the Supreme Court opinion, the putative right against monopolies does not 
appear conceptually linked to the Bill of Rights at all.
91
 
3. In 1875, James G. Blaine of Maine (Speaker of the House, who had been a 
member of Congress in 1866 when the Fourteenth Amendment was debated and passed) 
proposed an amendment to bar state establishment of religion.  No one rose to say “Blaine, 
we’ve already made the First Amendment applicable to the states via the Fourteenth.”   Instead, 
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the house discussed anti-Catholicism—specifically the dangers of state support for Catholic 
schools—on its merits.92  
But perhaps I would merely beat a dead hobbyhorse.  Whether anyone besides myself is 
interested in revisiting the fascinating, valuable, and intriguing Fairman/W.W. Crosskey debates 
is doubtful.  Perhaps I should content myself with declaring victory on behalf of Fairman and 
Frankfurter and leaving the field in the hands of the routed but numerous, committed, and 
undaunted forces of the total incorporationists.  With cultural scholarship of constitutional 
history fast supplanting (and possibly suppressing any interest in) an older, unabashedly elitist 
legal history intensely focused on documents generated by a privileged, out of touch, and 
powerful few, it perhaps matters very little that Fairman (by his own admission) devastated 
Crosskey or that Berger (so he assures us) demolished Curtis.  Few now remember or care about 
the rules by which the empiricist constitutional doctrinalists played. 
Amar’s history of Reconstruction is more intriguing, more novel, more clever, more 
morally inviting, and more in tune with our times than Fariman’s.  And ultimately, Amar is 
hardly wrong that the job of living participants in our constitutional democracy is not to 
recapture Reconstruction as it was (or was intended to be), but to use it as a guide to applying the 
text the Reconstructionists bequeathed to problems they did not foresee or wish to resolve.  And 
this is a task to which he turns with more logic, faith, and fidelity but no less concern for humane 
outcomes than Chief Justice Warren, who in Brown v. Board of Education chose to ignore the 
intent of the framers all together, because—so says the opinion—it was unfathomable, and 
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Professor Amar also relies on the assumption that individual self-defense was deemed 
more desirable than collective self-defense under color of law during Congressional 
Reconstruction, as Republicans looked southward from Washington and beheld the savagery of 
Klansmen and nascent Redeemers.  Here, too, Amar has evidentiary problems he has not 
adequately accounted for.  Saul Cornell and Nathan DeDino’s effective critique of this 
component of the Amar thesis in the Fordham Law Review demonstrates the centrality of black 
and integrated, lawfully established militia to Republican rule in the South.
94
  Conversely, 
disarmament and disbanding of black militia was a central—indeed the principal—aim of the 
Redeemers as they returned to (or shall we say usurped) power in the former Confederate states.  
Cornell and Dedino draw part of their evidence from Otis Singletary’s classic and supremely 
relevant study Negro Militia and Reconstruction,
95
 a dusty volume laden with rich insight 
concerning conflicts between rival black Republican and white Democratic militia during the 
struggle for state-level control in the South that ensued as Union troops withdrew. 
Inspired by Singletary’s forgotten history and Amar’s intriguing suggestions regarding 
the relevance of the Second Amendment to police integration today, I would like to proffer my 
own modest proposal for recasting Reconstruction as it might (and should) have been.  Like 
Amar, and more expressly like Cottrol and Diamond, my proposal is for an Afro-centric 
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reconsideration of the incorporationist possibilities of federal imposition of the right to bear arms 
on the states.  In this respect, Cornell and DeDino (as well as Carole Emberton, in her engaging 
contribution to this symposium assessing “The Battle of Liberty Place” waged between white 
Democratic and black Republican militia for control of New Orleans in 1874)
96
 have stolen some 
but not quite all of my thunder. 
Cornell and DeDino analyze the South Carolina Ku Klux Klan trials of 1871-72, in which 
U.S. Attorney Daniel Corbin asserted Fourteenth Amendment claims (this was before the Civil 
Rights Cases of 1883 limited the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions to state actors) against 
members of the Klan for violating black persons’ right to arms guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment.
97
  This appears to buttress Amar’s claim that incorporation was in the air during 
Reconstruction (but I would counter by asking whether it was meant to be selective or total, to 
proceed by means of Due Process or Privileges or Immunities, and whether it was endorsed by a 
scattered few or a constitutional majority of ratifiers).  Crucially however, as Cornell and 
DeDino stress, the disarmament in question was visited not on isolated individuals, but on militia 
members.  The right the U.S. Attorney sought to vindicate through the Fourteenth Amendment 
was indeed the right to armed defense against the Klan, but it was a militia-focused right, not a 
private liberty.  To these insights of Cornell and DeDino I’d like to add that this course—
application of a right to bear arms in the militia—is perhaps the path not taken that would have 
changed Southern history immeasurably for the better.  An enforceable (and there’s the rub) 
constitutional mandate to integrate the organs of state power—first militia, and then, in the years 
to come the state troopers of the South—would have put the breaks on Redemption, Jim Crow, 
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and Lynch Law, and made far more difficult the violent resistance to federal imposition of a new 
Civil Rights regime under the Second Reconstruction. 
 Amar’s most intriguing points in his latest essay on the right to arms relate not to 
Reconstruction, but to modern times, and not to African Americans collectively, but to women, 
and to gays and lesbians.  Advocating intratextualism (a far more appealing interpretive method 
than over rigid clause bound textualism, but one still susceptible to critique),
98
 he links the right 
to arms (as modified and individualized by Reconstruction) to the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
expansion of suffrage and, implicitly, full political citizenship, to advance a powerful argument 
for equal opportunity for women in the military.  He draws also on the once obvious and still 
primary military meaning of bearing arms to argue that the Second Amendment should be read 
to demand gay and lesbian access and equality in the Armed Forces.  This is an interpretation I 
too have suggested, and one which has such force from a plain meaning perspective, that I have 
often wondered why it is not a focal point of the legal effort to achieve gay and lesbian rights in 
the military.
99
  That said, the rights’ coupling to the militia suggests more immediate 
applicability to the National Guard and even Reserves than to the regular Armed Forces, but the 
relevance and command language are striking and forceful also respecting the full time federal 
forces. 
One gay rights angle I have not seen discussed at all respecting the Second Amendment 
directly concerns individual, private liberty rather than military service.  Lawrence v. Texas had 
its beginnings when the police in Harris County, Texas responded to a tip concerning a gun 
violation in an apartment in November, 1998.  When the officers arrived on the scene they found 
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John Lawrence and Tyron Garner engaged in the very acts Justice Kennedy described with 
nearly lyric appreciation in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court.
100
  Lawrence and Garner 
were arrested and spent a night in jail well before the Fifth Circuit recognized a private right to 
arms under the Second Amendment, but their appeal was still pending when Emerson was 
working its way up the federal Courts.
101
  By the time the Fifth Circuit panel announced its 
Emerson decision, the appellants in Lawrence therefore had a colorable claim that their sodomy 
bust was fruit of a violation of their federal right to arms!  Perhaps the Supreme Court of the 
United States might have clarified the right to arms at the same time it recognized the right to 
same sex intimacy in Lawrence, but, alas, this greatest of cultural ironies was not to be.
102
 
 Professor Amar’s work focuses on the impact of the right to arms on historic outsiders, 
on African Americans, on women, on gays and lesbians.  But those who are widely perceived as 
the most adamant champions of a vigorous, private right to arms are outsiders of a different 
stripe, rural white men, rustic individualists, disenchanted with elite America, with the 
mainstream, and for many years, with the federal government.  For a generation, the NRA has 
been their voice, but now the NRA has a seat in government, and gun rights are no longer outside 
the mainstream, but part of the federal executive’s agenda.  One wonders whether the basic 
background assumptions behind David Williams’ complex portrait of the cultural wars still hold.  
The Euro-centric, Atlantic elitist big government faction that America’s modern militiamen so 
much loathe has, after all, to all appearances, been routed.  So what will become of Williams’ 
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long time outsiders, now that the NRA has friends in high places, and its old enemies stand on 
the sidelines lacking any clear sense of purpose?  Will the rural militiamen still fear 
confiscation?  Perhaps, emboldened now that more sympathetic minds hold the reins of power, 
they will focus less on their vaunted rights to possess their weapons, but rather will cast an eye 
towards reanimating their militia, and coming out of hiding.  They may demand to return to duty, 
as minute men on the border, serving a government they no longer fear. 
Meanwhile, old faithful disciples of the regulatory state, New Dealers and their progeny, 
long hopeful that their government would build them pathways from cradle to grave, and disarm 
the ruffians along the way, may grow to whish less fervently that a government no longer quite 
so indelibly theirs possess an absolute and unchallengeable monopoly on violence.  Is role 
reversal in the great gun cultural wars in the cards?  Perhaps.  Perhaps it is even to be expected.  
The inevitability of revolution in the wheel of fortune was after all one reason the framers took 
the right to arms so seriously.  But before the gun culture attains the victory it has so long sought, 
one last battle—and the most important battle at that—remains. 
 
Conclusion 
The gun cultural wars inform academic debate on the Second Amendment, and do a great 
deal to explain why so much is at stake in judicial exposition of the right to arms.  But there is, I 
suspect, another powerful reason besides antipathy towards the coastal, cosmopolitan elite that 
explains why bedrock America covets a definitive Supreme Court reinterpretation of the right to 
arms.  Religiously and politically, a great many Americans view this as a covenanted nation.  
This notion has a powerful pedigree running backwards in time through Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address and the origins of the Republic, to John Winthrop’s homily on the City on a Hill and the 
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origins of the nation.  The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights 
(or at least the Free Exercise Clause, and the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, with the 
lesser elements of the first ten and perhaps all subsequent Amendments forming a disputed and 
dubious apocrypha) are sacred secular texts in this tradition.  They express a bond between the 
originators of the American republic and future generations, and witness to an obligation the 
inheritors of constitutional liberty owe to the founders as a debt to their sacrifice.
103
   In short, it 
is the secular equivalent of blasphemy—or perhaps, quite blasphemously, blasphemy itself—to 
denigrate, disobey, or ignore the precepts and commands that these texts enjoin.  Nor does their 
inspired language, according to this covenant tradition, admit of interpretive freedom; the 
language is plain, and its commands exacting. 
 In this belief system, there are several non-negotiable articles of faith.  These include that 
the Republic was born of violent resistance to oppression.  This heroic resistance was carried out 
by uncompromising individualists, acting collectively for the greater good and for the future of 
individualism.  By exercising their right to self-defense against tyranny, they established the 
constitutional tradition protecting our right to self-defense.  This right they preserved for the ages 
in the Second Amendment.  Thus, in a contemporary light, mere recognition that gun possession 
is safe because a popular or legislative majority favors it falls far from the constitutionally and 
covenantally required mark.  Likewise, new state constitutional amendments or even a new 
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federal amendment securing an unrestricted liberty to own and carry guns are neither needed nor 
desired (although the state amendment might be useful in the short term, pending recognition of 
incorporation in the great High Court opinion to come).  Ultimately, nothing short of penitent 
confession that the eternal Second Amendment of 1789 has always and always shall guarantee a 
private right to arms in its original language will suffice to achieve the desired rebirth of 
American freedom.  This conversion rite and no watered down substitute is what bedrock 
America demands that the Supreme Court perform. 
 Michael Dorf, while prognosticating that the social movement uniting gun rights 
enthusiasts in the call for Supreme Court acknowledgement that the Constitution recognizes a 
private right to arms will not succeed in its most cherished goal, allowed that a change in 
personnel on the High Court might prompt reconsideration of his prediction.
104
  This autumn 
President Bush, with the advice and consent of the Senate, is in the process of appointing two 
new justices to the Court, including John Roberts, now confirmed as Chief Justice, and very 
likely Samuel Alito, whose confirmation hearings await as of this writing.  Professor Dorf may 
have been overly pessimistic about the gun movement’s prospects when he published Identity 
Politics and the Second Amendment in 2004; the new appointments, I suspect, now make it more 
likely, perhaps all but certain, that a definitive Supreme Court opinion guaranteeing a private 
right to arms under the Second Amendment will issue within a short few years. 
 As Erwin Chemerinsky, Calvin Massey, and others remarked at the Fordham 
symposium,
105
 and as Adam Winkler especially has elucidated here,
106
 perhaps the important 
practical question is not whether the right to arms extends to all individuals, but what existing or 
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potential regulation is likely to fall if and when the right is reconstrued by the Court.  The answer 
may well be that most politically feasible restrictions or controls on gun ownership or use would 
pass muster under inexacting scrutiny, as the challenged provision did in Emerson, when the 
Fifth Circuit became the first federal Court of Appeals since Miller to hold that the right does 
apply to private persons.
107
 
 Perhaps then, there need be no sense of panic or imminent doom among persons and sub-
cultures favoring tighter control of guns, even when the rapture comes.  Still, the rapture likely 
will come, and come fairly soon.  Jonathan Simon, I suspect, is wholly correct in his linkage of 
popular fear of crime to rising calls for a vigorous enforcement of a robust right to arms, and 
accurate also, to predict that, following Bruce Ackerman’s paradigm, these demands will lead to 
a judicial reconceptualization of constitutional norms.
108
  But the history of constitutional norms 
and doctrines ebbs and flows.  Dual federalism, pronounced dead in the first edition of the 
Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court in 1992, is now alive and well.
109
  The Marshall 
Court’s vigorous construction of national powers, abandoned by the Courts of Taney, Fuller, 
White and Taft, experienced a rebirth under the Chief Justiceships of Stone, Warren, Burger, and 
even Rehnquist.  If the right to arms is now about to uncouple from its textual linkage to the well 
regulated militia, the new learning may not endure for all time.  That the champions of the 
decoupled right rely on palpably false history suggests they are not infallible.  And if it is not 
infallible, perhaps even the NRA may not prove invincible in the long run.  Maybe a lone 
dissenter, or the author of a dissent joined by a small band, will write in a few years time of a 
decision announcing a broad right to arms under the Second Amendment that “the judgment this 
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day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in 
the Dred Scott case.”110  Perhaps, that lone voice, or minority voice, will prophesy accurately 
that the new learning will one day be disowned and forsaken.
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From Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1E. © 2009 Gale, a part of Cengage Learning, Inc. 
Reproduced by permission. www.cengage.com/permissions. 
 
Article I, section eight, clause twelve of the Constitution conveys to Congress the power 
“[t]o raise and support Armies,” provided that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be 
for a longer Term than two Years.”  The reference to “Armies” signals that this power exists in 
addition and distinction to concurrent Congressional/state powers over the militia recognized in 
Article I Section 8 clauses 15-16.  Prior to the twentieth-century world wars, the bulk of the 
nation’s non-naval forces consisted of state militia or state units called into federal service, and 
to this day, the organized militia, in the form of the National Guard, continues to provide a 
substantial component of the armed forces.  The Supreme Court’s decision The Selective Draft 
Law Cases
1
 established unambiguously that congressional authority to raise armies includes the 
power to conscript civilians into national military service.  For much of American history, 
however, Congress has relied principally or even exclusively on its ability to attract volunteers to 
the federal forces by appeals to patriotism and through the allure of pay packages, bonuses, and 
other tangible incentives including land grants and—in recent decades—job training.  
During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress supplemented provincial 
recruitment by enlisting soldiers directly into the Continental line.  Congress never asserted 
authority to conscript, and no such power was recognized under the Articles of Confederation, 
but the states possessed the undoubted ability to compel militia service through their militia laws. 
Apart from its own direct recruitment, Congress relied on state conscription powers to fill state 
recruitment quotas, even though Congress lacked any enforcement mechanism for ensuring 
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compliance with these theoretically binding military obligations to the Confederation. 
Throughout the Revolutionary period, much political discussion focused on the dangers of 
standing armies to republican government, and pamphleteers and publishers made ready use of 
examples of military abuses in classical times, under the Stuarts, and during the English Civil 
War to remind their audiences that large professional armies might imperil liberty.  In contrast, 
many future Federalists, including Washington, Hamilton, and Knox saw citizen militia as 
militarily inadequate, and credited the regulars with the eventual American victory during the 
War.  In this context, the militia and army clauses of the Constitution reflect a balance between 
republican preferences for a virtuous citizen militia and the dictates of military necessity that 
favor a professional army.  The Constitution allows construction of a federal army that can be 
raised directly by the federal government, but it also ensures civilian supremacy over the 
military, divides authority over the army between Congress and the president and requires that 
funding measurers be reconsidered and reenacted at least every two years.  Moreover, the militia 
clauses and the Second Amendment attest that many members of the founding generation hoped 
the nation would place principal defensive reliance on the citizen militia notwithstanding the 
newly minted federal army powers.  
The regular army remained small through the nineteenth century, even during the Civil 
War, with full-time career soldiers in federal service seldom numbering more than 35,000.  The 
exigencies of the War of 1812, including New England reluctance to furnish militia, caused the 
Madison administration to contemplate federal conscription, but legislation authorizing a draft 
stalled when fortunes turned in America’s favor in late 1814.  Refusal of New England militia 
units to cross the Canadian border during the second war with Britain highlighted the 
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constitutional restrictions against foreign deployment of the militia
2
 and in this light the 
campaigns of the Mexican War of 1846-1848 were fought entirely by regulars and federal 
volunteers.  While the Confederate states resorted to conscription early in the Civil War, the 
government of the United States did not pass its first conscription law until March 3, 1863.  The 
Act required able-bodied male citizens of the United States between the ages of twenty and 
forty-five to enroll in the draft lists, but permitted persons actually drafted to hire a substitute or 
pay a $300 commutation fee.  Ultimately, President Lincoln issued four draft calls pursuant to 
the Act and its amendments, and some six percent of the 2.67 million men who served in the 
Union forces during the War were conscripted directly by the federal government (the remainder 
of the federal forces consisted of volunteer enlistees with either state militia or federal volunteer 
units).  Commutation, substitution, and allegations of corruption sparked class and ethnic 
resistance to the draft, which manifested itself most prominently in the violent New York City 
draft riots of July, 1863, requiring suppression by federal troops hastily removed from the 
battlefields after the Union victory at Gettysburg.  Partly owing to wartime suspension of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus no challenges to the Civil War draft were decided in the federal courts, 
but after initially allowing injunctions to arrest execution of the draft, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania rejected federal constitutional challenges to the draft in Kneedler v. Lane.
3
   
The War with Spain in 1898, fought largely by state volunteer militia units whose 
members enlisted for federal service prior to disembarkation for Cuba or the Philippines, 
highlighted once more the dubious constitutionality of foreign deployment of militia.  To 
forestall future constitutional difficulties on this front, Congress created the modern dual 
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enlistment system for the National Guard in the National Defense Act of 1916, which required 
guard members to take oaths to both the federal government and their states, and empowered the 
president to call up state militia units into federal army service for overseas deployment.  With 
U.S. involvement in the Great War looming, Congress also authorized the second federal draft in 
the nation’s history on May 18, 1917.  This is the Act challenged in the Selective Draft Law 
Cases.
4
  The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice White, reasoned that the 
power to raise and support armies included the power to compel service.  For the Court, the 
Article I Section 10 clause 3 prohibition against state keeping up troops in times of peace without 
congressional consent made clear that the framers had transferred the whole power over armies 
(as opposed to militia) to the federal government, and this necessarily entailed the ability to 
conscript, recognized by universal practice among nations and by jurists and philosophers as a 
corollary obligation of citizenship.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s establishment of the primacy 
of national over state citizenship further strengthened federal claims on citizen’s military duty.  
Finally, the Court rejected Thirteenth Amendment claims’ that military service constituted 
involuntary servitude and establishment clause claims that recognition of conscientious objector 
status privileged favored religions.  The Supreme Court has not revisited the question of whether 
Article I Section 8 clause 12 authorizes conscription since it decided the Selective Draft Law 
Cases, and has several times indicated that this issue is now beyond debate.
5
  Resistance to 
conscription was limited during World War II owing the perceived necessity of the war and the 
relative equity of drawing substantially all the military-aged men of the country into service, but 
conscripting only some of the military-eligible population for duty in Korea and Vietnam proved 
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politically more volatile.  For the time being at least, congressional repeal of the Selective 
Service Act and establishment of the all-volunteer armed forces in 1972 removes (or suspends) 
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RESPONDING TO RANDY BARNETT’S CRITIQUE  
 
Introduction 
 Several months before this issue of the William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal went to 
press, we received the comments submitted by Professors Barnett, Levinson, and Simon, and 
wrote our replies.  Professor Barnett alone substantially revised his submission after reviewing 
our reply.  Rather than commenting separately on our response, he incorporated his objections to 
our response into the revised version of his comment reprinted here.  This practice is unorthodox, 
to say the least.  It is not unlike competitors in an archery contest moving the targets once their 
rivals have let fly their arrows.  We have not revised our reply to his original comment to reflect 
the fact that much contained in that comment did not in the end make it into this volume.  Rather, 
we simply let stand our response to his original submission, and add a new afterword, that 
respond to his amended critique, and a conclusion.  
 It is difficult to know how to respond to the criticism of our most aggressive and 
persistent critic, Professor Randy Barnett.  He seems to be bitterly disappointed that we did not 
write a book different from the one we wrote.  He is particularly dismayed that we have no 
accorded him a label that would allow him to associate us with others, and, presumably, focus 
his fire.  Are we “originalists”?  And if so, do we belong among the original meaning set or the 
original intent group?  Are we “textualists”?  He seems to find it frustrating that he cannot 
readily categorize us or associate us with others who, he believes, reach their theoretical 
construction only in the service of their political objectives.  Had we written the book he wishes 
we had, we would have clearly identified ourselves politically and described our theoretical 
methodology in a manner that would present a more gratifying target for his disagreement.  
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We also failed to write the book he would have wished in that we offer little original data.  It 
may be trust, as Professor Barnett says, that a reader should not pick up our book expecting to 
discover new evidence, but a careful reader will discover a few intriguing items that to our 
knowledge have previously been discussed only casually in print.
1
  Still, we are glad that Barnett 
consoles us with the observation that, “There is nothing wrong, of course, with offering a new 
interpretation of previously discussed evidence.”2 
Professor Barnett’s piece is the most difficult of the three to address succinctly.  It 
contains much that is provocative, but also much that is simply unfounded.  Preparing 
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 Attentive readers of The Militia and the Rights to Arms will encounter some new 
evidence, as well as analysis of documents not to our knowledge previously discussed in any 
detail in print.  These include principally the Militia Censuses of the United States conducted 
between 1802 and 1830.  Barnett chastises us for relying uncritically on Michael Bellesiles, but 
while we have joined others in expressing skepticism about Bellesile’s claims related to probate 
inventories, our own independent review of the Militia Censuses discussed in detail at UVILLER 
& MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL 
SILENT 285-285 n.78 (2002), suggests that Bellesiles’s assertions regarding the content of these 
censuses are substantially correct.  We could not help but add that since these censuses cover 
hundreds of thousands of households—in theory the household of every militia-eligible citizen in 
the country—it is remarkable that so little is said about them, while so much is made of 
extrapolations based on the contents of a few thousand probate records, which, to a very large 
degree, must remain at least partly guesswork when projected onto the whole population. 
Evidence wholly new to the Second Amendment debate reported in our book includes newspaper 
articles related to the fears of slave-revolt in Virginia discussed in the context of Carl Bogus’ 
thesis that the Second Amendment was designed to protect the South against abolitionist inspired 
disarmament.  See id. at 305 n.44.  In writing this note, one of us discovered that a discussion of 
George Washington’s correspondence with his Fairfax neighbors about guns [not arms], dogs, 
and the hunt (including an interesting aside about lending champion dogs to slaves concerned 
about a raccoon problem) has mysteriously disappeared from the published version of the book, 
along with an analysis of a Washington letter to George Mason about arms and militia with 
which the guns letters were contrasted.  This unauthorized deletion prevents adding 
Washington’s pre-Revolutionary correspondence about guns, dogs, and pest control on the one 
side, and arms and militia on the other, to the list of original evidence contributed to the Second 
Amendment debates through The Militia and the Rights to Arms.  For more on Washington’s 
arms-related letters, see H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in 
Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 423-24 n.69 (2000).  
2
 Randy E. Barnett, Is the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on a Militia?, 12 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. __, __ (2004). 
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comprehensive replies to the many misleading and inaccurate assertions about our argument 
contained in his essay will prove a time consuming and laborious ordeal.  We hope to do so on a 
future occasion.  But for now, we reply to only three of the issues raised in his piece—two 
selected because they are premised on false or misleading representations of our work, and the 
third because of its great interest and patent absurdity.  
Barnett charges that we present “little evidence of the public meaning of the words used 
[in the Second Amendment] and “no quantitative evidence by which to distinguish dominant 
from deviant meaning.”3  In fact, we discuss in detail such sources as George Washington’s war-
time letter concerning the militia,
4
 Thomas Jefferson and James Madison’s correspondence 
relating to the desirability of a Bill of Rights and the advantages of militia over standing armies,
5
 
selected Anti-Federalist tracts and a number essays in The Federalist Papers concerning the 
militia and the right to arms,
6
 the petitions of various state ratification committees in favor of 
bills of rights (including the proposals of New Hampshire and the Pennsylvania minority 
discussing a very private sounding right),
7
 the debates in the House of Representatives on the 
pending Bill of Rights,
8
 the Militia Act of 1792,
9
 and a great deal more documentary evidence 
related to the meaning of the right to arms in the United States Constitution. 
In particular, we demonstrate that of the twelve members of the House of Representatives 
to speak concerning the text that become the Second Amendment, most concerned themselves 
with the very military issue of conscientious objection, and not one said anything that could be 
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construed from context to concern a private right related to self-defense, hunting, or sport 
shooting.
10
  We point out that the proposals of New Hampshire and the Pennsylvania minority 
respecting a private right to arms were not echoed in the petitions of Virginia, North Carolina, 
New York, and a Maryland minority that favored a militia-focused right.
11
  And we refer to 
Professor David Yassky’s research into the thirty congressional usages of the phrase “bear arms” 
and its cognates documented on the Library of Congress’ Century of Lawmaking website 
between 1774 and 1821, each one of which he reports occurred in an unambiguously military 
(i.e. not private) context.
12
 We did not replicate his search, but we promise to do so in the future. 
In a similarly misleading vein, Professor Barnett chastises us for relying uncritically on 
Garry Wills’ essay on the etymology of bearing arms published in the New York Times Book 
Review.
13
  He reports that we “do not scrutinize Wills’ evidence—nor present any new historical 
evidence of [our] own—but simply accept [Wills’] conclusions.”14  We refer Barnett to footnote 
seven at pages 296-97 to correct this misapprehension.
15
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 There he might read the following: 
Gary Wills’s provacation “To Keep and Bear Arms,” contains a thoughtful and learned passage 
on the meaning of “bearing arms,” which probably remains the most influential exegesis of the 
meaning of that phrase in the Second Amendment literature.  Needless to say, standard modellers 
have their rejoinders, and even more staid members of the academe sometimes take Wills with a 
few caveats.  While the respected and thoroughly dispassionate military historian Don 
Higginbotham has pointed out that Wills’s “analysis of to bear, well-regulated and the people is 
astute and helps rescue these terms from the distorted meanings ascribed to them by so many 
Standard Modellers,” he adds that “[i]n his examination of the term to keep . . . Will resorts to 
the same ‘linguistic tricks’ he repeatedly ascribes to Standard Modellers.”  Still, it remains highly 
difficult to make a credible case for a pervasive non-military meaning of “bearing arms,” all the 
more so in the context of statutory or constitutional usage.  As David Yassky remarks, 
“searching a Library of Congress database containing all official records of debates in the 
Continental and U.S. Congresses between 1774 and 1821 reveals thirty uses of the phrase “bear 
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Finally, we respond to Professor Barnett’s ultimate point, the point that he might call the 
thirteenth chime of the clock; the signal that is not only dubious in itself, but calls into question 
all that have preceded it. 
Barnett argues that our contention that there is no longer a militia, as used in the context 
of the Second Amendment, is wrong.  To disprove our contention, Barnett argues that the citizen 
militia, in the old-fashioned, eighteenth-century sense of the term, is alive and well today in the 
action of the brave passengers on the fourth suicide mission of 9/11.
16
  It is surely no denigration 
of the heroism of those who brought that plane down, and saved the Capitol or the White house, 
to say that they were not acting as militia in doing so.  It sounds very much as though Barnett 
would have us believe that any act of collective patriotic heroism, even the spontaneous response 
of desperate individuals who recognize their fate, is sanctioned by the Constitution.  The Second 
Amendment does not require airlines to allow passengers to carry arms aboard so that they may 
stand ready, as a militia, to repel attack in flight.  We think assertion of that point suffices to 
prove it.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
arms” or “bearing arms” (other than in discussing the proposed Second Amendment); in every 
single one of these uses, the phrase has an unambiguously military meaning.”  The Oxford 
English Dictionary also attests unequivocally to the military implications of arms before in 
eighteenth century usage.  In Yassky’s words “The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘to bear 
arms’ as meaning ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight.’ It defines ‘to bear arms 
against’ as meaning to be engaged in hostilities with.”  As an exemplary use of the phrase in 
1769, to OED gives ‘An ample . . . pardon to all who had born arms against him,” and the 
exemplary use of the phrase in 1609 is: “He bure armes, and made weir against the king.’ . . . 
Indeed, the word ‘arms’ itself has a primarily military connotation.  According to the OED, the 
oldest established meaning of ‘arms’ (other than the plural of ‘arm,’ meaning limb) is ‘armour, 
mail.’  The next oldest meaning is “[i]nstruments of offence used in war; weapons.’  The OED 
quotes a 1794 dictionary; ‘By arms, we understand those instruments of offence generally made 
use of in war; such as firearms, swords, etc.  By weapons, we more particularly mean 
instruments of other kinds (exclusive of firearms), made use of as offensive on special 
occasions.’”  UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 1, at 296-97 n.7 (citations omitted).  
16
 Barnett, supra note 2, at __. 
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To conceive of the spontaneous, desperate, efforts of a random group of passengers as the 
modern incarnation of the citizens’ militia demonstrates its fallacy in the mere statement of the 
proposition.  If Barnett means to argue that any time a citizen, cornered and desperate, draws a 
weapon and fires (regardless of the national peril), his access to the gun is a constitutional 
entitlement, we can only shrug and say that he has taken Second Amendment scholarship into the 




Afterword on Professor Barnett’s Amended Critique  
 In the most recent issue of the American Historical Review, Robert Shalhope has called 
The Militia and the Right to Arms the “most sound and sophisticated study yet to appear . . . [of] 
the historical origins of the Second Amendment,” and the “most closely reasoned and deeply 
researched study of the subject.”17  Randy Barnett, for one, clearly does not share this 
assessment.  This, of course, is no bad thing—academic disputation is a large part of the driving 
engine of the scholarly profession.  That he and we should disagree over interpretation is neither 
surprising nor discouraging.  We object, however, to his repeated mischaracterization of our 
arguments, the evidence on which we rely, and the counter evidence that he adduces.  A case in 
point is his treatment of our alleged failure to provide any support (his claim in the comment to 
which we replied above) or support he deems acceptable (his revised argument in the version 
printed in this volume) for our assertion that the military meaning of “bearing arms” and its 
cognates clearly predominated in political usage at the time of the framing.  
 In his initial version, Barnett ignored, among other things, our reliance on the Library of 
Congress database of recorded debates in the Continental Congress, Confederation Congress, 
and United States Congress between 1774-1821, which, as David Yassky reported, contained 
thirty occurrences of bearing arms, all of which are clearly military.
18
  In the version printed 
here, Barnett concedes that this is quantitative evidence of a sort, if not quite the kind he was 
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  He even agrees that the recorded usages up until 1821 are uniformly military in 
tone and meaning.
20
  But he then goes on to argue that the same database now extends through 
the Civil War and Reconstruction years, and that recorded usage by that era is no longer wholly, 
or even predominantly, military.
21
  In so doing, Barnett has pointed to interesting and valuable 
evidence that bearing arms carried both military and non-military meanings in political and legal 
usage during the Civil War years.  This is an issue we might have treated in more detail in the 
book, and which at least one of us has on his research and writing agenda for the future. 
However, in examining the Library of Congress database, Barnett has done nothing but confirm 
our point that the military meaning of bearing arms dominated recorded political usage during 
the founding, federal, and Jeffersonian periods.  It did so, in Congress at least, by a recorded 
margin of thirty to nil.  
 In order to support his claim that a private, non-military meaning of bearing arms was far 
from marginal when the Second Amendment was drafted and ratified, Barnett relies principally 
on the “Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention,” with 
its invocation of private as well as civic rights to arms, and even a right to hunt.
22
  But Barnett 
overstates this document’s significance.  Published privately as a broadside after the 
Pennsylvania Convention has adjourned, the Dissent purported to speak on behalf of the twenty-
three delegates who voted against ratification with no amendments at all.
23
  This two-to-one split 
in favor of ratification without amendment at the Convention mirrored the sentiments of the 
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 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 188 (1997); Saul Cornell, Beyond the Myth of Consensus: The Struggle to Define 
the Right to Bear Arms in the Early Republic, in BEYOND THE FOUNDERS (forthcoming 2004) 
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Keystone State’s voters, who soundly rebuffed opponents of ratification during elections for the 
Convention, which were contested specifically over the issue of amendments.
24
  Pennsylvania’s 
first elections under the federal system a year later confirmed the voters’ approval of these 
results, with Federalists winning a clean slate in the state’s congressional contest.25 
 Moreover, it is by no means clear that the Dissent compiled by Samuel Bryan actually 
reflected the sentiments of all the anti-federal Constitutionalist delegates to the Pennsylvania 
Convention, or that it was taken seriously at the time as evidence of the Constitution’s meaning. 
In the 1796 House debates regarding the constitutionality of the Jay Treaty, William Findley, one 
of the leaders of the anti-federalists at the Pennsylvania Convention, acknowledged that he had 
himself been one of the dissenters in 1787, but insisted that the Pennsylvania Dissent had no 
relevance to questions concerning construction of the Constitution.  Findley expressed his alarm 
that the Dissent, representing at best “the sentiments of a minority, acting under peculiar 
circumstance of irritation . . . would be quoted as good authority for the true sense of the 
Constitution on this occasion,” and went on to argue that the House retained a role in foreign 
affairs notwithstanding anything the Dissent of the Minority had said to the contrary.
26
 
 Only Delaware had already ratified when Pennsylvania voted on the Constitution and as 
Barnett rightly states, the Dissent of the Pennsylvania Minority enjoyed wide circulation 
throughout the nation while the remaining states deliberated.
27
  But at least respecting private 
self-defense and hunting, Bryan’s formulations failed to resonate.  Indeed, no other state 
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 STEVEN R. BOYD, THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION: ANTIFEDERALIST AND THE 
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endorsed the Pennsylvania Dissent’s unusual language respecting the right to arms.  The 
Virginia, New York, and North Carolina Conventions formally proposed amendments that 
protected a clearly militia-linked right to arms; so too did Rhode Island in 1790, after Congress 
had already submitted amendments to the ratifying states.
28
  Following their state’s resolution in 
favor of ratification without amendment, a minority of Maryland delegates proposed that 
standing armies in time of peace should be allowed only upon two-third majority votes of each 
House, and that conscientious objectors not be compelled to serve.
29
  A Massachusetts’ minority 
proposed that Congress not be allowed to prevent the people of the United States, who are 
peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms; or to raise standing armies, unless when 
necessary for the defence of the United States, or some or more of them; but said nothing about 
hunting or private self-defense.
30
  Even the New Hampshire Convention, which favored 
amending the Constitution to declare that “Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such 
as are or have been in Actual Rebellion” steered clear of the Pennsylvania Minority’s 
formulation which would have allowed Congress to disarm individuals who posed “a real danger 
of public injury.”  Nor did New Hampshire say anything about private self-defense or hunting.31 
 More important to understanding the original meaning of the federal right to arms than 
any of the state conventions is the drafting history of the Second Amendment itself.  We have 
already stressed that bearing arms carried only military connotations in Congressional usage up 
to at least 1821.  This holds true for the debates about the Second Amendment.  The Senate’s 
debates were not yet the subject of public record, but twelve members of the House spoke during 
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 Id.; see also Cornell, supra note 26.  
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floor debate concerning the proposed right to arms, sounding such themes as the danger of 
standing armies, the virtues of citizen militia, and the morality of conscientious objection.  None 
of them mentioned private self-defense, hunting, or keeping weapons for any purpose other than 
performance of public duty under law.
32
  If the views of Samuel Bryan (or, for that matter, 
Randy Barnett) had advocates in the House of Representatives, they chose to hold their peace as 
the people’s chamber set about the task of constitutionalizing the right to arms.33 
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 Barnett’s assessment of the significance and impact of the Address and Reasons of 
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(admittedly a Massachusetts Federalist) chose precisely the proposed amendment about hunting 
as a target for ridicule.  Rakove, supra note 23, at 135-36.  And Paul Finkelman, American legal 
history’s most prolific encyclopedist, writes, “Had the proposals of the Pennsylvania 
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 Taking aim at our subtitle, Professor Barnett concluded his amended critique as he did his 
original comment, by warning that the Second Amendment “has never fallen silent.”34  His point, 
we think, is that the right to arms endures, not just because it exists apart from and outside the 
context of militia service, but because we are wrong in our basic premise that the militia 
contemplated in the Amendment has disappeared.  Barnett suggests that the unarmed passengers 
aboard United Flight 93 were performing militia duty when they overcame the terrorists who had 
hijacked the plane, because, as able-bodied males between seventeen and forty-five, the 
passengers were members of the unorganized militia defined in 10 U.S.C. § 311.
35
  To Barnett, 
then, the militia of the Second Amendment is reconstituted every-time able-bodied men under 
forty-five take collective action, or, at least, collective action (armed or unarmed) of a defensive 
nature.
36
  The debates in the First Congress about the Second Amendment and in the Second 
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 Barnett seems to have a fondness for far-fetched claims about the common militia in 
our own times.  On another occasion, Barnett and co-author Don B. Kates argued that the militia 
of the Second Amendment was still alive, because “[s]everal Florida countries ha[d] gone so far 
as to declare that their entire populations constitute their militias, and thus are exempt from the 
federal ‘assault weapon’ ban.”  Randy Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus 
on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1233 n.438 (1996).  When we tracked down the 
edition of the St. Petersburg Times on which this assertion relied, we encountered no evidence 
that state or local legislatures had passed laws or ordinances to reconstitute the general militia, 
but only a story about private citizens who had formed their own militias on their own authority. 
The particular organization studied in the article did not bear the imprimatur of the state 
government, and the local sheriff expressed considerable skepticism about the sui generis armed 
band’s self-proclaimed role in law enforcement.  See Larry Dougherty, Taking Up Arms: Militias 
Attract Hundreds in Florida, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Apr. 30, 1995 at 1A.  Regarding 
allegedly reconstituted general militias, Barnett and Kates also made reference to Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737, 1755 n.55 (1995), but there Kates and Reynolds actually question 
the legitimacy of alleged local ordinances reestablishing general militia without the sanction of 
the state government.  For evidence that such legally dubious ordinances exist, Kates and 
Reynolds relied wholly on Mike Tharp, The Rise of Citizen Militias, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Aug. 15, 1995 at 34, but that article discusses only self-proclaimed militia, and makes 
no mention of any general militia reconstituted under the color of state or local law.  Thus, 
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Congress about the Militia Act do not support this reading.  Rather, they focus on duty, 
command, compulsion, system, fines, conscientious objection, equipment, training, pay, 
regulation, and standardized arms
37
 —all absent from Barnett’s minimalist conception of the 
modern militia.  The unorganized militia may live on in the statute books, but membership 
therein is not at all onerous.  In fact, it is wholly illusionary.  No one now alive has ever been 
summoned by its commend or fined for failure to attend when summoned; few even know of its 
paper existence.  The general militia of 1789 is long gone, and the right to arms written into the 
Bill of Rights went with it.  
 
Conclusion 
 Perhaps the salient theme joining the comments and rejoinders of this forum and the 
participants’ earlier presentations at the William and Mary Conference of February, 2003 
concerns the Second Amendment’s continuing, altered, or abated relevance in the modern world. 
Jonathon Simon has argued that fear of crime and loss of faith in law enforcement lent the right 
to arms renewed meaning in the last years of the twentieth century.  For Sanford Levinson, the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment altered the character of the right to arms, rendering what 
was once a civic entitlement much more liberal and individualistic.  To Randy Barnett, the 
constitutional right to arms has always had a private dimension, and in that capacity, the right 
endures to this very day.  In The Militia and the Right to Arms and in our remarks here, we have 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Barnett based his assertion that there exist in the United States actually functioning general 
militia established under law not on legislative acts, but on news articles he, or the authorities he 
cited, misrepresented.  Even more importantly, he failed to address the larger question of 
whether localities might derive the alleged power to make militia law in contravention of federal 
and state statutes defining the militia pursuant to authority vested by the state and federal 
constitutions.  
37
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argued that the disappearance of the well-regulated militia envisioned by the framers and 
memorialized in the Second Amendment has sapped the right to arms of meaning and 
application—at least until such time as state or federal governments restore a militia bearing 
some of the defining attributes of the militia known to the framers: qualities such as universal 
rather than selective membership, compulsory rather than voluntary service, the availability of 
sanction to enforce participation and compliance with regulation, individual responsibility 
(perhaps with government assistance) for equipment and arms, and an identity clearly distinct 
from that of the regular Army.  
 While the constitutional right to arms has become, in our analysis, inoperative, there is 
another sense in which we think the values behind the Second Amendment retain a curious and 
vital currency.  The anti-federalists who lobbied so hard to preserve the citizen militias as a 
bulwark against a dangerous standing army were animated by republican principles.  Their most 
extreme fear was that a federal army, answerable to a Caesarist president, would dissolve 
Congress and the state governments and institute dictatorial rule.  But the republicans had many 
palpable worries that stopped short of so grave a perversion of constitutional governance.  They–
and many moderates in the First Congress—feared that access to a massive federal army would 
tempt governments to empire building.  They feared that entanglement in overseas wars would 
be expensive, that it would lead to profiteering, deficit spending, and to creeping debt that would 
drain the exchequer and enfeeble the nation.  They feared that the resulting system of debt-
serving financed by borrowing and taxation would lead to corruption, to government dependency 
on wrongheaded men and measures.  They feared that irresponsible leaders with access to armies 
would be tempted to bid for glory by starting wars that did not serve legitimate defensive ends. 
They feared that a Congress full of placemen and dependent members would yield up their 
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powers too readily to the President, and place no obstacles in the path of his martial dreams.  
And they feared that unchecked federal control over the citizen soldiery would lead to coerced 
deployment in oppressive campaigns far from family and community.  Historians have long 
debated whether these republicans were paranoid or prescient.  For a decade at least, the 
historical pendulum has swung against the soundness of the republican vision, but in recent 





BOOK REVIEW: SAUL CORNELL, A WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA  
 
In May 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren announced the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, following extensive argument the previous autumn 
respecting the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Warren explained that the discussion had “cast some light” but that this illumination, such as it 
was, was “not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced.”  Original meaning was 
neither ascertainable nor dispositive, Warren explained, not for the last time during his career. 
He then decided the most significant constitutional question of the twentieth century on grounds 
of justice and public policy, touching off a firestorm of critique focused on activism, subjective 
values, and legislating from the bench that continued unabated.  Ultimately, the reaction against 
Brown ripened into the “originalism” of Justices William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and 
Clarence Thomas, holding out original understanding as a supposed recipe for judicial neutrality, 
premised on historically ascertainable objective meaning. 
For some enthusiasts and detractors, the meaning of the Second Amendment right to arms 
(perhaps as reconfigured by the Fourteenth Amendment during Reconstruction) presents a 
similarly pressing question of constitutional interpretation, a question whose resolution (like that 
of Equal Protection before it) has been too long deferred.  And as the debate over Second 
Amendment and gun control has heated up in recent decades, partisans of all strips have invoked 
originalism—now the dominant constitutional philosophy—to legitimize their answers to 
questions focused on the permissibility of gun regulation or prohibition.  Much writing by 
advocates and by pedigreed academics has probed the original meaning of the Second 
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Amendment, with monographs of relatively fresh vintage exploring the problem from the 
standpoint of cultural theory and constitutional values
1





, and alleged nineteenth-century transformations
4
.  Saul 
Cornell’s new book synthesizes his decade-long research and writing in the field and develops a 
sophisticated and insightful new perspective that shuns monocausal explanation in favor of 
nuance and appreciation of complexity.  In the process, Cornell has crafted what may well be the 
most balanced and informed account of the Second Amendment’s shifting popular and judicial 
interpretations over the two plus centuries since its ratification. 
In other venues, Cornell has not been shy about his views on the politics of gun control, 
but this is not a teleological or instrumental history. Indeed, only in the short concluding chapter 
does Cornell address the current political and jurisprudential setting at all.  Most of his fast-paced 
book is narrative rather than argumentative in style, and a reader might well come away with the 
impression that Cornell wrote not so much for the sake of joining a debate as for the challenge 
and joy of exploring and explaining his subject.  His overarching theme is that there have been 
during various periods of American history at least four major interpretative spins to the right to 
arms, each of which has been embraced in different contexts and eras by elite jurists and by 
populists alike.  During the founding period, a civic reading, stressing an individual right 
conterminous with the duty to serve in the lawfully established militia, appeared self-evidence 
and sensible to Federalists and moderate Anti-Federalists alike, and informed James Madison’s 
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drafting of the amendment during the First Congress. Cornell draws heavily on his expertise 
respecting radical Anti-Federal thought in the 1780s and 1790s to trace the origins of a second 
strain of gun rights rhetoric, presenting itself as the far more localistic, antistatist, and at time 
individualistic claim to arms among the Carlisle rioters, Shaysites, and Whiskey rebels.  
Also in play even before the Constitution and then the Bill of Rights were ratified was a 
third variant of Second Amendment thought, a state focused interpretation that viewed control of 
the militia as the ultimate check on federal tyranny, and in some cases blended into the compact 
theory of the constitution that in extreme form saw secession and revolution as legitimate 
responses to national usurpation or state authority.  But as Cornell explains things, the fourth 
version of the Second Amendment right—the familiar modern view celebrating a personal right 
to hold weapons for individual self-defense against aggressors (including perhaps government 
agents)—did not emerge until the Jacksonian era, did not acquire mainstream support until 
Reconstruction, and did not threaten to supplant a judicial consensus in favor of the civic model 
until our own time.  
Cornell is careful to distinguish between the right to self-defense long asserted on a sub-
constitutional level in gun-related cases and the Second Amendment-based claim to 
constitutional immunity against gun regulation that has come into its own in the late twentieth 
century.  This analytic precision yields rich rewards in recapturing popular as well as elite 
approaches to many semi-famous and some previously obscure gun-related controversies that 
Cornell elucidates in fascinating detail.  His account of Reconstruction, in particular, weaves 
together new, old, forgotten, and original scholarship concerning the “Negro Militia,” the Ku 
Klux Klan, and the contested Fourteenth Amendment to present a fuller picture and more 
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theoretically cogent explanation of the ton tested and transformed right to arms than I have seen 
before. 
Cornell’s history of gun rights and gun control in the United States is accessible and 
lively, but the engaging style belies an impressive seriousness of purpose and approach.  The rich 
annotations make clear that Cornell has read and accounted for vast swaths of the expansive 
body of evidence, scholarship, and polemic in the field. It is hard to imagine that anyone else has 
read more about the history of gun rights in America; the notes themselves are of no 
inconsiderable value and interest.  The passionate nature of the subject makes it unlikely that any 
book—even one as well qualified as this—will dominate the field.  Other scholars will offer 
other (I suspect less informed and less balanced) spins.  In the meantime, Cornell’s conflicted, 
constantly turning, frequently ironic tale will make sane constitutionalists inside and outside 
academia and the judiciary despair of discovering one definitive, immutable meaning to the right 
to arms.  It might even cause some fair-minded readers to abandon any pretence that either in 
1789-1791 or 1866-1868 a constitutional majority of Americans embraced a wholly privatistic 
notion of the constitutional right to arms.  But Warren’s style of pragmatism has long since 
ceased to command a consensus on the Supreme Court, and should the High Court choose finally 
to expound on the right to arms, hopes that an informed, nuanced, subtle, and well-rounded 
history might contribute to a humanized and humbled originalist approach to Second 
Amendment interpretation might prove unduly sanguine.  It is sadly just as likely that bad history 
written by a less stable scholar than Cornell will provide a pretext for value-laden, results-
oriented, activist legislation from the bench. 
 





BOOK REVIEW: STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,  
THE FOUNDERS SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
 
 
Stephen P. Halbrook's new book represents the most careful and well‐thought‐out study 
yet in support of the politically ascendant claim that the Second Amendment, as originally 
intended and understood, protects a right to own guns for purposes other than service in the 
lawful militia.  It far surpasses Justice Antonin Scalia's historically naïve analysis in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, the 2008 Supreme Court decision that first recognized a constitutional right 
to weapons possession for hunting and self‐defense.  Halbrook's latest work is exhaustive in 
scope.  He reviews dozens of documents (many of them previously ignored) that can quite 
plausibly be read to support an original understanding of a right that extends far beyond what 
was required to ensure the people's capacity to serve in the militia.  At the same time, however, 
Halbrook ignores, truncates, glosses, slants, and misconstrues hundreds more documents that not 
only demonstrate the primacy of the anti‐standing‐army and pro‐militia trope in the framers' 
minds but also leave no reason to believe self‐defense or hunting figured in the creation of the 
Second Amendment at all. 
Halbrook has clearly immersed himself deeply in the primary record of the constitution 
making process on the state and federal levels.  His analysis of Justice James Wilson's law 
lectures in Philadelphia, St. George Tucker's Blackstone's Commentaries, and post‐ratification 
state constitutional reform in the early 1790s do support (but not irrefutably so) the claim that for 
some contemporary readers, more was at stake in the Second Amendment than preservation of 
the militia. But for all its utility as a compendium of relevant material, and the cogency of its 
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unexpected insights, there is an insurmountable and overarching oddness to this book that 
ultimately saps its credibility. 
To begin with, there is Halbrook's endless exegesis of block quotes concerning the utility 
of a militia composed of an armed populace that simply do not support his claim that the Second 
Amendment also protects a right to have guns for hunting and shooting burglars, suggestive 
adornments notwithstanding.  Next there is the issue of Halbrook's unbridled jingoism.  For 
Halbrook, the American Revolution was fought and won by an armed populace who defeated 
evil invaders.  The Continental Army is barely mentioned; the French Army is not mentioned at 
all. We are simply told that the defeat of British regulars was inevitable because the American 
militia comprised a population that was armed to the teeth.  Paradoxically, there is much 
discussion of the supposedly well‐armed revolutionaries' desperation to import arms and powder, 
but we are not told why these well‐armed and invincible patriots took seven years to win the war. 
Nor are readers given pause to reflect that the conflict amounted to a civil war, in which at least a 
fifth of the white population supported the British crown and in which at least that many tried to 
stay neutral, and that if black and Indian opinion were taken into account, the American 
Revolutionary cause reduces to a violent minority movement that used terrorist means to impose 
a disfavored solution on a reluctant populace. 
Halbrook's analysis of the constitutional crisis that followed the Revolutionary War is, 
like his account of the war itself, monocausal, indeed, monomaniacal.  Not only was the war 
fought to vindicate the right to arms, but the Constitution was also authored to vindicate that 
same right. And the Bill of Rights was added to remove threats to the right to arms that the 
Constitution created.  To be sure, there are other, lesser elements to the Bill of Rights that 
accompany the Second Amendment, and they merit some mention.  But they are instrumental 
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rights, useful chiefly to the extent that they provide auxiliary protections for the right to own 
weapons.  Guns cease in Halbrook's analysis to be tools, but become the summa bona of 
American political eschatology.  In a near inversion of Immanuel Kant's celebrated categorical 
imperative that no person is a mere means to a greater end, people and constitutionalism in 
Halbrook's account become devices whose merit lies in the service they offer to the right to arms. 
Halbrook works hard, but he has a tremendous evidentiary burden to overcome, starting 
with the First Federal Congress, who gave us the text “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”  Twelve members of the House of Representatives spoke when the Second 
Amendment was under consideration, and not one mentioned hunting or private self‐defense. 
They discussed only service in the militia, and the question of conscientious objection.  The 
debates of the Senate were conducted in secret until 1796, so they can offer us no guidance here. 
But we can turn to uses of the pivotal phrase “bear arms” in legislative, political, and journalistic 
contexts of the times.  According to Nathan Kozuskanich, well over ninety percent of the usages 
of bear arms and its cognates preserved in the journals of the Continental and United States 
Congresses between 1775 and 1791, Charles Evans American Bibliography (books and 
pamphlets from 1690–1800), and in Early American Newspapers (1690 to 1800) unambiguously 
relate to service in the army or militia, not self‐defense or hunting. 
Halbrook concedes much more than other gun rights advocates respecting the meaning of 
the right to arms.  He acknowledges that the principal evil that the framers of the Second 
Amendment aimed to prevent was the disarming of the militia that would invite creation of a 
standing army.  He even allows that the militia of the framers has long since gone away. In The 
Militia and the Right to Arms, Or, How the Second Amendment Fell Silent (2002), Richard 
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Uviller and I contend that the consequence of this disappearance of the militia was that the right 
to arms lapsed, pending recreation of something approximating the lawful, universal (or at least 
general), obligatory militia of the framers.  This, of course, Halbrook will not accept.  Bearing 
arms for Halbrook, as for Justice Scalia, means carrying weapons for any lawful purpose.  Not 
only does the right extend to hunting and protection against criminals, but it endures also as the 
ultimate check on government tyranny.  As Halbrook concludes, “the experiences of the 
American Revolution proved the right to keep and bear arms serves as the ultimate check that the 
founders hoped would dissuade persons at the helm of state from seeking to establish tyranny.  In 
hindsight, it would be difficult to quarrel with the success of the founders' vision” (p. 338).  It 
seems to me one could quarrel with the success of that vision on at least two levels. Realizing 
that the American War was fought as much over taxes as over guns, one might ask whether 
objections to readily affordable taxes on tea imposed by a government whose legitimacy nobody 
had questioned until a decade before justified a resort to arms, seven years of war, 40,000 dead, 
and 100,000 refugees.  One could also argue that precisely those dangers which animated the 
framers of the Second Amendment have now been willingly embraced by the governmental 
agents of the American people, and that we confront the very ruin the framers prophesized.  We 
have an enormous standing army we cannot afford, and with it foreign military adventures and 
two wars looking suspiciously like wars of imperialism.  We have lost our virtue, and become 
slaves to deficit spending and heavy taxes, and a client dependant on foreign interests to finance 
our martial folly.  To the framers of the Second Amendment, these would have been grounds for 





DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER (2008)  
FROM GUN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY:  
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS,  





The watershed District of Columbia v. Heller decision of June 26, 2008 marked the first 
time the United States Supreme Court enforced a claim of any description under the Second 
Amendment, and the first time the Court clearly acknowledged a Second Amendment right 
independent of service in the lawfully established militia and delinked from possession of 
weapons held for militia service.  As proposed by Congress in 1789, and ratified by the requisite 
ninth state in 1791, the Second Amendment proclaims “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”  Writing for a sharply divided 5-4 Court in Heller, Justice Antonin Scalia relied 
heavily on his signature jurisprudential theories of plain meaning textualism and original public 
understanding to hold unconstitutional both the District of Columbia’s ban on handgun 
possession in the home and the requirement that permissible weapons kept in the home be 
disassembled or fitted with trigger locks.  For Justice Scalia and the majority, the District’s strict 
gun control regime vitiated a right of personal self-defense, and particularly a right to defend the 
home, that rests at the core of the Second Amendment.  In separate dissents authored by Justices 
Breyer and Stevens, the Court’s four dissenters maintained the Amendment could not be fairly 
construed to say anything about weapons possession unrelated to militia service.  For the 
dissenters, regulation of weapons possession unconnected to militia service is consistent with 
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founding era practice and should remain a matter of discretion for the politically accountable 
branches of local, state, and national government. 
Precedent 
Prior to deciding Heller, the Supreme Court had addressed Second Amendment claims on 
only four prior occasions.  The decisions, United States v. Cruikshank (1876), Presser v. Illinois 
(1886), Miller v. Texas (1894), and United States v. Miller (1939) were old, in three cases 
arguably obsolete, and in the fourth allegedly ambiguous.  The first three of these cases involved 
claims raised against state and local governmental actors and individuals alleged to be acting 
under color of state law in an era when Bill of Rights guarantees were not yet enforced against 
the states by the federal judiciary.  The particular issue of enforcing the Second Amendment 
against the states was not implicated by Heller’s claim since it arose in the District of Columbia. 
Moreover, since the Supreme Court did not enforce non-economic liberties guaranteed in the Bill 
of Rights against state actors through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment until 
well into the Twentieth Century, the continuing precedential value of Nineteenth Century 
decisions holding that the Second Amendment did not speak to state infringement of the right to 
arms was subject to question by the time Heller was argued.  (Indeed, two years after Heller, in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment right to arms 
was incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, even though the Court had held in Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller v. Texas that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require application of the 
right to arms against the states).  The fourth pre-Heller case, United States v. Miller, was the 
most significant respecting the substantive scope of the constitutional right to arms.  The case 
reversed a decision of the Federal District Court for the Western District of Arkansas quashing 
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an indictment of two Depression era gangsters for transporting a sawed-off shotgun across state 
lines in violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934.  The Federal District Court had sustained 
a demurrer on the grounds that the conduct for which the defendants were indicted was protected 
by the Second Amendment.  Writing for the Court, Justice McReynolds stressed “[c]ertainly it is 
not with judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its 
use could contribute to the common defense.”  Thus, the weapon at issue was not protected by 
the Second Amendment and application of the National Firearms Act to punish its possession 
was not constitutionally infirm.  Perhaps Justice McReynolds’s opinion did not set out with 
crystalline clarity a test for distinguishing weapons protected by the Second Amendment from 
those subject to governmental regulation and prohibition.  In any case, the opinion has been 
subject to radically different readings by subsequent commentators, with one group wishing to 
exempt from Second Amendment protection all weapons not actually carried in service in the 
lawfully established militia, and another wanting to subject to Second Amendment protection 
any weapon that might be of a class that conceivably has some utility for military or paramilitary 
purposes.  Federal Courts of Appeals uniformly read Miller as a severe limitation on the scope of 
the constitutional right to arms for many decades, but the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States 
v. Emerson (2001) and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Parker v. District of Columbia (2007) (the 
case that became Heller upon appeal to the Supreme Court) recognized a Second Amendment 
right unrelated to militia service and created a split in the Circuits suggesting that the Second 
Amendment was ripe for reconsideration in the Supreme Court. 
 
Lower Court Litigation 
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Dick Heller was one of six District of Columbia residents to challenge various aspects of 
the city’s strict gun control regime in Parker v. District of Columbia (decided 2004 in the 
Federal District Court, and in 2007 in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia).  In his capacity as a special police officer, Heller was authorized under the D.C. law 
to carry a handgun while on duty at the Federal Judicial Center, but he was not permitted to 
register or obtain a license to keep a handgun at home.  The Parker plaintiffs argued 
unsuccessfully in Federal District Court that the city’s bar on registration and licensure of 
handguns for home protection violated the Second Amendment.  Heller was the only one of the 
Parker litigants who had actually applied for a registration certificate to keep a handgun, and 
since his claim focused on the concrete harm allegedly flowing from denial of that application, 
he alone could claim to have suffered adverse governmental action as a consequence of the 
District’s laws.  According to Judge Silberman writing for a split three judge panel of the D.C. 
Circuit in 2007, Heller was therefore the only Parker plaintiff to satisfy standing requirements, 
and the only one allowed to challenge the unfavorable federal trial court decision in the Court of 
Appeals.  Judge Silberman embraced an individualistic reading of the Second Amendment and 
held for Heller on the merits, ruling that the District’s prohibition on registering handguns for 
home protection was unconstitutional.  In justifying his decision, Judge Silberman relied 
principally on the Fifth Circuit’s Emerson opinion, which in turn drew heavily on the self-
proclaimed “standard model” of the Second Amendment, a revisionist interpretation of the 
constitutional right to arms that won favor among gun rights advocates and law professors 
committed to libertarian principles in the last decades of the twentieth century.  The “standard 
model,” which Justice Scalia went on to endorse in Heller, depends on textual exegesis and the 
weight of often isolated historical quotations to buttress a private rights reading of the Second 
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Amendment even as it rejects more contextualized accounts favored by academic historians.  
Thus, while most historians writing on the original meaning of the Second Amendment focus on 
the role of the militia in late eighteenth century Anglo-American political discourse, standard 
modelers, Judge Silberman, and eventually Justice Scalia have zeroed in on the image of the 
individual rights bearer defending home and hearth against all enemies (including potentially 
governmental ones) as the archetypal embodiment of Second Amendment freedoms. 
 
Justice Scalia’s Analysis 
The District of Columbia appealed the D.C. Circuit’s adverse decision to the Supreme 
Court in hopes of preserving what was effectively a total handgun ban.  The District maintained 
that the Second Amendment did not concern weapons possession unrelated to service in the 
lawfully established militia, and, in the alternative, that even if the Court chose to recognize a 
private right to self-defense disconnected from militia service, such a right was not violated by 
the District’s gun control laws because they left open the possibility of defending the home by 
other means.  Justice Scalia rejected both arguments and endorsed a broader reading of the 
Second Amendment that embraces at its core a purely private right to self-defense, particularly 
of the home.  That right, the majority reasoned, could not tolerate restrictions as severe as those 
imposed by the District.  For the majority, the time required to assemble, unlock and aim a more 
cumbersome weapon than a handgun imposed unacceptable burdens on Heller’s right to defend 
himself against intruders into his own home. 
 Justice Scalia’s began his analysis by dividing the text of the Amendment into a 
“prefatory clause” concerning the militia and an “operative clause” concerning the right to arms.  
This division of the text implies a hierarchical ordering that proved outcome-determinative in the 
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Court’s analysis.  For the majority, the purpose of preserving the militia announced in the so-
called prefatory clause did not limit the meaning of the text labeled operational.  Indeed, the 
Court went so far as to assert that preservation of the militia was but one of many purposes 
behind the Amendment, and likely not the most important.  Both during oral argument and in the 
Opinion of the Court, the majority celebrated a private right to self-defense assumed to rest at the 
core of the Amendment.  The Court played down evidence respecting original intent such as the 
fact that none of the reported commentary during the House of Representatives debates on the 
proposed Amendment in 1789 touched on a private right to arms, while twelve members went on 
record to discuss a right related to militia service.  (Since the Senate debated behind closed doors 
until 1794, only House of Representatives debates were reported—and even these were only 
partially reported—during the First Congress).  Rather, the Court focused on original public 
understanding, that is, the alleged meaning attached to the text by the general public participating 
in the ratification process that gave life to the new constitutional text.  The Court stressed the 
Amendment’s reference to a “right of the people,” which for the Court implied individualist 
liberties analogous in application to rights belonging to “the people” described in the Fourth 
Amendment.  Perhaps more controversially, the Court proceeded to endorse a non-military sense 
of “keep and bear Arms,” which it supported by citations to various dictionaries of the times, in 
the face of countervailing evidence respecting standard usage cited by the dissenters.  The Court 
acknowledged that bearing arms at least sometimes means rendering military service, but this 
usage according to the majority was “idiomatic” rather than “natural.”  According to the Court 
the orthodox construction of the Amendment’s operational language, and the one enshrined in 
the Constitution, guarantees not a narrow right to carry weapons in military or militia service, but 
“the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” 
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 While five justices signed off on this meaning, oral argument also suggested differences 
among the majority respecting the scope of the constitutional right to arms, and these differences 
led to Justice Scalia crafting a narrower opinion than his own comments and questions indicated 
he might have wished to pursue.  Alan Gura, counsel for Heller, urged an extremely potent 
version of the right to arms for purposes of self-defense, and Justice Scalia made clear during 
oral argument that he felt government action impacting an individual’s ability to engage in armed 
self-defense should be permitted only if it could withstand strict scrutiny, that is, only if the 
government measures served a compelling interest and employed means necessary to achieving 
that interest.  Chief Justice Roberts, in contrast, expressed reticence about subjecting gun control 
legislation to a heightened form of judicial scrutiny, and in the end, the Court left open the 
question of what standard lower courts should apply in reviewing gun laws in the future.  Justice 
Kennedy, for his part, expressed great skepticism about United States v. Miller during argument 
in Heller, and made clear that he did not think gun possession unrelated to militia service was 
protected under the Miller interpretation of the Second Amendment.  Kennedy was willing to 
overturn Miller, but the greater reluctance of other justices including Chief Justice Roberts to lay 
aside precedent pushed the majority towards a strained reading of Miller rather than forthright 
confrontation with that decision’s severely skeptical approach to private rights claims under the 
Second Amendment.  Meanwhile, the law and order sensibilities of the justices comprising the 
Heller majority militated against the potentially boundless version of the right to self-defense 
urged by Gura and in some libertarian leaning amici curiae briefs.  Thus, Justice Scalia readily 
conceded that some gun control measures might not run afoul of the Amendment, writing 
“nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms 
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in sensitive places such as schools or government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”  In addition, Justice Scalia limited the right to 
“weapons in common use” thereby excluding “dangerous and unusual weapons.”  The opinion 
strongly suggests, and oral argument made entirely clear, that Justice Scalia concedes the 
constitutionality of federal prohibitions on machine guns precisely because they are “dangerous 
and unusual” and not “in common use” among the population.  This allowance gives rise to a 
paradox, namely that in the Court’s reading of the Second Amendment, arms particularly 
suitable for militia service such as M-16 rifles are not constitutionally protected, while weapons 




Justices Stevens and Breyer developed different lines of objection to the Court’s opinion 
in their separate dissents, each of which was joined by all four dissenting justices.  Both Stevens 
and Breyer took issue with Justice Scalia’s focus on original public understanding, in each 
instance both because they disagreed that Justice Scalia had accurately and faithfully rendered 
the original public understanding of the Amendment, and also because they disagreed as a 
jurisprudential matter whether original public understanding should be the dominant 
consideration in constitutional questions.  For Justice Stevens, the majority’s claim that the 
Amendment was originally understood to focus on private self-defense unrelated to militia 
service was simply wrong as a matter of text and history.  Stevens highlighted studies raised by 
amici demonstrating that contrary to the majority’s assertions, bearing arms had an 
overwhelmingly military meaning in the late Eighteenth Century.  Stevens considered also 
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broader questions of original intention, and these allowed him to focus on debates in Congress 
and scholarship on late Eighteenth Century American political ideology that undermined the 
majority’s reasoning.  For his part, Justice Breyer expressed agreement that Justice Stevens had 
demonstrated the absence of a private rights dimension to the Second Amendment, but accepted 
for the sake of argument the Court’s determination that the Amendment does include the right to 
self-defense.  Even if the constitutional text did encompass the right to defend the home against 
intruders, Breyer then argued, the District’s measures were consistent with founding era practice, 
including many municipal laws severely restricting the ability to use guns in urban settings in the 
late colonial and early national periods.  Justice Breyer also strongly objected to the Court’s 
decision on grounds of localism and democratic legitimacy.  Since in his view the text of the 
Constitution provided no solid basis for judicial intervention, the people of the District of 
Columbia should be free to choose strict gun control even if their preferences do not harmonize 
with those in other regions of the country or of a bare Supreme Court majority. 
 
Reaction 
Heller was hailed by gun rights enthusiasts as a major landmark in the Supreme Court’s 
checkered history of rights enforcement and as vindication of popular support for a robust, 
individualistic Second Amendment.  Popular constitutionalists favoring traditional values 
associated with the founding era were not alone in singing Heller’s praises.  Prominent 
constitutional scholars Randy Barnett and Eugene Volokh who champion the theory that judicial 
reliance on original public meaning of constitutional text can minimize the dangers of judges’ 
personal political preferences infecting judicial review celebrated Justice Scalia’s opinion as the 
high water mark of originalist constitutional interpretation.  But noted constitutional historians 
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including Jack Rakove and Saul Cornell responded that Justice Scalia’s version of the historical 
understanding of the Amendment was objectively untenable, and their suspicions of Heller’s 
jurisprudential bona fides were echoed by jurists with otherwise unimpeachable conservative 
credentials such as Richard Posner and Harvey Wilkinson, who labeled the decision activist and 
insufficiently supported by the Constitutional text. 
 
Significance 
Heller left open for future consideration at least four broad questions about the right to 
armed self-defense.  One of these questions—whether the constitutional right to arms would be 
applied against the states and municipalities—was answered affirmatively two years later in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago.  A second question, whether there is a constitutional right to 
weapons possession for purposes other than self-defense or militia service, has not been 
addressed at all by the Supreme Court.  Two other broad classes of questions adumbrated in 
Heller and McDonald remain, and burgeoning litigation in the lower courts will likely bring 
them before the Supreme Court in the coming years.  These concern the standard of judicial 
review, and permissible classes of gun regulation.  In Heller, the Court deliberately shied away 
from announcing that a particular level of scrutiny would automatically be triggered by Second 
Amendment claims, and given the Chief Justice’s skepticism respecting tiered scrutiny and the 
skepticism of four justices regarding a personal right to arms, it is likely that the current Court 
will address Second Amendment claims on a case by case basis, carving out doctrinal niceties 
incrementally as the justices did in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment arenas during the 
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist years.  The permissible reasonable limitations on the right to 
arms endorsed by the Court in Heller were recited once more in McDonald, but since issues such 
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as carrying guns in schools or prohibiting the mentally ill from acquiring arms were not litigated 
in either Heller or McDonald, it might be tempting for gun rights enthusiasts to argue that the 
Court’s endorsement of restrictions amount to mere obiter dicta and are not part of the holdings 
of the cases that form binding precedent.  For their part, government attorneys defending gun 
control regulations and statutes will almost certainly argue that the exceptions listed in Heller do 
not form a complete class, and that other analogous or conceptually related limitations on the 
right to arms should also be tolerated under the Second Amendment.   The future of course 
remains unwritten, but gun rights litigation, for the first time in the nation’s history, has solid (if 
not impregnable) constitutional underpinnings.  Civil litigation challenging licensing regimes has 
increased apace since Heller, although the Heller Court took for granted that licensing was not in 
itself unreasonable.  Perhaps more dramatically, Second Amendment claims are rapidly 
becoming part of the criminal defense attorney’s arsenal to be deployed alongside Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims in gun cases.  In the longer term, it is possible that Heller 
may be confined to its facts, standing for the important but limited principle that the government 
may not render impossible armed defense against home invaders.  As of this writing, however, 
the scope of the right to armed self-defense of the home and the applicability of the right to 
armed defense to spaces outside the home remain very much in play, and criminal defense 
counsel, private litigants, lobbyists and action groups, and the judicial and legislative branches of 
local, state and national government are all poised to participate in determining the metes and 
bounds of these rights. 
For Further Reading 
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“I am not so naïve (nor do I think our forbears were) as to be unaware that judges a real 
sense ‘make’ law.  But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they 
were ‘finding it.’”1   
 
“[E]ven though the Justice is not naïve enough . . . to be unaware that judges in a real 
sense ‘make law, he suggests that judges (in an unreal sense, I suppose) should never 
concede that they do and must claim that they do no more than discover it, hence 
suggesting that there are citizens who are naïve enough to believe them.”2  
 
 
Heller and the Second Amendment Right to Arms 
 
For many years following the Supreme Court’s 1939 decision in United States v. Miller, 
academics and federal appeals courts alike adhered consistently to the opinion that the Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution did not protect possession of firearms unrelated to 
service in the lawfully established militia.
3
  But in the 1980s and ‘90s, a phalanx of gun rights 
advocates, single-topic academics, and contrarian and clever constitutional theorists, including 
Sandy Levinson, Akhil Amar, Larry Tribe and Randy Barnett, emerged to challenge the old 
understanding on originalist grounds related to both the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
4
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and classifying law review pieces on the Second Amendment through 2000). 
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Claims and appeals challenging gun control laws under the newly emerging individual reading of 
the Second Amendment increased apace.  The once dominant view of the militia-focused right 
prevailed in Judge Reinhardt’s opinion for the Ninth Circuit in Silveira v. Lockyer in 2003, but 
the self-proclaimed standard model favoring a purely private right to arms won out in the Fifth 
Circuit’s Emerson opinion in 2002 and in the D.C. Circuit’s Parker decision in 2007.5  In June 
2008, the United States Supreme Court resolved the split in the circuits and endorsed a private 
rights reading of the Second Amendment by upholding the D.C. Circuit’s decision sub nomine 
District of Columbia v. Heller.
6
  Writing for five justices on a sharply divided Court, Justice 
Scalia based his decision on fidelity to the alleged original public understanding of the Second 
Amendment over sharply worded dissents by Justices Stevens and Breyer. 
 There may be sound reasons for recognizing a federal constitutional right to own 
firearms for private purposes wholly unconnected to militia service.  Two potentially convincing 
rationales spring readily to mind: in the United States, a majority of the population probably 
favors such a right, and a majority of the population understands that right to be rooted in 
constitutional text and tradition.
7
  But in writing for a majority of the Supreme Court in Heller, 
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 JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 38-43, 52-53 (2002) (studying public 
opinion regarding gun rights).  Over the last decade, popular constitutionalism, essentially 
rejecting the teachings of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), and the cultish following of 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137 (1803), in favor of the Jeffersonian belief that that the living 
demos is the ultimate arbitrator of constitutional values, has been embraced by several leading 
constitutional theorists.  See Sanford Levinson, Why I do not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern 




Justice Scalia did not openly embrace popular constitutionalism (although he has done so before, 
most famously in his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas).
8
  Instead, he claimed to rely on textualism 
and originalism, and, in the process, produced a decidedly disingenuous and unprincipled 
opinion.  From the standpoint of an academically trained historian, Justice Scalia’s reasoning in 
Heller is objectively untenable, in that it privileges the current Court’s fixation with libertarian 
individualism over the framers’ civic republican focus on the organized militia as a preferred 
alternative to a dangerous standing army and military establishment.
9
  But leading academic 
specialists of founding era constitutional thought such as Jack Rakove and Saul Cornell are 
hardly alone in condemning Justice Scalia’s decision in Heller.10  The majority opinion in Heller 
has also been savaged as results-oriented historical fiction by Judges Harvey Wilkinson and 
Richard Posner, two of the nation’s foremost conservative jurists, who in other contexts are 
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(2006) (going even further, and arguing that judicial enforcement of constitutional rights against 
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democratic society).  Waldron hints strongly that the American preference for judicial rights 
enforcement is idiosyncratic and insular, but given the fact that the German-speaking countries, 
post-Soviet states, and all of Southern Europe including as of this summer France have also 
embraced judicial rights enforcement, Waldron’s claim appears exaggerated.  Cite Dorsen et al. 
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that the textually unspecified right to same sex intimacy recognized by the majority was not 
deeply rooted in American history and tradition, and therefore not a legitimate basis for judicial 
invalidation of a statutory prohibition). 
9
 See generally H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE 
RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2003) (describing in great 
detail the classical republican conceptual framework that animated founding era discourse on the 
right to arms). 
10
 See Q&A: Jack Rakove on Heller and History, NEW YORK TIMES TOPIC BLOG, June 26, 
2008, http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/qa-jack-rakove-on-heller-and-history/; Saul 
Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 




entirely sympathetic to claims premised on gun rights, autonomy, and self-defense.
11
  Indeed, 
Judge Wilkinson has gone so far as to liken Heller to Roe v. Wade, the famous abortion decision 
long held in contempt by conservative thinkers skeptical of judge-made law and judicial veto of 
democratically-sanctioned criminal statutes where no constitutional text demands judicial 
intervention.
12
    
In Heller, Justice Scalia contorted the original public understanding of the Second 
Amendment’s textual command into something neither the framers nor ratifiers would have 
recognized as their own handiwork.  The contested text proclaims, “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.”13  According to Justice Scalia and the Heller majority, the language about 
the militia and the State is prefatory and non-operative, while the plain meaning of the 
operational text respecting the right to bear arms, as understood at the time of its creation, is that 
the Constitution protects a personal right to carry commonly held weapons for purposes of 
confrontation.
14
  The historical record proves otherwise.  Not only was discussion of the right to 
bear arms almost invariably linked to discussion of the virtues of the militia and the dangers of 
standing armies in the late eighteenth century, but the “operative” phrase bear arms carried an 
overwhelmingly martial meaning.  Twelve members of the House of Representatives spoke 
when the Amendment was under consideration in 1789; all discussed militia- and military-
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 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265118; Richard A. Posner, In Defense of 




 Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 1; see also Cass. R. Sunstein, Second Amendment 
Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 121 HARV. L. REV 246, 254-55 (2008).  
13
 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
14




related issues, principally conscientious objection.  Not one mentioned private self-defense, 
hunting, or gun collecting.
15
  Senate debates were not recorded until 1796, but an electronic 
search of the Library of Congress database containing all extant official records of debates in the 
Continental and U.S. Congresses between 1774 and 1821 reveals thirty additional uses of the 
phrase “bear arms” or “bearing arms” in contexts other than discussion of the proposed Bill of 
Rights, and in all but four instances the use is unambiguously military and collective.
16
  
Similarly, as reported by careful historical scholar Nathan Kozuskanich, an electronic search of 
Charles Evans American Bibliography, a comprehensive collection of surviving books and 
pamphlets in the colonies and United States from 1639-1800, yields 210 hits for bearing arms 
and its cognates other than those contained in reprints of the Bill of Rights and other government 
papers.
17
  According to Kozuskanich, 202 of these 210 uses (96.2%) are unambiguously military 
and collective, not private.
18
  The same search on Early American Newspapers, a database of 120 
American newspapers from 1690 to 1800, yields 143 hits, all but three of which (97.9%) 
Kozuskanich describes as clearly related to rendering military service or performing militia 
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 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 778-796 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); UVILLER & MERKEL, 
supra note 9, at 97-103 (discussing some of the debate on the conscientious objector clause and 
the purpose of the amendment as a militia-based protection against standing armies). 
16
 Nathaniel Kozuskanich, Originalism, History and the Second Amendment: What Did 
Bearing Arms Really Mean to the Founders, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 413, 416 (2008) (a 
preliminary form of the argument which will appear in Journal of the Early Republic) 
[hereinafter Originalism, History and the Second Amendment].  Kozuskanich, a graduate student 
in history at Ohio State, was inspired in part by David Yassky, a law professor turned Brooklyn 
politician, whose article The Second Amendment: Structure, History and Constitutional Change, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 618 (2000), counted and analyzed surviving uses of “bear arms” in the 
leading electronic database of early Congressional debates.  All the numbers here are from the 
Kozuskanich tabulations. 
17
 Nathaniel Kozuskanich, Originalialsim in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right to 
Bear Arms, J. EARLY REP. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, on file with author) (containing 









  In ignoring this record, cited by several amicus,
20
 Justice Scalia thus elevated what was 
in the late eighteenth century a decidedly eccentric and outlying meaning (bearing arms as 
carrying weapons for non-military purposes) to the summit of constitutional orthodoxy.
21
 
 The decision’s historically unsupportable appeal to interpretive fidelity marks a 
significant victory for results-oriented jurisprudence even as it points to the shallowness of 
originalist claims to neutrality.  It also lays bare interesting philosophical tensions between the 
intent-based originalism that animates the Stevens and Breyer dissents and the original public 
understanding method of originalism expounded by Justice Scalia in his 1997 manifesto A 
Matter of Interpretation and applied to telling effect in the majority’s Heller opinion.  The older 
intent-focused version of originalism, long associated with Edward Meese and Robert Bork, 
focuses on justifying judicial invalidation of democratically enacted legislation by invocation of 
the higher authority of constitutional compact.
22
  Justices Stevens and Breyer in their dissents 




 Brief for Jack N. Rakove, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157183, 11-13 [hereinafter 
Historians’ Brief]; Brief for Professors of Linguistis and English Dennis E. Baron, Ph.D., 
Richard W. Bailey, Ph.D., & Jeffery P. Kaplan, Ph.D. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157194, 14-15 
[hereinafter Linguists’ Brief].  
21
 Scalia justifies this move in two fashions, first, by strained and exaggerated readings of 
the relatively small number of late eighteenth-century utterances that might plausibly support his 
interpretation, and second, by invoking numerous nineteenth-century examples that are in some 
instances consistent with his interpretation of the right.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 
2783, 2791-94, 2804-12 (2008).  The latter actually demonstrates that popular conceptions of the 
right to arms were changing in the nineteenth century, rather than that the right was understood 
as individualistic and privatistic at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified.  See SAUL CORNELL, 
A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN 
AMERICA passim (2006). 
22
 Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: 
THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13-21 (Jack N. Rakove ed. 1990); ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).  Indeed, this argument 
is as old as judicial review itself, and was famously advanced by Chief Justice Marshall in 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and again in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 




look to the original intent of the framers and ratifiers of the Amendment, find strong evidence of 
concern with militia-related questions and little evidence of concern with private self-defense, 
and vote to let the D.C. handgun band stand as they saw no constitutional warrant for judicial 
intervention.
23
  In contrast, Justice Scalia no longer seems concerned with the question of the 
validity vel non of legislating negatively, i.e. vetoing legislation from the bench.  His version of 
plain meaning originalism is focused only on ensuring that when judicial invalidation of 
legislation occurs, it proceeds according to neutral—not subjective—principles.24  However, 
plain meaning textualism could achieve this goal only if the constitutional text admitted but one 
single meaning when it was created; as Heller painfully illustrates, even in the rare instances 
when this is true, clever results-oriented jurists are quite capable of ignoring the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence in order to justify striking down legislation based on a constitutional 
understanding that did not exist when the constitutional text was ratified.
25
 
Rather than original meaning, the Court’s embrace of an individual right to own guns for 
purely private purposes reflects the larger symbolic significance of the right to arms in popular 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Marshall reasoned that the ratifying supermajority acted directly, and their authority trumped that 
of mere representative agents elected to make statutes.  But those who voted to ratify the 
Constitution are long since dead.  The ratifers of 1787-88 (original seven articles), or 1789-91 
(Bill of Rights), or 1866-68 (Fourteenth Amendment) were never appointed agents by members 
of the now existing polity of the United States.  The best that could be said respecting their 
authority and the binding character of their actions is that they have been implicitly ratified after 
the fact by those now living.  But those now living have expressly (not implicitly) voted into 
office legislative agents, and it is hardly self-evident that their commission carries lower 
authority than the Supreme Court’s self-proclaimed power to strike down legislation in the name 
of a Constitution that nowhere expressly conveys that power.  
23
 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2824-31, 2847 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Cornell, supra 
note 10, at 626. 
24
 ANTON SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14-
15, 23-29, 37-41, 44-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (discussing the need for a science of statutory 
interpretation, textualism and canons of construction, interpreting the Constitution, and the 
dangers of lacking guiding principles in judicial review); Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788-90 
(discussing constitutional interpretation and the Second Amendment). 
25
 See critiques of Scalia’s textualism in Cornell, supra note 10, at 625; Sunstein, supra 




constitutional culture during later periods of American history and in our own times, and the 
long-range tendency of that evolving popular culture to affect the jurisprudence of the Court, 
principally by influencing the politics of appointment.
26
  The image of the gun as a central icon 
of American liberty taps into a powerful national obsession mythologizing the revolutionary 
generation as supposed originators of libertarian norms few of the framers actually would have 
recognized as their own.
27
  That mythology clearly swayed the all important “swing voter” 
Justice Kennedy in Heller, who at least five times during oral argument interjected at seemingly 
irrelevant occasions words to the effect that: surely the framers must have had frontiersmen in 
mind, and must have wished to constitutionalize their need for guns to defend themselves against 
animals and Indians.
28
  Nothing in the case file or historical record supports Kennedy’s 
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 See generally DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT (2003); CORNELL, supra note 22; William G. Merkel, A Cultural Turn: Reflections 
Recent Legal and Historical Writings on the Second Amendment, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 671, 
672 (2006) (all of these discuss the changing cultural significance of gun ownership through the 
course of American history); on popular political preferences and Supreme Court appointments, 
see LEE EPSTEIN AND JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENT (2005); John Massaro, SUPREMELY POLITICAL: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND 
PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT IN UNSUCCESSFUL SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS (1990), LORI J. 
OWENS, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT: THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005). 
27
 On the symbolic significance of guns and gun ownership in American history, see 
Williams, supra note 26 and Cornell, supra note 21.  On the attitudes of the founding generation 
towards guns, see Cornell, supra note 21, at 13-18. 
28
 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 
07-290) (where Kennedy asks, “It [the Second Amendment] had nothing to do with the concerns 
of the remote settler to defend himself and his family against hostile Indian tribes and outlaws, 
wolves and bears and grizzlies and things like that?”); id. at 30 (where Kennedy asks General 
Clement, “So in your view this amendment has nothing to do with the right of people living in 
the wilderness to protect themselves, despite maybe an attempt by the Federal Government, 
which is what the Second Amendment applies to, to take away their weapons?”); id. at 30-31 
(where Kennedy states, “I agree that Miller is consistent with what you’ve just said, but it seems 
to me Miller…is just insufficient to subscribe—to describe the interests that must have been 
foremost in the framers’ minds when they were concerned about guns being taken away from the 
people who needed them for their defense.”); id. at 57-58 (where Kennedy asks Mr. Gura, 
“I’m—I want to know whether or not, in your view, the operative clause of the amendment 




assumption.  But in Heller, he voted with his colleagues Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice 
Roberts to recognize a private right to guns for defense against burglars and other human and 
animal threats. 
 The eight speaking justices’ historically-inflected readings of the Second Amendment 
revealed during oral argument in Heller make fascinating studies.  In the case of the five justices 
who voted for a private right to arms, they highlight the inevitable failure of originalism to live 
up to its neutral pretensions.  And yet Heller is no garden variety case of originalism manqué.   
Typically, originalism fails because there was no single agreed or dominant understanding of 
constitutional text at the time of its creation.  Generally, there were two or more mainstream 
understandings of constitutional principle reflected in newly-created constitutional text, and the 
judicial act of recovering and applying the meaning of that text requires judges faithfully 
committed to originalism to choose from among those meanings at play when the language came 
into being.
29
  In such cases, originalism cannot elevate constitutional judging above the 
contentious plane of politics, because the meaning of the constitutional text was hotly, bitterly, 
and ideologically contested at the time it was created.  But the question of whether the Second 
                                                                                                                                                                           
have a gun against some conceivable Federal enactment which would prohibit him from having 
any guns?”). 
29
 The fallacy that constitutional meaning was noncontentious in the Revolutionary and 
early national period cannot withstand serious reflection about the bitter partisan struggles over 
constitutional meaning that did so much to define the politics of the times.  See e.g., JACK N. 
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8 
(1996) (discussing the disputes over meaning of the proposed text at the Convention); 1 THE 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND 
LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION (Bernhard Bailyn ed., 1993) (discussing 
disputes between Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the Constitution’s meaning during the 
ratification struggle); STANLY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM passim 
(1993) (discussing disputes between Jefferson’s Democratic-Republicans and Hamilton’s 
Federalists during the 1790s regarding the Constitution’s application); LANCE BANNING, THE 
JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY passim (1978) (also discussing 





Amendment protects a right to weapons possession outside the context of service in the lawfully-
established militia does not present this type of dilemma for a selector of judicial options.  The 
documentary record is clear, and opinion among historians (as opposed to litigators, polemicists, 
and bellettrists) specializing in late eighteenth-century American political thought is 
overwhelmingly against Scalia:  debates surrounding the future Second Amendment focused on 
one concern, and one concern only—the desire to ensure the preservation of the local militia as 
the preferred option to a politically dangerous standing army, and for that purpose, and that 
purpose only, preserve the right of individuals to remain armed so that they could fulfill their 
civic duty in that militia.
30
 
In short, the Second Amendment presents the rare case where originalism, honestly and 
faithfully applied, could afford an unambiguous answer.  The proposers, drafters, and ratifiers of 
the constitutional right to arms were not at all concerned with rights to gun possession for 
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 Among scholars who have written on the Second Amendment, historians specializing 
in late eighteenth-century American political thought who reject Scalia’s reading include Saul 
Cornell, David Konig, Paul Finkelman, myself, Peter Onuf, Jack Rakove, and Robert Shalhope.  
Those who come closer to Scalia’s interpretation are Robert Churchill, perhaps James Henretta, 
and the eccentric Leonard Levy, who came to the issue only in retirement.  See Historians’ Brief, 
supra note 20, signed by Jack N. Rakove, Saul Cornell, David T. Konig, William J. Novak, and 
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see Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early 
America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 143 (2007); 
James A. Henretta, Collective Responsibilities, Private Arms, and State Regulations: Toward the 
Original Understanding, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 529 (2004); and LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE 




purposes such as self-defense or hunting.
31
  This result, of course, is unacceptable to gun 
enthusiasts inside and outside the Court.  Equally unacceptable, from their perspective, is 
abandonment of the obsession with foundation mythology that has dovetailed with originalism 
since its beginnings as a reaction against the Warren Court’s novel project of taking seriously the 
textual commands of Equal Protection and of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.  The 
problem then becomes squaring the commands of policy preference (broad access to guns) and 
jurisprudential theory (historical fidelity).  There are only two obvious solutions to this problem, 
both of which members of the Heller majority embraced quite eagerly.  The first is elevation of 
outlying, eccentric, discredited and largely ignored voices from the founding period regarding 
private self-defense into a privileged position as evidence of mainstream understanding.  The 
second tack, which is either more cautious or more outrageous than the first depending on the 
brazenness of the justice in question, is to assume on faith that there must have existed a 
consensus in favor of a constitutional right to guns for private purposes, and that the existence of 
this assumption need not be proved.  This course, it should be plain, blends quite readily into 
self-deception, deception of the public, and ultimately, to embrace the label applied by Chief 
Justice Burger to the NRA’s now completed project of re-conceptualizing the right to arms— 
outright fraud.
32
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 This point is self-evident not just to historians critical of originalism premised on 
fallacious historical assertions, but to Judges Posner and Wilkinson as well.  See Posner, supra 
note 11, at 32; Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 3-4; see also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 255-56.    
32
 In a PBS television interview in 1991 marking the two hundredth anniversary of 
ratification of the Bill of Rights, Burger commented:  “If I were writing the Bill of Rights now 
there wouldn’t be any such thing as the Second Amendment . . . . This has been the subject of 
one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word ‘fraud,’ on the American public by special 
interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime.  Now just look at those words.  There are 
only three lines to that amendment.  A well regulated militia—if the militia, which was going to 
be the state army, was going to be well regulated, why shouldn’t 16 and 17 and 18 or any other 
age persons be regulated in the use of arms the way an automobile is regulated? It’s got to be 





Oral argument in Heller took place on March 18, 2008, running an hour and thirty-seven 
minutes.
33
  The justices heard from Walter Dellinger on behalf of the District of Columbia, 
Solicitor General Paul Clement as amicus nominally supporting the District, and Alan Gura for 
the respondent, Dick Heller, the only one of six original plaintiffs held to have standing and 
granted relief in Parker.
34
  The comments of the four speaking justices who together with Justice 
Thomas formed a majority in favor of a private right to arms are analyzed in the following 
paragraphs. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ questioning was not dogmatically originalist, but he drew heavily 
on history, and assumptions about history, as he sought to clarify the litigants’ positions.  The 
Chief Justice left no doubt that he believes private firearms possession falls within the 
constitutional guarantee, even if the weapons in question have no direct relation to militia service 
or militia preparedness.
35
  Interestingly, the Chief Justice also expressed hostility to expanding 
the judicially created construct of tiered scrutiny to areas not already burdened thereby, and 
urged that the right to arms is subject to reasonable regulation.
36
  In considering whether any 
                                                                                                                                                                           
repeat that they [the NRA] . . . have had far too much influence on the Congress of the United 
States than as a citizen I would like to see—and I am a gun man.  I have guns.  I have been a 
hunter ever since I was a boy.”  MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Interview by Charlayne Hunter-
Gault with Warren Burger (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 16, 1991) (Monday transcript # 
4226), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (News Library, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer File) 
(quoted in Uviller & Merkel, supra note 9, at 13). 
33
 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at 1, 91 (stating argument began at 10:06 
a.m. and ended at 11:43 a.m.). 
34
 Id. at 3, 28, 48; Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
aff’d sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).  
35
 Transcript, supra note 28, at 12 (showing Chief Justice Roberts’ disbelief that the 
Second Amendment right would belong solely to the militia and not be in the militia clause 
itself); id. at 54 (discussing whether a conscientious objector has a  potential right under the 
Second Amendment to hunt deer); id. at 85 (asking whether it makes sense to make a distinction 
between handguns and rifles for self-defense purposes). 
36




restrictions on gun possession might be constitutionally permissible (and hinting that they were 
to Blackstone, and hence continue to be today), Roberts made clear his skepticism of the 
District’s total ban on possession of handguns, but suggested strongly that a total ban on machine 
guns (as exists under federal law) is reasonable (dodging the argument that automatic rifles 
clearly have a far closer relation to service in the lawfully established militia than do 
handguns).
37
  He also pressed respondent on the question of what restrictions and regulations 
would be reasonable (suggesting that lineal descendants of those existing in 1791 would be), 
with respondent urging that the right extends only to weapons commonly in civilian use (a point 
that resonated in particular with Justice Scalia).
38
  During petitioner’s rebuttal, the Chief Justice 




Justice Scalia, eventual author of the majority opinion, left little doubt that the Second 
Amendment right to arms should trigger strict scrutiny.  Scalia believes that militia service is 
only one (and perhaps not even the most important) purpose behind the Second Amendment.  
With multiple colleagues on the bench (perhaps including even Heller dissenters) he assumes 
that even though no member of Congress discussed self-defense while the constitutional right to 
arms was under debate, the desire to protect private self-defense must have been prominent if not 
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 Id. at 23 (discussing how if a ban on machine guns comes to the court they may find it 
reasonable); id. at 46 (where Chief Justice Roberts asked about distinguishing a ban on machine 
guns); id. at 61 (where Roberts asks, “Is there any parallel at the time that the amendment was 
adopted to the machine gun?”  In response, Mr. Gura says, “[I]t’s hard to imagine how a machine 
gun could be a ‘lineal descendent,’ to use the D.C. Circuit’s wording, of anything that existed 
back in 1791, if we want to look to the framing era.”). 
38
 Id. at 71(asking whether the modern trigger lock provisions are similar to the 
gunpowder storage restrictions in place at the time of the Second Amendment’s drafting); id. at 
76 (asking whether age limits would be reasonable); id. at 77 (asking whether reasonableness 
should be determined in light of restrictions in place at the time of the Second Amendment’s 
adoption). 
39




paramount in the minds of the ratifiers.  But there is little evidence to support this inference, and 
while Scalia refers to “three states” petitioning in favor of a private right to arms, apart from the 
New Hampshire’s Ratification Report, there are only two dissenting instruments that bolster 
Scalia’s claim:  that of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention and a failed 
western Massachusetts proposal to amend that state’s constitution.40  While Scalia assumes that 
self-defense is an important purpose behind the Second Amendment, he urged inconsistently that 
only individually held firearms that are in common use and might be useful respecting militia 
preparedness fall within the terms of the Amendment.  Thus, automatic weapons, even if 
standard issue in the National Guard, fall outside the Amendment because they are not in 
common private use.   
Confused as it is, Justice Scalia’s understanding of the Second Amendment is 
inextricably entwined with his famous sense of historical fantasy.  That said, Justice Scalia’s 
understanding of the Second Amendment is in no sense a product of the “originalism” he 
advocated as an academic before he came to the Bench or in his manifesto A Matter of 
Interpretation.
41
  In his classical mode, Justice Scalia favored judicial restraint and deference to 
legislatures.  Constitutional text, he argued, needed to be narrowly construed according to its 
original understanding in order to forestall legislating from the Bench.
42
  In the context of the 
Second Amendment, however, Justice Scalia embraces a wide, latitudinarian vision of the right 
to arms decoupled from the militia predicate of the constitutional text.  He takes as an article of 
faith that the Second Amendment was inspired by a desire to protect the right of private self-
defense, even though this represents a strained reading of the text unsupported by the 
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 Scalia, supra note 24.  
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 See RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION 5 




documentary record.  Relying heavily on Joyce Lee Malcolm’s Anglo-American Origins of the 
Right to Arms, a book endorsed by virtually no commentators holding Ph.D.s in American 
history,
43
 Scalia made numerous historical assertions during oral arguments, all of which turn out 
to be false, and many of which would be of very dubious relevance even if true.  These include: 
1. The militia that resisted the British was not state controlled.   (In truth, the 
militia units on the revolutionary side refused to answer to royal governors, but 
they were very much creatures of statutory law passed by the colonial 




2. Well-regulated meant well trained, rather than subject to rules and regulations.   
(A quick look at the Oxford English Dictionary reveals that, rather 
unsurprisingly, and contra Malcolm, in the eighteenth century regulated 
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 JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGIN OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); but see Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English 
Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 27, 28 (2000) (critiquing Malcolm’s thesis).   
44
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(1998); MICHAEL MCDONNELL, THE POLITICS OF WAR: RACE, CLASS, AND CONFLICT IN 
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 37 (2007).   
45
 Transcript, supra note 28, at 26; 13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 524 (2d ed. 
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regulated.”).  The OED offers the following examples of eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
usage:  “a1704 T. BROWN Satire Antients Wks. 1730 I. 16 These [verses]..had regulated forms, 
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253 When those companies..are obliged to admit any person, properly qualified, . . . they are 
called regulated companies. 1828 SPEARMAN Brit. Gunner (ed. 2) 336 They are fired with a 
regulated charge of powder and shot. 1848 ALISON Hist. Europe ii. §23 I. 121 Regulated 
freedom is the greatest blessing in life.”  It then offers the following obsolete usage: “b. Of 
troops: Properly disciplined. Obs. rare
1
. 1690 Lond. Gaz. No. 2568/3 We hear likewise that the 
French are in a great Allarm in Dauphine and Bresse, not having at present 1500 Men of 
regulated Troops on that side.”  Id.  Note that Justice Scalia did not pursue the point that well-




3. Blackstone thought a private right to arms was rooted in natural law and was 




4. The framers revered Blackstone (in truth, many of them detested Blackstone’s 
high Tory politics and his departures from Coke’s Whiggish view of the law.  It 
is perhaps worth remembering—or instructing those not in the know—that as 
an M.P., Blackstone voted to use the most forceful measures to suppress North 
American grievances about Parliamentary tax policy.  He was no friend to 




5. Joseph Story thought the Second Amendment was a personal guarantee 
unrelated to the militia (this is patently false, and can only be explained on 
grounds of obstinate ignorance or deliberate falsehood.  Story’s discussion of 
the Second Amendment in his Commentaries is focused exclusively on the 
militia dependency of the right, and the perils confronting the right on account 




6. The federal government could disband the state militia by failing to arm them, a 
position that Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito also embrace (presumably, the 
purpose of the assertion is to show that the Amendment could not possibly 
concern a state right as opposed to a private right, seeing as Congress had 
plenary authority to abolish the militia by disarming them.  But this claim is 
certainly false—John Marshall and James Madison made clear at the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention that the states retained concurrent authority to arm the 
militia, and were perfectly at liberty to arm their units to the extent the federal 
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government neglected to do so.
49
  The states did just that, until the militia began 




7. Scalia insisted on at least two occasions during oral argument that legislation 
disarming Highlanders and Catholics in eighteenth century Britain spoke of 
arms, meaning that arms means any weapons, not just weapons in military 
service (as David Konig has elucidated in great detail, Parliament’s concern 
was very much to suppress disloyal militia, particularly after the two Jacobite 




8. Scalia argues also that any weapon in common use is protected by the Second 
Amendment, in part because in 1791 when the Amendment was ratified 
Americans were expected to bring their own arms to militia muster (but this 
position is impossible to square with the Militia Act of 1792, which required all 
privates enrolled in the militia to acquire either a regulation musket or rifle 
meeting particular standards, implying that other weapons were irrelevant for 
purposes of militia preparedness).
52
   
 
In short, no justice made more patently false historical claims during oral argument in 
Heller than the Court’s self-anointed originalist savior.  But Justice Scalia had plenty of support.  
Justice Alito, for his part, expressed skepticism that the purpose of the Second Amendment was 
to prevent disarmament of the militia.  The basis for Alito’s incredulity was his assumption that 
Congress has plenary power to disarm the militia.  As explained above, and as elucidated in more 
detail by James Madison and John Marshall at the Virginia Convention, this objection carries 
little weight, given the concurrent authority of the states to arm the militia absent Congressional 
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attention to its responsibility to arm.
53
  For Justice Alito, but not for the framers, clearly the real 
purpose of the Second Amendment is to secure the right of self-defense in the home, and here the 
D.C. statute becomes highly problematic, given that it prohibits handguns and requires rifles and 




The fourth member of the Heller majority, Justice Thomas, has famously declined to 
speak on the bench in well over two years, and true to form, did not speak during oral arguments.   
Indeed, Thomas was the only member of the Court not to speak in Heller.  Justice Thomas’s 
views on the Second Amendment are, however, no mystery.  They were suggested in his 
concurrence in Printz v. United States, the case striking down provisions of the Brady handgun 
control act on anti-commandeering grounds under the Tenth Amendment.
55
  There, Justice 
Thomas endorsed a private rights reading of the Second Amendment, and cited the standard 
cannon of tendentious literature that does the same.
56
  (It is perhaps worth noting that Printz 
itself cannot be squared with foundation era precedent.  The Federal Militia Census, first 
conducted in 1806, was carried out by state militia officials, ordered, i.e. commandeered, by 
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President Jefferson to go door to door in their districts and count militia-eligible residents and 
guns in every household).
57
 
The final vote needed to create a majority in favor of a historically-rooted private right to 
arms came from Justice Kennedy.  The Court’s so-called “swing voter” made clear during oral 
argument in Heller that he viewed the two clauses of the Second Amendment as logically 
independent, meaning that the right to arms exists independently of the constitutional preference 
for the militia.  For Kennedy, the heart of the matter is that the “operative clause” (in contrast, 
one supposes, to “inoperative clause” on which the “operative clause” is syntactically dependent) 
relates to something other than the militia, namely “the concern of the remote settler to defend 
himself and his family against hostile Indian tribes and outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies 
and things like that[.]”58  This concern becomes a hobbyhorse for Kennedy, who returns 
repeatedly during oral arguments to the issue of a right to arms in rural, western settings, and 
frequently pleads that the framers of the Amendment must have been concerned to protect 
frontiersmen against federal disarmament.  Even more than in the case of Justice Scalia, Justice 
Kennedy’s history is a matter of faith rather than study or fact, and Kennedy offers no evidence 
whatsoever to bolster the view that he urged on the petitioner.  In an oral argument with Alan 
Gura, counsel for Heller, and Solicitor General Clement, Kennedy urged that United States v. 
Miller was “deficient,” because it fails to address “the interests that must have been foremost in 
the framers’ minds when they were concerned about guns being taken away from the people who 
needed them for their defense.”59  Again, this is the language of faith, not empirical history.  
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Kennedy would not “allow[] the militia clause to make no sense of the operative clause.”60  
Since the Second Amendment for Kennedy is about the rights of homeowners and western 
rustics, the fact that automatic weapons are useful to the National Guard is irrelevant—they are 
outside the terms of the Second Amendment because the Second Amendment must be about 
hunting and home defense, and because, after all, that must be what the framers were really 
concerned with, even if they said otherwise in the clause that Kennedy labels “inoperative.”61  
Justice Kennedy also raised the issue of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 (implying that he, like 
Scalia, has fallen under the thrall of Malcolm’s odd and error-prone book on the same subject).  
Kennedy implies that the English Bill of Rights recognized a right independent of militia service, 
and that the U.S. Bill of Rights therefore likely does the same.
62
  He did not mention that the 
English Bill of Rights concerned liberties against the Crown not against the legislature, and that 




Kennedy’s vote brought the number of justices in favor of a non-militia linked right to 
five, meaning Justice Scalia, clearly the most enthused and invested in the project, had his 
majority.  But it left open at least three questions (apart from incorporation, not before the Court 
in a claim arising out of the District):  what would become of the Miller precedent, what 
limitations would the right tolerate, and what level of scrutiny would the right trigger?  On this 
last issue at least, Justice Scalia lacked a majority, for the Chief Justice had been clear in oral 
argument that he did not favor strict scrutiny in this context or indeed in any other where 
precedent did not already command its application.  Justice Kennedy had signaled his desire to 
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overturn Miller, but the Court ultimately chose to reread that precedent creatively instead of 
casting it aside as bad law.  Perhaps Kennedy’s greater intellectual honesty respecting the 
teaching of Miller unsuited him to write for the five justice majority, but in any case, for reasons 
the are not self-evident to outsiders, Chief Justice Roberts elected Antonin Scalia to write for the 
Court, assuring in the process that originalism (and commitment to the desired result) rather than 
pragmatism would drive the opinion.  As he wrote for the five justice majority, Justice Scalia felt 
compelled not only to define at least the initial scope of the private right to gun possession and to 
answer provisionally the question about what restrictions that right could bear, but also to engage 
the vigorous dissenters.
64
  As he made clear in oral argument, Justice Stevens supported the view 
that the right to arms was originally understood as militia-dependent, a view shared by Justices 
Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer—the latter of whom was particularly struck by the founding-era 
right’s peaceful co-existence along side numerous city and town regulations severely restricting 
gun possession, even in states with constitutional provisions analogous to the federal Second 
Amendment.
65
    
 
The Scalia Opinion 
Justice Scalia begins his analysis of the Second Amendment right in Heller with a pivotal 
ipsi dixit assertion:  “The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts:  its prefatory 
clause and its operative clause.”66  This is a crucial step for Justice Scalia, as it allows him to 
uncouple the right to arms from the militia.  The late Professor Uviller and I made a different 
argument in our book, The Militia and the Right to Arms, where we relied on syntax, the debates 
in the first Congress, and historical context to make the claim that the two parts of the 
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Amendment were logically and linguistically dependent.
67
  Our position is shared by amicus 
Historians and Professors of Linguistics.
68
  While Scalia cites no authority for his proposition 
that the Second Amendment’s militia language is merely prefatory, that argument was prefigured 
by Eugene Volokh in an influential article called The Commonplace Second Amendment.
69
   
There, Professor Volokh concedes that the structure of the Second Amendment (linking the right 
to arms to a purpose clause) was unique in the federal Bill of Rights, but then points out that 
purpose clauses occurred more commonly in state constitutions and bills of rights.
70
  Volokh 
argues further that purpose clauses did not determine meaning of the rights to which they 
attached, and this assertion becomes a major premise in Scalia’s exegesis of the Second 
Amendment right.
71
  Volokh’s claim is essentially anachronistic.  While several nineteenth-
century treatises on interpretation support his devaluation of prefaces or prologues, orthodox late 
eighteenth-century learning, reflected by Blackstone among others, was that they were pivotal to 
ascertaining meaning, and indeed that purpose clauses were largely outcome determinative 
respecting textual interpretation.
72
  Thus, Scalia’s devaluation of the militia clause, calculated as 
it is to lead to the result he prefers, is arbitrary and unfounded.  
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 Justice Scalia’s next move is to urge the importance of the phrase “right of the people” in 
support of his case for a right unrelated to service in the militia.  Of course, the identity of those 
holding the right does not determine the nature of the right, and it is hardly as obvious, as Justice 
Scalia assumes, that a right of the people must be privatistic in character rather than civic in 
scope.  Indeed, the powers of the people retained in the Tenth Amendment are certainly 
collective in character, the unenumerated rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment 
could just as well be corporate and civic as wholly private (democratic self-governance comes to 
mind, as does freedom of association), and the First Amendment right of the people to assemble 
and petition Congress for redress of grievances would be nonsensical if conceived of as atomistic 
as opposed to corporate and civic in nature.  The Preamble speaks of the people coming together 
to form a more perfect union, not coming apart to create more perfect anarchy.  Article I, Section 
2 says, “the People of the several States” shall choose the members of the House of 
Representatives.
73
  This act is both collective and private in character, although voting in the 
founding era was not always done privately and secretly as it is today.
74
  That statement 
respecting elections to the House of Representatives is the only use of the term people in the 
original seven articles (apart from the Preamble), and the framers thereafter abandoned this 
locution in favor of “person” or “persons,” terms they used no fewer than nineteen times in 
Article I through VII when they wanted to describe acts performed individually or list purely 
personal disabilities, liberties, and responsibilities. 
 Building on his a priori assumption that the Second Amendment’s militia language is 
subordinate and his strained reading of right of the people to mean a private, personal right, 
Justice Scalia next moves to interpreting the phrase “keep and bear arms.”  Justice Scalia’s 
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willful blindness respecting the obvious and overwhelmingly military connotation of bear arms 
was discussed in some detail in the first section of this Essay.  In the written opinion, he cites 
two prominent late eighteenth-century dictionary entries that seem to favor his construction, but 
as amicus Professors of Linguistics demonstrated in a far more exhaustive survey of dictionaries 
of the times, bearing arms most commonly was defined with clear military resonance and 
illustrated by quotations military in character throughout the eighteenth century.
75
  Justice Scalia 
also lays great stock in the fact that the word “keep,” standing alone, does not convey a 
collective or military meaning.  However as Justice Stevens reminds us in his dissent, the Second 
Amendment does not speak of a right to keep arms, but of “the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms.”76  The text describes one right, coupled syntactically to the militia and to the 
security of a free State, and that right is to “keep and bear Arms”—not own guns and carry 
weapons.  Justice Scalia and fellow travelers in the original public meaning school abhor 
consideration of historical context,
77
 but canons of legal interpretation in the late eighteenth 
century stressed the importance of focusing on the evil a law was designed to remedy.
78
  In the 
case of the Second Amendment, there is no doubt that the evil in question was disarmament of 
the citizen militia, leading inevitably to over-reliance on a dangerous standing army.
79
  Since the 
civic right to arms aims at preserving the citizen militia against disarmament, it is self-evident 
that the right must extend to protecting possession of arms to be carried in militia duty as well as 
to the actual carrying of those weapons when called to service.  Disarmament of the militia, 
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when attempted and achieved by British authorities during the Revolutionary period, targeted the 
arms used by militiamen both when they were kept in private homes and stored in public 
arsenals.
80
  The concern for keeping arms was therefore as closely tied to preservation of the 
militia as was concern for bearing arms.  In short, Justice Scalia places far more weight on the 
word “keep” than it will bear in any but the most abstract and a-contextual analysis.  
 Having opted to ignore context in the interest of theoretical purity (original public 
meaning devotees insist on this ploy),
81
 to treat “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” 
as two distinct entitlements, and to discount the military implications of bearing arms, Justice 
Scalia did not settle for redefining arms bearing to mean carrying weapons for any purpose 
(which would at least be supported by some outlying and eccentric uses) but instead seized on 
the arbitrary and largely unfounded construct of carrying weapons for confrontation as the new 
meaning of the pivotal “operative” phrase of the Second Amendment.  To be fair, Scalia’s 
assertion is not entirely ipsi dixit.  It is Ginsburg dixit, having originated in a dissenting opinion 
by Justice Ginsburg in Muscarello v. United States in 1998, a case in which the justices 
addressed the meaning of a federal statute proscribing heightened penalties for crimes committed 
while a person “carries a firearm.”82  There, Justice Ginsburg was concerned to spare a convicted 
                                                     
80
 Cornell, supra note 21, at 14. 
81
 Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2788 (stating, “In interpreting this text [the Second Amendment], 
we are guided by the principles that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the 
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from 
technical meaning’ . . . . Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it 
excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the 
founding generation.” (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931), alteration in 
original); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620-21 
(1999) (quoting Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia saying that original meaning can only be 
determined through the meaning of the words in the statute or Constitution). 
82
 Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2793 (where Scalia quotes Ginsburg’s dissent in Muscarello v. 
United States saying, “[s]urely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second 
Amendment…indicate[s]:  ‘wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a 




criminal who had not actually brandished or employed a gun during the course of the crime from 
enhanced sentencing requirements.
83
  She was clearly not interested in defining the scope of the 
constitutional right to arms possession.  And even if she were, Justice Scalia is on very shaky 
originalist grounds when the only authority he cites in support of his newly hatched 
interpretation of the meaning of bearing arms in the Second Amendment—passed in 1789 and 
ratified in 1791—is a somewhat ill-thought aside of a dissenting Supreme Court justice regarding 
an unrelated matter uttered in 1998.  Is this originalism based on neutral principles?
84
  Machine-
like law finding, in the fashion of Montesqieue’s la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi?85  
Reliance on an algorithm guaranteed to purge subjectivity from interpretative process?
86
  Or is 
this a case of window-dressing a policy choice made on the bench, and imposed upon a polity 
whose legislature had selected another option? 
 While the Heller opinion is in many respects disingenuous, Justice Scalia invests some 
limited energy in putting on appearances of reasonableness, or at least acknowledging that there 
is some quantum of evidence that cuts against his analysis.  Thus, after labeling carrying 
weapons for purposes of confrontation the “natural meaning” of bearing arms, he does admit that 
the “phrase ‘bear Arms’ also had at the time of the founding an ‘idiomatic meaning’ that was 
significantly different from its natural meaning: ‘to serve as a soldier, to do military service . . . 
.’”87  So for Scalia, the meaning that the phrase bear arms carried in over ninety-five percent of 
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its surviving eighteenth-century uses in British North America and the United States is not 
natural but idiomatic.  And, presumably based on his locution, also entirely out of fashion in our 
own times—after all, bear arms had that quirky idiomatic meaning “at the time of the founding,” 
as opposed to here and now.  But bear arms, according to Scalia, carried this idiomatic meaning 
only when the phrase was expanded into the three word construct bear arms against.  Since the 
Second Amendment speaks of the right to keep and bear arms, not the right to bear arms against 
enemies of the state, the idiomatic meaning (which, it bears repeating, the phrase carried over 
ninety-five percent of the time) can be discarded.  Justice Scalia seized on this useful contrivance 
thanks to the radical libertarian blogger Clayton Cramer, who, in a piece co-authored with Joseph 
Edward Olsen but not yet published at the time the Heller decision was announced, first made 
the claim regarding the difference between bearing arms against and simply bearing arms.
88
  
Some convenient sleight of hand was absolutely essential for purposes of propping up the 
originalist case for a private right to arms against the obvious challenge that bear arms almost 
always carried a military meaning when uttered during the founding period, and that it did so 
uniformly during Congressional debates on the Amendment.  Cramer’s move had the added 
advantage of not appearing in print in time to be refuted prior to publication of the Heller 
decision.  Unfortunately for Scalia, Cramer’s claim is unmasked as absurd in a forthcoming piece 
in the Journal of the Early Republic by Nathan Kozuskanich who has laboriously catalogued 
every surviving use of the phrase bear arms available in electronic collections of colonial and 
founding era writings, and counted up hundreds of instances where the phrases bear arms or 
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 Philological and syntactical exegesis rather than historical context determines meaning 
for devotees of original public meaning constitutionalism,
90
 but the meaning of the Second 
Amendment Justice Scalia divines from those processes is not, he assures us, out of harmony 
with historically inflected meaning.
91
  Indeed, that “meaning is strongly confirmed by the 
historical background of the Second Amendment,” which, it turns out, is relevant “because it has 
always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and the Fourth 
Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”92  Implicitly then, history is not material when 
considering constitutional rights newly minted by drafters and ratifiers, because judicial 
interpreters contemplation of historical sources would shade into original intent based inquiries 
disfavored by members of the original public meaning school.  In contrast, history is relevant 
when considering the meaning of more venerable rights merely codified by drafters and ratifiers, 
because then those making the inquiries are not probing the intentions of the constitution makers.   
But why are interpreters not probing those intentions—or at least the received meaning of their 
expressed language—in precisely the same way interpreters approach relevant considerations 
concerning rights newly created by the Constitution?  After all, it is still the ratifiers who gave 
the old common law right constitutional status.  Consequently, I see no material differences 
respecting the relevance of history when it comes to attempting to figure out the meaning of text 
codifying old rights and text recognizing new ones.  Whatever differences there may be, Justice 
Scalia assures us that because the right to bear arms is a common law right predating the Bill of 
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Rights, it is not “in any manner dependent upon that instrument [the Second Amendment] for its 
existence.”93  So constitutional text tells the whole the story, but the right under analysis in 
Heller we suddenly learn does not depend on text in any manner?  This is a very odd—and 
perhaps too telling—concession, seeing as the first third of Justice Scalia’s opinion was devoted 
entirely to a-historical textual analysis leading to a historically implausible reading of the text 
under analysis.  Justice Scalia never explains the basis for his distinction between rights with pre-
constitutional pedigree and those without, leaving the reader to wonder why history not relevant 
for the first part of the opinion, when Justice Scalia determined the meaning of constitutional 
text.  This question is vexatious, but on the terms of the opinion, perhaps unfathomable.  In any 
case, the history Justice Scalia deploys after abruptly and unexpectedly conceding history’s 
relevance turns out to be tendentious and wrong and sometimes irrelevant.   
 To keep Heller’s odd relation with history in perspective, recall that for Scalia, the 
debates in the United States House of Representatives in 1789, concerning the meaning of the 
proposed amendment guaranteeing the right of the people to keep and bear arms, are irrelevant to 
the judicial task of giving meaning to the constitutional text that Congress forwarded to the states 
for ratification.  Of much greater relevance for Justice Scalia is the alleged meaning of Section 7 
of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, as glossed by Joyce Lee Malcolm in our own time, or as 
glossed by William Blackstone in the 1760s, or as glossed at two levels removed by Professor 
Malcolm’s glossing Blackstone’s gloss of the original.94  Now, it is not entirely clear that the 
English statutory language “That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their 
defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law,”95 means remotely the same thing as 
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the American constitutional text, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”96  The English 
Bill of Rights was concerned to recognize limits on executive authority that William and Mary 
accepted as conditions for being offered the crown abdicated when James II fled the country.
97
   
Except in so far as the Crown prerogatives were concerned, the English text took for granted 
legislative omnipotence.
98
  In contrast, the United States Bill of Rights was concerned to mark 
out limits to federal legislative authority.
99
  The English right described an immunity against the 
Crown that could be waived as Parliament saw fit; the American right described a right against 
Congress that left state regulatory authority untouched.  The question of what sort of 
governmental actors were estopped and which were not blends into substance, for in both 
instances, legislators—Parliamentary in one case, state in the other—remained fully licensed by 
the terms of the social compact to regulate gun possession.  The scope of the textually protected 
right differs between the 1689 and 1789 Bills of Rights as well in that the English right is limited 
to Protestants, dependant on conditions, and subject to statutory allowance, while the right 
secured in the United States is syntactically linked to the existence of a well-regulated militia.  
Neither right is boundless and unlimited, and neither represents an atomistic liberty characteristic 
of a pre-social, lawless state of being.  But the limits to which the English and American rights 
are subject are different because the two texts specify different limits, and in that context, Justice 
Scalia’s claim that Blackstone, when analyzing the English Bill of Rights, did not have militia 
dependency in mind rather misses the mark, for Blackstone was not discussing the American 
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right with its textual commitment to a well-regulated militia.  Blackstone did, as Scalia claims, 
link Section 7 of the English Bill of Rights to “the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation” and “the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence,”100 but it 
is not at all clear that he was interested in doing anymore than making the orthodox Lockean 
move of retroactively justifying the show of force that ushered in the bloodless or Glorious 
Revolution.
101
   
 One of the principal hazards of originalism is that modern American jurists are relatively 
inexpert in the history of late eighteenth-century American constitutional thought.
102
  They tend 
to know even less about seventeenth and eighteenth century English constitutional thought. 
Bearing this in mind, I shall offer a radical proposition, not at all in harmony with Justice 
Scalia’s interpretive scheme:  since neither the framers of the English Bill of Rights nor William 
Blackstone lived to see the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, arguing over 
what spin they placed on the textually different Section Seven of the English Bill of Rights is not 
guaranteed to yield unambiguous and neutral answers respecting the contested meaning of that 
American constitutional text they never saw.  Figuring out what the materially different 
American language meant to everyday, intelligent language users on the streets and fields of the 
new republic—if that is to be our task—requires consultation of other sources.  And if 
constitutional language has meaning that depends on more than the isolated (and themselves 
frequently ambiguous) meanings of the words that make up that constitutional text, why not 
consult the works of commentators from the immediate post-constitutional period, all the more 
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so when they purport to explain what that text means (and not what it ought to mean) as a 
coherent and integrated whole?
103
  
Now, to be fair, Justice Scalia does reference and on occasion excerpt treatise writers of 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
104
  One could argue easily—and Saul Cornell 
does so masterfully—that he excerpts them tendentiously, and that when he does so he blends 
analysis of the common law right of self-defense into the Second Amendment when in reality 
jurists of the times viewed the right to self-defense and the right to arms as distinct and separate 
constructs.
105
  But my point here is another one.  When Justice Scalia cites treatise writers in 
Heller, he cites them not to establish the meaning of the Second Amendment, but only to confirm 
the putative meaning of the text he had already cobbled together from his a-historical and 
anachronistic musings respecting the Second Amendment’s various words and phrases pondered 
as isolated phonemes rather than as parts of an integrated whole.  In contradistinction to Scalia, I 
am proposing reliance on the meaning treatise writers ascribe to the text of the Second 
Amendment as a complete and coherent ensemble.  Accepting, at least arguendo (well, to be 
honest, perhaps only arguendo), Justice Scalia’s preference for original public meaning, there is 
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no reason not to focus on the meaning of whole provisions as originally received, rather than on 
the component parts of a text that early Americans read as a whole.  While original public 
meaning advocates generally eschew historical context, it is hardly clear that individual words 
have plain meaning while complete texts communicate only ambiguous purposes and shady 
intentions.  To read a text as a complete entity is no more inherently likely to slide into non-
interpretive intent-focused methods than focusing on individual words, unless of course the 
authors of the completed text succeeded in integrating their intended meaning into the text, 
which would surely make our reliance on that intended meaning legitimate so long as we 
understand it as the ratifiers did.  Let us try the holistic approach then, or rather check in with a 
treatise writer who pursued a holistic approach to explaining the Second Amendment’s meaning 
in those halcyon days so long ago, before activists ascended to the Bench and made war on 
behalf of rights social conservatives do not like, and against right that they do.  
 The treatise writer I have in mind is Joseph Story, Justice of the Supreme Court, Harvard 
College professor, and along with New York’s Chancellor James Kent, the most influential 
scholar of constitutional law during the early national period.  Story published the first edition of 
his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States in 1833,
106
 some twenty years after 
being appointed to the Supreme Court and more than forty years after the Bill of Rights was 
ratified.  But Story was around to take in the received meaning of the Bill of Rights in 1789-91, 
having been born in Marblehead, Massachusetts in 1779.
107
  Story’s father, a medical doctor, 
served with George Washington in the Continental Army, and Story grew up in politically-aware 
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circles in Marblehead, Massachusetts.
108
  He did not start reading law until he graduated from 
Harvard in 1798, so when he first encountered the proposed Bill of Rights as a student at 
Marblehead Academy in 1789, Story understood it a an intelligent school boy, not as a 
doctrinaire lawyer.
109
  When he came to write the Commentaries in the early 1830s, he wrote not 
with a view to new-modeling a visionary understanding of the Constitution of his youth, but to 
preserving the orthodox views of the Age of Federalism against the newly emerging anti-statist, 
anti-corporatist, profoundly individualistic views of the Age of Jackson.
110
  (It is telling, 
incidentally, that Scalia, the alleged originalist, cites more Jacksonian authorities on the meaning 
of the Second Amendment than he does Federalist or Jeffersonian authorities).
111
  This is Story’s 
entry concerning the Second Amendment and the federal constitutional right to arms:   
The importance of this article will scarcely be doubted by any persons, who have duly 
reflected upon the subject. The militia is the natural defence of a free country against 
sudden foreign invasions, domestic insurrections, and domestic usurpations of power by 
rulers. It is against sound policy for a free people to keep up large military 
establishments and standing armies in time of peace, both from the enormous expenses, 
with which they are attended, and the facile means, which they afford to ambitious and 
unprincipled rulers, to subvert the government, or trample upon the rights of the people. 
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the 
palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the 
usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful 
in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them. And yet, though 
this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well regulated militia would 
seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people there is a 
growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from 
a sense of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the 
people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no 
small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus 
gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our national bill of 
rights.
112
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Story’s right to arms does not concern hunting, or defense of the home against burglars, 
or the joys of collecting.  It concerns service in the militia, the preferred alternative to the 
standing army, bulwark of civic republicanism, and shield against tyranny.  Story’s entry on the 
Second Amendment laments the passing of the New England militia of his youth and the 
abandonment of the communal tradition of obligatory service in local units comprising a 
universal army of the people and of the Constitution.  The late Richard Uviller and I chronicled 
the demise of the citizen militia of the framers in our book The Militia and the Right to Arms, in 
which we described rising popular disaffection for compulsory militia duty in the post-
revolutionary years which lead to the disappearance of the old militia during the Age of Jackson, 
and its replacement by volunteer companies of select militia, who no longer represented the 
undifferentiated communities of the Republic, but only selected parts, composing small segments 
of the population who banded together for reasons such as ethnic pride, social ostentation, or 
desire for status and for glory.
113
  This process took longer in New England than the rest of the 
country, but by 1830s it was well underway even in Massachusetts, and Justice Story needed no 
special sense of prescience to foretell the ultimate demise of the army of the people.
114
  
Crucially, for present purposes, the end of the common militia signaled for Story the evisceration 
of the constitutional right to arms.  “There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may 
lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended 
by this clause of our national bill of rights.”  All the protection, says Justice Story, intended by 
the Second Amendment, will be eviscerated by the passing of the militia system.  This can only 
be because all the protection intended by the Second Amendment was linked to the militia 
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system, and because the framers successfully imbedded that intention in the language they chose 
to constitutionalize the right. 
 Justice Scalia, who was not born in Marblehead, Massachusetts in 1779, but in Trenton, 
New Jersey in 1936, sees things differently.
115
  According to Justice Scalia “[t]he prefatory 
clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the 
ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting.”116  
This is the crux of Scalia’s analysis, and it is a claim for which he does not cite and cannot cite 
any authority whatsoever.  It is a leap of faith, not a logical surmise or plain deduction from the 
text that pointedly links the right to the militia and not to hunting or to defense of the person or 
home.    It is an assertion based on beliefs which, if they existed from 1789-1791, were none the 
less omitted from the language selected to codify the right to arms.  Justice Scalia’s right to arms 
may be based on natural law, common law, the Ninth Amendment, or historical fiction, but it is 
not plainly enshrined in the Second Amendment.  
This Essay began with the observation that there were at least two plausible reasons to 
recognize a private right to weapons possession under the United States Constitution, i.e. fealty 
to persistent, popular and super-majoritarian demands for such a right, and the popular belief that 
a right to have guns is in fact rooted in the Second Amendment as originally understood.  There 
may well be other ways to articulate the right, more in harmony with mainstream American 
judicial traditions of rights enforcement than appeals to popular sovereignty as the source of 
concrete unwritten norms.  One could, without forsaking the Supreme Court’s extra-textual claim 
of Marbury v. Madison
117
 and Cooper v. Aaron
118
 to have the dispositive and final say in matters 
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of constitutional interpretation (a claim with which the people out of doors, even popular 
constitutionalists among them, have largely acquiesced, even if Professors Tushnet, Levinson 
and Kramer do not join them in so doing), find a basis for a judicially minted right to arms in the 
penumbra of various elements of the Bill of Rights, in common law constitutional traditions, in 
substantive due process, in firmly rooted history and traditions of the American people, or in the 
Ninth Amendment.  Indeed, in his forthcoming piece in the Harvard Law Review, Cass Sunstein 
accuses Justice Scalia of performing precisely this operation.
119
  The great irony, as developed by 
Chief Judge Harvey Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit in his comment in the Virginia Law 
Review,
120
 is that Justice Scalia came to prominence as a self-avowed principled opponent of 
judicial recognition of textually unspecified rights—at least those not firmly rooted in American 
history and tradition.  And Justice Scalia’s claim that there is in fact a deeply entrenched history 
of immunity against gun control regulations in the United States is patently false, as ably 
demonstrated respecting colonial times by Justice Breyer in dissent,
121
 and respecting the early 
national period and the twentieth century by Professor Saul Cornell.
122
  Indeed, even Professor 
Robert Churchill, the most careful and sophisticated historical scholar to endorse a private right 
to arms on originalist grounds, concedes that gun regulation (but not prohibition) was 
commonplace in the early national period.
123
  One could perhaps say in Justice Scalia’s favor that 
Justice Douglas took a longer and more convoluted path in Griswold from the emanations of the 
First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the right to sexual privacy than Justice Scalia took 
in Heller from the arms related language of the Second Amendment to his newly forged private 
right to arms.  But that is rather like the claim made on behalf of Lochner-era substantive due 
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process that at least there is language in the Constitution about contract.  To be sure there is, but 
it addresses impairment of the obligations of existing contracts, not the right to be free of 
government interference when entering into any contractual work arrangement no matter how 
onerous and coercive the terms.  Indeed there is arms related language in the Constitution, but 
without making Justice Scalia’s leap of faith, one cannot tie that language to hunting or shooting 
home intruders. 
The sense of boot-strapping, artifice, and judicial innovation that Heller conveys does not 
enhance the decision or the Court’s legitimacy.  Yet bad history and manufactured immunities 
are perhaps not Heller’s greatest failings.  There is also something profoundly anti-democratic, 
and anti-localist about Justice Scalia’s holding in Heller, that rather undermines his populist 
claims.  The case, after all, does not hold that the good people of Montana may legislate to allow 
guns free of interference by do-gooders and know-it-alls in Washington, or that the legislative 
agents serving the teaming elite masses of New York and California should keep their hands off 
Mississippians.  Rather, with the Heller decision Justice Scalia annulled crime control measures 
embraced by the legislative agents of the people of the District of Columbia, who deemed them 
urgently necessary to curb an epidemic of violent crime in the 1970s, and who to this day 
consider the measures effective in having partially mitigated the problems of homicide and 
assault in the District.  It does not help the Court’s pretence at legitimacy to reflect that home 
rule came very late to the District, that the District is majority black and was long ruled directly 
by a lily white Congress, that the victims of violent crime in urban areas are disproportionately 
black, and that the Supreme Court is overwhelmingly non-black.  When all is said and done, 
Heller allows officious individual residents of the District who disagree with popularly enacted 




justices of the national Supreme Court whose policy preferences happen to be out of harmony 
with those of the majority of the District’s residents.  And this profoundly anti-democratic act 
relies for authority on nothing more than historical fantasy and imagination.     
 
Failure, Fraud, and Originalism 
For the legal process theorists who dominated American jurisprudence from the New 
Deal to the 1970s, judges were meant to stick to what they were good at most of the time, which 
is to say judging particular controversies under existing law as opposed to legislating proposed 
resolutions of broader problems by making new law.  In Carolene Products, Justice Stone 
described three classes of exceptions to this general rule, in which judicial intervention was 
warranted to make or undue legislatively determined policy to uphold larger constitutional 
values.
124
  Stone had in mind situations involving legislative violations of express constitutional 
prohibitions, cases in which the normal channels of democratic redress through the legislature 
had malfunctioned or been blocked off, and matters adversely impacting discreet and insular 
minorities who could not hope for remedies through the same majoritarian process that had 
embraced oppressive policies in the first place.
125
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For at least thirty years, process theory was ascendant in the Supreme Court.  Process 
theory and the three Carolene exceptions explain much of the Court’s post-War jurisprudence on 
civil rights, desegregation, criminal procedure, and voting.  But beginning in the 1970s, 
originalist critics of the Warren and early Burger Courts mounted a counter-offensive.  For Bork, 
Scalia, and Meese, process theory was an excuse for judicial subjectivity.  Allowing judges to 
occasionally violate the norm against judicial legislation impermissibly introduced judges’ 
personal preferences into the judicial process resulting in usurpation of the lawmaking function.  
In essence, the originalists argued judges should stick to what they were good at—judging 
controversies under the law—not just most of the time, but all of the time.  While constitutional 
text might warrant occasional judicial invalidation of legislation, it could never authorize active 
lawmaking by unelected judges.  Originalism’s assertion of legitimacy by virtue of neutrality 
built on compact theories of the Constitution to argue that that the Court could validly undue the 
acts of a democratic majority only when those acts were prohibited in the fundamental law 
originally ratified by the higher authority of a constitutional supermajority. 
Other auxiliary claims are not always stated but require assertion and resolution to 
complete the orginialists’ argument and cement their method’s alleged legitimacy.  Any given 
originalist must decide what aspect of original meaning tests her claim to be in harmony with the 
constitutional design as it existed when the language at issue became part of the constitutional 
compact to which she claims fidelity.  Is it the original intent of the framers?  But the framers did 
not all share the same understanding of contested text.  Debates dragged on over four months at 
the Constitutional Convention, and the Bill of Rights was on the floor of the House for three 
months.  Had the members been in harmony, they surely would have spared themselves these 




our constitutional text (and that would be all the provisions that matter, and nearly all the 
provisions we have), some who participated in the framing process wished to scuttle, others to 
modify, still others to water down, others still to pass as is in expectation the language would 
ratchet itself up over time.  Search for unified understanding among the drafters will very likely 
prove futile (or delusional).  Perhaps then it is not collective or individual intention of the 
legislators who created text, but the understanding of the ratifiers who gave the text life that 
should guide the modern interpreter.  And yet the national polity has never been any less fissured 
than national or state representative assemblies. 
Adherents of the original public meaning school of plain meaning textualism maintain 
there is a way out of this conundrum.  They assert that the subjective understanding of several 
tens of thousands of ratifiers need not concern us because we can safely recreate their 
understanding by objective consultation with dictionaries of the times.  Note we are by now 
several steps removed from the comparatively straight-forward argument that a modern 
legislature (say one consisting of the elected representatives of the three-hundred million 
individuals making up the national population) must yield to the voices of a majority in each of 
the nine states required for ratification under Article VII in 1787-89 when fewer than a half 
million persons—all of them long since dead—were entitled to vote.  We have added 
assumptions that those barely half million or so permitted to participate in 1787-89 all shared 
exactly the understanding of the originalist jurist in our time, or that the understanding two 
hundred years ago does not matter, since it, or something just as useful, can be surmised from a 
straight-forward consultation with a dictionary written by Johnson or Webster (one a hidebound 
Tory, the other a fanatical High Federalist).  Either way, the claim that a supermajority of the late 




nonsense, but whatever it is, it stands on stilts, and very big ones at that.  We are left with the 
assertion that only one reading matters, and it is the one original public meaning adherents offer 
up for our consumption.  It is, they proudly avow in attestation of its principled neutrality, a 
meaning unburdened by context or history, a meaning that follows mechanically from consulting 
with dictionaries.  That this proffered meaning—divorced as it purports itself to be from the 
nuanced history that gave it life—has some title based on super-majoritarian democracy is 
anything but self-evident. 
In my view, just as Scalia and company flatter themselves respecting their ability to 
divine unambiguous historical truth from mystic séances with the spirits of 1787, so Barnett and 
partners significantly overestimate their skill at deriving unambiguous meaning of text by casual 
perusal of lexicographers’ entries for individual terms in dictionaries.  To the limited extent that 
historical truth and historical meaning is ascertainable, much work is required to acquire 
sufficient perspective to discern the probable and plausible from the facile and fallacious.  The 
originalists’ jurisprudential oeuvre gives no reason to believe that they (Manning, Rosen and 
some few others excepted)
126
 have laid the perspectival foundations to support their bold, 
confident, historical, and linguistic assertions.  This holds for the majority’s mistake-ridden 
efforts in Heller.  Perhaps Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito possess special gifts that 
particularly suit them to performing the legislative function, and perhaps, in a common law 
culture in which constitutional law has always developed at least in part in a common law 
way,
127
 these gifts make them fit candidates to “legislate from the bench.”  There is however 
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absolutely no evidence to support the proposition that any of them has arrived at a sufficiently 
accurate understanding of late eighteenth-century American constitutional history to be able to 
read “neutrally” and without recourse to other internal or external values the original meaning of 
the Second Amendment.  It is past time for judges and jurists with political agendas (something 
they share in common with most of humanity) and marginal senses of historical literacy to 
abandon disingenuous claims of principled neutrality based on little more than glib assumptions 
that the framers, ratifiers and dictionary writers of the 1780s and 90s must have harbored 
political sensibilities similar to their own.  There is in fact nothing neutral about this self-
indulgent leap of faith.  When judges say we are faithful to our ancestors because they looked 
like us, they do not engage in self-abnegation.  When jurists imagine that these ancestors made 
constitutional laws that look like laws we would wish to have, they compound their error.  And 
when they imagine into being a judicial duty to enforce those imagined laws, they are making 
law, with no more democratic legitimacy and great deal less candor, than the process theorists 
during the days of Harlan Stone and Earl Warren.  In our age of originalism, the nation worships 
and the Court reifies what never before existed, and fidelity to false history elevates an imaginary 
constitutionalism of the past into a new modeled higher law of the present.
128
  The driving engine 
of this revolution, and of Justice Scalia’s Heller decision, is the predictable capacity of the 
imagined past to harmonize with the normative vision of those inside and outside the judiciary 
and academy who are most active in imagining that fictive past into existence.  As a consequence 
of this triumph of imaginary history, the originalist project first celebrated by Robert Bork, 
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Edwin Meese, and Antonin Scalia as a means of restoring neutral principles to constitutional 
adjudication and supplanting the value-laden judging of the process theorists and living 
constitutionalists has failed—and failed colossally—to remain true to its own creed.129 
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HELLER AS HUBRIS, AND HOW  
MCDONALD v. CITY OF CHICAGO MAY WELL CHANGE THE  






   Supreme Court prognostication is famously tricky business.  As would be landmark cases 
loom on the horizon, doctrinal revolutions are sometimes imagined into existence by the most 
informed Supreme Court watchers, only to fail to materialize once the justices speak and their 
opinions are published.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and 
Dickerson v. United States come readily to mind as the most famous recent instances of 
constitutional revolutions that never were.
1
  But District Columbia v. Heller,
2
 in which the 
Supreme Court for the first time announced that the Second Amendment protected a right to 
weapons possession unconnected to service in the lawfully established militia, did not disappoint 
those who anticipated momentous doctrinal change.  The burden of this comment is that Heller 




 would have it, an act of humility on the part of Justice 
Scalia, or a case of judicial minimalism.  Indeed, claims by some gun rights enthusiasts that 
Heller did not change or expand beyond recognition the doctrine pronounced sixty years ago in 
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 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
2
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
3
 See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism:  Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 246 (2008). 
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United States v. Miller
5
 are hard to accept at face value, given that under Miller, it was all but 
impossible to plead that arms possession of any sort merited judicially enforceable constitutional 
protection.
6
    
Heller changed the constitutional landscape boldly and significantly.  The majority 
decision and the opinion that supports it were, in my view, acts of hubris, and the right they 
created—I do not say recognized—threatens to become absolutist rather than limited in its 
application once it is incorporated against the states as it almost certainly will be in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago.  Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s famous disclaimers in Heller, which were 
perhaps inserted solely for the purpose of bringing Justice Kennedy on board to create a 
majority, the case is likely to spawn progeny that substantially undermines the gun control and 
anti-crime policies now embraced by the democratically elected legislatures and councils of 
numerous urban and suburban jurisdictions throughout the land.
7
  This process will begin when 
McDonald is decided, likely on the last day of the 2010 term. 
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numerous federal appellate courts that had uniformly rejected Second Amendment challenges 
over the seven decades prior to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 
F.3d 370 (2007), it was therefore not necessary for Justice Scalia to overturn Miller in order to 
uphold the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Parker by holding in favor of Heller and against the 
District of Columbia.  In dissent, Justice Stevens vigorously disagreed respecting the meaning of 
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Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Telling Miller’s Tale: A Reply to David Yassky, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2002, at 113, 114 (2002).  
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  Writing for a 5-4 Court over strongly worded and passionate dissents by Justices Breyer 
and Stevens, Justice Scalia claimed to rely on originalism of the original public meaning stripe as 
he read a private right to arms into the Second Amendment.
8
  His alleged reliance on originalism 
paid homage—in name, if not in fact—to the celebrated faith in neutral principles of judging that 
Scalia most famously articulated in his 1997 manifesto, A Matter of Interpretation.
9
  There he 
embraced the position that by cleaving to the original public meaning of constitutional text, 
judges could review and invalidate legislative and executive acts at odds with constitutional 
precepts based on a wholly objective standard that did not require, in Alexander Hamilton’s 
famous phrase from Federalist No. 78, substituting will for judgment.
10
  Some commentators
11
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons or the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, 
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry 
arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were 
those "in common use at the time."We think that limitation is fairly supported by 
the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual 
weapons."  
 
Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2816-17 (citations omitted).  On Justice Kennedy’s posture in Heller 
(reflected in his comments during oral argument), see William G. Merkel, The District of 
Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV., 349, 364-65 (2009). 
8
 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788.  
9
 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
10
 Justice Scalia explained his rejection of original intent in favor of original meaning 
during a speech at Catholic University the year before he published A Matter of Interpretation:  
 
The theory of originalism treats a constitution like a statute, and gives it the 
meaning that its words were understood to bear at the time they were 
promulgated. You will sometimes hear it described as the theory of original 
intent. You will never hear me refer to original intent, because as I say I am first 
of all a textualist, and secondly an originalist. If you are a textualist, you don't 
care about the intent, and I don't care if the framers of the Constitution had some 




and a very small number of historians
12
 have expressed sympathy or even admiration for original 
public meaning focused jurisprudence, but the more common practice among historians expert in 
the founding and Reconstruction eras is to lampoon the practitioners of original public meaning 
jurisprudence as historically naïve, politically calculating, and results oriented.
13
  This has 
certainly been to case respecting historians who have commented on Heller, and while Justice 
Scalia’s opinion has its fans in the gun rights advocacy community and among libertarian leaning 
                                                                                                                                                                           
were promulgated to the people of the United States, and what is the fairly 
understood meaning of those words.  
 
Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at The Catholic University of America: A Theory of 
Constituion Interpretation (Oct. 18, 1996).  On the difference between intent-focused originalism 
and original public meaning focused originalism, see also Randy Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV., 611, 621 (1999).  In The Federalist, Hamilton wrote: 
 
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretence of a repugnancy, may 
substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature.  
This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as 
well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute.  The courts must 
declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL 
instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of 
their pleasure to that of the legislative body.  The observation, if it prove any 
thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body. 
 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).  
11
 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 10, at 613; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
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Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 
(2006); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 299 (2004). 
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America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009).  While highly critical of Heller’s application of history, 
Konig accepts, at least for the sake of argument, the legitimacy of original public meaning-
focused constitutional interpretation. See id. 
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 See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (2008); Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: 
The Highest State of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2001); The New York Times.com,  
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 historians of the founding era have been joined by numerous other public 
intellectuals in condemning Heller as an unprincipled exercise of judicial law-making.
15
  Indeed, 
some of Heller’s strongest critics are conservative judges and jurists with unimpeachable 
movement conservative credentials.
16
    
 
The Hubris of Heller 
 My own objections to Justice Scalia’s work product in Heller focus on the fact that his 
allegedly history-driven method depends fundamentally on numerous false historical claims. 
According to Justice Scalia and the Heller majority, the Second Amendment’s language about 
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 Prominent historians of late eighteenth century political thought in the United States to 
have criticized Justice Scalia’s opinion as results driven include Jack Rakove and Saul Cornell. 
See Cornell, supra note 13; The New York Times.com, supra note 13 (featuring Q&A with 
Rakove); see also Merkel, supra note 7.  Over a dozen leading historians of the late eighteenth 
century joined an amicus brief in Heller highly critical of the private rights reading of the Second 
Amendment.  Brief of Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove et al. in support of Petitioners at 9-13, 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008)(No. 07-290).  The brief was signed by 
leading eighteenth-century specialists Jack N. Rakvoe, Fred Anderson, Carol Berkin, Saul 
Cornell, Paul Finkelman, R. Don Higginbotham, Stanley N. Katz, David Konig, Pauline R. 
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whose work focuses on other periods.  See id.  David Konig, a highly respected legal historian 
with particular expertise in the founding period is willing to take original public meaning at face 
value as a philosophy of constitutional interpretation, but argues that the Scalia opinion 
disingenuously imports nineteenth century concepts into the eighteenth century in order to prop 
of the desired reading.  Konig, supra note 12.  Academics in other disciplines who have 
expressed enormous skepticism of the Heller majority opinion include law professors Reva B. 
Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
191, 215-26  (2008), and Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch 22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009), and 
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(2009). 
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VA. L. REV. 253 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and 





the militia and the State is prefatory and non-operative, while the plain meaning of the functional 
text respecting the right to bear arms, as understood at the time of its creation, is that the 
Constitution protects a personal right to carry commonly held weapons for purposes of 
confrontation.
17
  Having read the pivotal introductory language about the militia out of the 
equation, Scalia and the majority conclude that the core meaning of the constitutional text is that 
individuals have the right to armed self-defense, and that any secondary meaning related to 
performing armed service in the militia is secondary and idiosyncratic.
18
  These claims depend 
on haphazard assumptions rather than historically supportable deductions.  In fact, the surviving 
historical record demonstrates quite conclusively that just the opposite of what Justice Scalia 
asserts is true.  Not only was discussion of the right to bear arms almost invariably linked to 
discussion of the virtues of the militia and the dangers of standing armies in the late eighteenth 
century, but the “operative” phrase “bear arms” carried an overwhelmingly martial meaning 
when the Second Amendment was debated and ratified.
19
 
As recorded in the Annals of Congress, twelve members of the House of Representatives 
spoke when the text that became the Second Amendment was under consideration in 1789.  All 
discussed militia- and military-related issues, principally conscientious objection.
20
  Not one 
mentioned private self-defense, hunting, or gun collecting.
21
  Senate debates were not transcribed 
until 1794 when the Senate first opened its proceedings to reporters and the public, but an 
electronic search of the Library of Congress database (containing all extant official records of the 
Continental and U.S. Congresses between 1775 and 1791) reveals forty-one additional uses of 
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the phrase “bear arms” or “bearing arms” in contexts other than discussion of the proposed Bill 
of Rights.
22
  In all but four instances the use is unambiguously military and collective.
23
    
Of course, aficionados of original public meaning have been known to shrug off damning 
evidence taken from the deliberations of legislative or constitution-making bodies
24
 on the 
grounds that the intent of a collective body is a mysterious and elusive thing, not well calculated 
to be clearly ascertainable, and not likely to map on to the common sense understandings of the 
good people out of doors whose act of ratification gave constitutional text binding authority in 
the first place.
25
  But when usage in legislative and constitutional chambers is overwhelmingly 
contra the meaning espoused by advocates preaching original public meaning, surely the burden 
rests on the original public meaning adherents to show that their preferred understanding, while 
inconsistent with that of the text’s authors, is nonetheless in harmony with that of its ratifiers.    
The problem for Justice Scalia is that the record respecting public usage of the phrase 
“bear arms” overwhelmingly supports a dominant military meaning just as clearly as do the 
records from legislative chambers.  As reported by careful historian Nathan Kozuskanich in the 
peer-reviewed and highly respected Journal of the Early Republic, an electronic search of 
Charles Evans’s American Bibliography, a comprehensive collection of surviving books and 
pamphlets in the colonies and United States from 1690 to 1800, yields 210 hits for “bearing 
arms” and its cognates other than those contained in reprints of the Bill of Rights and other 
government papers.
26
  According to Kozuskanich, 202 of these 210 uses (96.2 percent) are 
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unambiguously military and collective, not private and personal.
27
  The same search on Early 
American Newspapers, a database of over 120 American newspapers from 1690 to 1800, yields 
143 hits, 140 of which (97.9 percent) Kozuskanich describes as clearly related to rendering 
military service or performing militia duty.
28
  In ignoring this record (cited by several amici in 
Heller), Justice Scalia elevated what was in the late eighteenth century a decidedly eccentric and 
outlying meaning to the summit of constitutional orthodoxy.  
 Not only is Justice Scalia’s Heller opinion unsupported by the historical record, it has 
been savaged by several leading lights among historians of late eighteenth-century American 
political thought, including Jack Rakove and Saul Cornell.
29
  To my knowledge, Justice Scalia’s 
interpretation is considered historically accurate by only two PhD historians whose expertise 
focuses on the late-eighteenth-century United States:  Robert Churchill and James Henretta.
30
  
Granted, at least two additional prominent Heller enthusiasts, Joyce Lee Malcolm and Robert 
Cottrol, hold PhDs in history, but Malcolm’s expertise is in seventeenth-century England and 
Cottrol wrote his PhD on black communities in Providence, Rhode Island in the antebellum 
period before he embarked on a law teaching career.
31
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 On the other side, a veritable honor role of thirteen prominent historians of the late-
eighteenth-century United States joined other distinguished scholars in an amicus brief in Heller 
highly critical of the private rights reading of the Second Amendment.
32
  These historians object 
to the conclusions endorsed in the Heller opinion not simply on the grounds that they are 
irreconcilable with historical facts, but because they depend on a disingenuous interpretation of 
constitutional language.  Indeed, for those who understand that the meaning of language is 
historically inflected rather than suspended out of time, the opinion’s linguistic assumptions and 
purported conclusions beggar belief.
33
  Justice Scalia broke the text of the Second Amendment 
down into its component parts, arbitrarily labeled the text that did not comport with his 
predilections a “preface,” and the part he found more congenial “operative.”34  In the process, 
he relied on mid- and late-nineteenth-century interpretive conventions that allegedly downplay 
the significance of preambles, and ignored the dominant interpretive paradigms of the late 
eighteenth century that accord preambles very substantial weight.
35
  He then broke the language 
he called operative down into its component parts, and ruled that the essence of the 
Amendment, the right to bear arms, meant the right to carry weapons for confrontation in the 
late-eighteenth-century United States, even as he ignored the fact that well over ninety percent 
of surviving recorded uses from the colonial and early national periods concern service in the 
military or militia as opposed to private uses of weapons.
36
 
 Thus, it is not only the counter-factuality of Justice Scalia’s opinion that strikes historians 
as wrongheaded:  from the perspective of specialists in late-eighteenth-century American 
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political thought, the most disturbing feature of the Heller opinion is that it is militantly a-
contextual.  Deliberate avoidance of context in turn depends on tuning out the preamble which 
when crafted highlighted the context and helped crystallize the meaning to late-eighteenth-
century eyes and ears. As a theoretical matter, Justice Scalia abhors context, because it muddies 
the waters of the fictive world of objective interpretive simplicity that he finds congenial.
37
  
According to Justice Scalia, Randy Barnett, and other leaders of the original public meaning 
school, neutral interpretation requires recovering constitutional meanings without recourse to 
anything that might inject subjective values into the process.
38
  But in the Second Amendment 
context this approach is inherently dishonest to the extent it purports to be based on fidelity to 
the understanding of the ratifying public, precisely because that public chose to ratify the whole 
text of the Amendment, not just the part Justice Scalia arbitrarily classified as significant.  
Indeed, those who voted to ratify the language at issue two hundred twenty and twenty years 
ago had subjective values, and they had tried very hard to insure that those values were written 
into the language that presented itself for ratification before they allowed themselves to be 
satisfied it merited approval.
39
 
  As historians of American political thought know all too well, an enormous amount of 
scholarly effort over the past two generations has gone into rediscovering all the nuanced 
meanings of the political discourse of the revolutionary and founding periods.  That effort 
yielded what historians call the republican synthesis, and aspects of the republican synthesis 
were absorbed into the law schools twenty or so years ago when people like Bruce Ackerman 
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and Cass Sunstein became intrigued with the concept.
40
  But something was lost in translation.  
To historians, the anti-army trope was always at the center of the republican paradigm, and to 
anyone who spent long years in grad school reading the works of J.G.A Pocock, Bernard 
Bailyn, and pre-1992 Gordon Wood,
41
 there can be no doubt that the language of the Second 
Amendment signaled to Americans who read or heard the words in 1789 or 1791 a desire to be 
free of the baneful effects of standing armies that had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with 
hunting or shooting burglars.
42
   
 It is crucial for Justice Scalia to keep Pocock and company out of the picture, because 
once they are on the scene Scalia’s interpretive gambit and that of private rights enthusiasts is at 
an end.  Hence, Scalia emphasizes that the task of the judge applying original public meaning 
originalism is to interpret text according to its everyday and ordinary meaning, and not probe 
into its secret or technical meanings.
43
  But in this instance at least, this process of reliance on 
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reconstructed simple self-evidence is unfaithful to original understanding, because the language 
of the Second Amendment was actually originally understood by the average, everyday 
American on the streets or in the fields in 1789-1791 in the anti-army, anti-corruption idiom 
elucidated by Pocock and company, as the empirical work of Kozuskanich makes abundantly 
clear.
44
  To be sure, Joyce Appleby, Daniel T. Rogers, James Kloppenberg, T.H. Breen and 
others have challenged the ascendancy of the republican synthesis.
45
  But even those who argue 
that the republican case was pressed too far acknowledge its power at its core and question 
merely its application at the edges, stressing that there are some things it does not explain.  And 
historians skeptical of republicanism’s explanatory power regarding the individualistic Age of 
Jackson still accept its explanatory power for the revolutionary period.
46
  To the overwhelming 
majority of professional historians there remains little doubt that for non-elites and nascent 
individualists as well as classically trained planters and urban lawyers, language about militia 
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and bearing arms sounded in terms of civic virtue and not private rights to hunt or shoot 
burglars when the Bill of Rights was debated and ratified.
47
 
Justice Scalia’s rhetoric about neutral principles of judging notwithstanding, to historians 
of the late eighteenth century (other than Robert Churchill) Heller is self-evidently a case of a 
judicially invented right, or, at the very least, a mid-nineteenth-century right transposed 
backwards in time to the late eighteenth century.
48
  There is, however, a larger issue at stake in 
Heller, and it concerns the legitimacy of judicial invalidation of legislation— not just on 
grounds of violation of a judicially invented private right to weapons possession, but on any 
judicially enforced grounds whatsoever.  When Chief Justice Marshall asserted the authority of 





 he was at great pains to explain two things:  first that the invalidation 
amounted (again, in Hamilton’s words) to an act of judgment not of will, and second, that in 
invalidating acts of the democratic arms of federal and state government was not usurpation of 
the powers of the peoples’ representatives, but rather an act authorized by the higher authority 
of the Constitutional Convention, in which the people themselves set up a system to delimit the 
authority of their legislative and executive agents.
51
  And perhaps this claim of Marshall’s—
legitimizing judicial review by reference to the super-majoritarian authority of the ratifying 
conventions—had some validity in 1803.  But Jefferson’s famous time-window of nineteen 
years—the time, using contemporary demographic data, during which half the generation of 
adults who had ratified a Constitution would pass on—was hard at work.  By the time Marshall 
                                                     
47
  See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
48
 See Konig, supra note 12.  
49
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
50
 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).  
51




decided McCulloch, relatively few who had voted to ratify remained, and by the end of the 
antebellum years, all had passed.
52
    
It is more than counter-intuitive that originalists would still rely implicitly on the same 
supermajoritarian claim as Marshall to justify judicial review, for the founding generation’s 
capacity to license agents surely does not escape to confines of the Rule Against Perpetuities.  
To invoke a long dead principal to veto the acts of agents of the living is not an appeal to 
democracy or to popular sovereignty.  It is an appeal to defunct authority.  It bears emphasis 
that the question of the basis for judicial review remains analytically distinct from that of 
ensuring the neutrality of judicial review should judicial review be found appropriate.  While 
Justice Scalia claims that orginalism of the original public meaning stripe can keep subjective 
values out of the invalidation process, as far as I can tell he has nothing other than vague hints at 
ancestor worship (and lets face it, they are not even his ancestors) to offer to justify recourse to 
the process at all.     
With this analytic groundwork laid, let us unpack the absurdity of Justice Scalia’s 
interpretive claim in Heller in all of its dimensions.  His reasoning, in its express and implicit 
dimensions, closely tracks the following schematic:  
It is legitimate for the Supreme Court of the United States to intervene and by a one-
vote majority strike down a gun control statute enacted in the 1970s by the 
democratically elected legislature of the District of Columbia because: 
 
a.   220 years ago, 500,000 or so voters, all of them long since dead, ratified a 
Constitution  
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 On Jefferson’s theory that constitutions lost their legitimacy once half the generation 
that had ratified the instrument passed away, see HERBERT E. SLOAN, PRINCIPLE & INTEREST: 
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b.   That does not expressly establish judicial review in the Supreme Court 
 
c.   But can be creatively read to do so 
 
d.   And was amended within a few years to contain language 
 
e.   That overwhelmingly, at the time it was used, signified nothing whatsoever 
about private self-defense 
 
f.   But as interpreted today by Justice Scalia clearly had a principally private self-
defense significance at the time it was ratified. 
 
In a path-breaking article in the Yale Law Journal,
53
 Jeremy Waldron made several 
trenchant and controversial points about judicial review generally, and judicial review in the 
United States in particular.  As Waldron remarked, Americans tend to celebrate judicial review 
as the great national contribution to political science, and perhaps as a consequence they may 
overestimate its philosophical significance and—more importantly—fail to realize how 
profoundly anti-democratic the device is.
54
  This problem is compounded, in Waldron’s eyes, 
because there is neither an empirical nor a principled case that judges are better suited than 
legislators to take rights seriously and to protect their exercise by minorities.
55
  I disagree with 
Waldron to the extent that he feels judicial review cannot be justified, but I agree that the burden 
is on those who would justify it.
56
  And, if originalism it is to justify judicial intervention, I’d like 
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 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 
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 Id. at 1348-49, 1353. 
55
 Id. at 1349, 1405.  
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 My sense is that at least in the extended federal republic, there is something to be said 
for judicial intervention as an added bulwark against abuse of local and regional minorities, for 
precisely the reasons articled by Madison in The Federalist No. 10.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 
(James Madison).  The more diverse and extended the polity, the less likely it becomes that a 
national majority will agree to reduce any particular minority to second-class citizenship. That 
said, Madison’s system celebrated in The Federalist No. 10 is also rigged against change and in 
favor of the status quo.  Id.  In this light in particular, Waldron’s point that it may be merely a 




to hear a far better explanation of how the supermajority of 1788 trumps the majority of today 
than that which underlies Justice Scalia’s reasoning.    
On the most basic level, conventional justifications for judicial intervention in the name 
of originalism make little sense, as aptly illustrated by their application to the Heller majority 
opinion:  people we never knew who are long since dead made rules to bind us, and we must 
follow them because they said so.  (Of course, as a historical matter, it is anything but clear that 
the framers or ratifiers did say we must follow their rules, but originalists have never been 
concerned with historical accuracy.)  And, in following the rules they made, we must interpret 
the rules exactly as they intended, because they said so.  (Of course, once again, the truth of the 
matter is that they didn’t say so, since the Constitution did not come with an owner’s manual, or 
an interpretive handbook.)  And Justice Scalia is here today to interpret the language exactly as 
those people 220 years ago would have interpreted it, because he says so.  (They certainly never 
said so, for there are no founding era prophesies that a judge would one day rise to restore the 
fallen nation to true constitutional understanding.)  Having established, at least implicitly, this 
foundation as a warrant for neutral judging, Justice Scalia then gets the interpretation patently 
wrong, embracing a meaning that was, at best, a fringe outlier when the text was created.  On the 
whole, it is a farcical exercise. 
 Fans of originalism or variants of originalism as diverse as Bruce Ackerman
57
 and the 
tandem of the John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport
58
 have sometimes argued—on grounds 
partly instrumental and partly directed towards legitimizing constitutional principles by reference 
                                                                                                                                                                           
judiciary to take African American rights more seriously than state legislatures during the 1950s 
and 60s cannot readily be dismissed.  
57
 See ACKERMAN, supra note 40; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).  
58
 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: 




to popular sovereignty—that the Constitution merits greater deference than simple legislation 
because the former was ratified by a supermajority of an animated populace rather than by a 
narrow legislative majority acting on behalf of a largely disengaged electorate.
59
  This premise, 
too, is perhaps more alluring on casual first impression than on closer inspection.  To be sure, the 
consent of nine out of thirteen states was required to give the Constitution effect, but the votes of 
the conventions in such populous states as Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York were very 
close, ratification failed in North Carolina and Rhode Island, and numerous groups (comprising 
an overwhelming majority of the population) were excluded from the electoral process and the 
ratification conventions in every state.
60
  The claim that the Constitution was ratified by a super-
majority of the people is, therefore, very much less clear than the case that it was ratified by a 
super-majority of the states. 
Assuming originalism-inspired judicial review could overcome the democratic deficit 
problem, there arises the perhaps more fundamental issue of whether the revolutionary 
generation possesses any moral authority to govern beyond the grave.  The Constitution of 1787-
1788 and the Bill of Rights of 1789-1791 are at once eloquent and elegant, and over the course 
of more than two centuries’ use they have shown themselves eminently workable, but these 
documents and the institutions they bequeathed originated in a violent and in many respects 
unjustifiable revolution.  The revolutionary generation led a revolt on behalf of a minority with 
highly questionable grievances, and in the process, initiated a war that killed 40,000 and drove 
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 See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 57; ACKERMAN, supra note 40; McGinnis & 
Rappaport, supra note 58.  
60
 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 94-160 (1996), for a trenchant analysis of the ratification process.  The role 
and extent of popular participation is analyzed cogently in SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER 







  What principles did the war vindicate, and were the human costs of victory 
justified by the gravity of the alleged wrongs the revolutionary Americans sought to overcome?   
The Declaration of Independence intones incontrovertible and compelling precepts of 
human rights and good government, but the bill of particulars it recites against the British 
government do not appear especially persuasive in the fullness of time.  There are essentially two 
classes of grievances against the King—one consisting of executive orders to enforce the law 
against smugglers, tax evaders, and rioters, the other of repeated failures to veto Parliamentary 
legislation deemed undesirable by colonists who disputed the subject matter jurisdiction of 
Parliament in North America.
62
  The first class of grievance then merely chides an executive for 
enforcing the law—perhaps over-zealously, perhaps recklessly—and in the process costing loss 
of property and small-scale loss of life.  The colonial response initiated a war that cost more lives 
by orders of magnitude, perhaps by several thousand fold.
63
  The second class of complaint, 
concerning failure to use the negative, is in large measure fanciful, since the power of the Crown 
to veto acts of the Westminster Parliament had long lied in abeyance, and had not been asserted 
since Queen Anne vetoed the Scottish Militia Bill of 1708 one year after the Union.
64
  This larger 
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class of grievance, then, did not in truth concern failure of regal duty, but objection to 
Parliamentary policy.  Yet many of the Parliamentary acts deemed particularly offensive now 
appear more enlightened than the colonists’ preferred alternatives.  These included the “right” to 
remove Indians more aggressively than Britain thought prudent or just, “security” against the 
exercise of Catholicism by Quebecois who chose to remain true to the faith and civil law they 
had inherited, “freedom” from repealed taxes that had confiscated a trivial portion of colonial 
wealth, and the “duty” of a violent and at times terroristic minority to impose radical political 
change on a passive majority.  In point of fact, these are hardly the well springs of binding moral 
obligations to descend to the tenth generation and beyond. 
To be sure, the fighting done and independence achieved or imposed, depending on one’s 
perspective, the framers did propose, and the public did ratify, a well-conceived and workable 
system of republican government in a federal republic.  Mr. Justice Scalia is also quick to laud 
them for having the foresight to leave us (their successors in interest) free to change
65
 that 
system—if we can overcome its deep barriers of entrenchment and amend by two-thirds majority 
in each federal house and with the concurrence of each house of the legislature in at least thirty-
eight states; that is, avoid veto to the proposed amendment by a coalition that could be as feeble 
as a single-vote majority in thirteen of the 101 legislative chambers in the federal republic.
66
   
                                                                                                                                                                           
POLITICAL ISSUE, 1660-1802, at 162 (1965); David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A 
Missing Transatlantic Context for the Historical Meaning of "the Right of the People to Keep 
and Bear Arms,” 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 119, 132 (2004). 
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 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
66
 The Constitution states: 
 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures 
of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing 
amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as 




For this, the living generation is supposed to be grateful to Mr. Madison?  We can change the 
rules that govern our lives because a cabal who lived 220 years ago proposed that we might, and 
a small majority of the voting-eligible population, in a then sparsely populated country 
embracing less than half the territory, and one hundredth of the people of the present United 
States said we can—but if, and only if, we can achieve majorities in at least seventy-seven of the 
101 legislative chambers in the current federal republic?  For this so-called gift, I will not thank 
Mr. Madison or his almost-chosen generation.
67
  From the perspective of first principles of 
democracy and constitutionalism, it would seem to me much more legitimate to assert in 
pointedly Jeffersonian terms that we now living could change the rules that govern our lives 
today if a substantial majority of voters now living agree to do so.
68
  More concretely, it is not at 
all clear as a matter of moral duty that the opinions of people living 220 years ago should have 
any thing to do with whether the people of the District of Columbia can decide to ban handguns 
in our own lifetimes.  It is even less clear that Justice Scalia’s patently false gloss on what people 
living 220 years ago meant by enacting the Second Amendment should trump what the 
democratically elected government of the District of Columbia clearly and self-evidently meant 
                                                                                                                                                                           
several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress. 
 
U.S. CONST. art. V.  All states but unicameral Nebraska have two chambers; the ninety-nine state 
chambers plus the federal chambers make 101. 
67
 The reference is to Lincoln’s famous description of the flawed American nation as 
God’s “almost chosen people,” which Lincoln employed in his Address to the Senate of New 
Jersey on February 21, 1861 during his journey to Washington for his first inauguration.  See 
generally ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 575 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 2001). 
68




when it duly enacted a statute banning handguns on behalf of an electorate who still favor that 
legislative choice over the alternative selected for them by the Supreme Court.
69
 
   
How McDonald May Change the Constitutional World as We Know It 
 
So much for the Heller decision, for Justice Scalia’s handiwork, and the generation of 
’76.  What about McDonald v. City of Chicago and incorporation?  And what about 
intergenerational fealty owed to those who fought and died four score and some years after the 
colonists rebelled?  This, to me, is a decidedly different question, and one that might be 
answered in the affirmative without recourse to nationalism and patriotic fervor to steer ones 
judgment.  On grounds of human rights and collective responsibility alone it should be self-
evidently less problematic that the generation that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment has a 
greater moral claim on posterity than the revolutionaries of 1776, who merely asserted what 
Harvard history professor David Armitage calls “settler grievances” against the colonial 
metropolis.
70
     
Nearly four hundred thousand Union soldiers died during the Civil War.
71
  And what did 
they die for?  Not for the right to be free from Catholicism in Quebec, or easily affordable taxes 
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on tea, or to obtain unhindered access to Indian lands beyond the crest of the Appalachians.  
They fought to save the Union, and as the Civil War wore on, more and more clearly, they 
fought to end slavery.
72
  The Reconstruction Congress that assembled when their work was done 
proposed not only recognition of slavery’s end but state obligations to uphold equal protection, 
due process, and privileges or immunities as amendments to the Constitution, and the nation 
ratified the language Congress had drafted.
73
  Four hundred thousand died for a noble cause, one 
of unassailable importance under modern human rights law.  The figure four hundred thousand is 
significant for one, perhaps, less obvious reason as well.  It is roughly the number of persons 
transported from Africa to mainland British North America and the United States—this country’s 
share of the larger toll of ten million survivors of the African slave trade to the Americas over 
nearly four centuries, an “execrable commerce” that cost many millions more lives in Africa and 
on the Atlantic journeys to the principal New World slave societies of Brazil, St. Dominque 
(now Haiti), and Jamaica.
74
  Perhaps, then, four hundred thousand Union dead represents the first 
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great step in the process of expiating the guilt associated with the forced transport of four 
hundred thousand Africans in the slave trade to the United States, and certainly the sacrifice of 
the Grand Army of the Republic was conceived in precisely these terms at the time.
75
  In this 
light, I am prepared to acknowledge a personal debt to that generation of 1861-1876, utterly 
unlike the lesser debt owed to the generations of 1776 or 1789.  
Accepting a special sense of duty to the Civil War dead and the constitutional 
amendments they made possible need not require conceding to Akhil Amar or Robert Cottrol 
that the Fourteenth Amendment privatized the Second Amendment right to arms.
76
  Evidence 
regarding the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 1868—while certainly not clear, 
one-sided or unambiguous—does admit of a non-trivial claim that those voting to ratify the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended to recognize a right to self-defense for freed persons and for 
other Union sympathizers facing terrorism and violence in the South.  It bears emphasis however 
that the suddenly fashionable claim for total incorporation of a very privatistic Bill of Rights is 
                                                                                                                                                                           
prohibit or restrict this execrable commerce” was struck before the Continental Congress 
approved the Declaration.  Id. 
75
 Lincoln’s words from the Second Inaugural poignantly reprise the theme of national 
sin, sacrifice, and redemption:   
 
Fondly do we hope – fervently do we pray – that this mighty scourge of war may 
speedily pass away . . . .  Yet if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth 
piled up by the bondman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be 
sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another 
drawn with the sword, as we said three thousand years ago, so it must be said, 
“the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether.” 
 
RICHARD J. CARWARDINE, LINCOLN 240-42 (2003); MCPHERSON, supra note 71, at 844 (quoting 
and analyzing Lincoln’s text). 
76
 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 262 
(1998); Robert Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Public Safety and the Right to Keep and Bear 
Arms in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA: REVISED AND EXPANDED 88-107 (David J. 




much less strong then some in the academy currently assume.
77
  The Thirty-Ninth Congress 
included forty-nine Senators and 183 Representatives during the debates on the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
78
  Unlike the Annals of Congress containing excerpts from the First Congress’s 
debates on the Bill of Rights, the Congressional Globe is complete and comprehensive in its 
coverage of the debates on Reconstruction.  It is highly probative then that of the 232 members 
seated when the Fourteenth Amendment was under discussion, only one Senator and five 
Representatives uttered what can be construed as endorsements of a total incorporation theory.
79
   
Advocates of total incorporation and champions of a reconstructed, privatized right to arms 
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inevitably cite the speeches of John Bingham, a member of the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction, and principal spokesperson for the pending amendment in the House.
80
  In 
particular, those favoring total incorporation rely on Bingham’s comments of February 28, 1866 
when he said an early version of the Fourteenth Amendment he introduced in the House of 
Representatives aimed to “secure to the citizens of each State all the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States in the several States.”81  Earlier that day, in introducing the new 
draft of the Amendment, Bingham stated with apparent clarity “the proposition . . . is simply . . . 
to arm the Congress . . . with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the constitution 
today. It hath that extent—no more.”82   
But this is hardly all that Bingham said about the pending Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
deeper one delves into the debates, the clearer it becomes that Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger 
had good reason to characterize Bingham as a haphazard and inconsistent thinker, who 
frequently said one thing only to retract it when pressed by other members to elucidate his most 
recent remarks.
83
   At times, Bingham happily endorsed the view that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was intended to do no more than ensure non-discrimination and equal access 
to whatever civil rights a particular state granted white inhabitants, and it is anything but clear 
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that he was concerned with substantive rights except so far as he wished to ensure that any 
substantive rights applied equally in favor of all adult male citizens.
84
  He could not give a 
principled and consistent answer regarding the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on state 
police powers, respecting the question of whether it created national police powers, its impact on 




Citing Bingham does little to demonstrate the sense of the House or of Congress; it does 
absolutely nothing to prove the plain meaning of Privileges or Immunities at the time they were 
voted into the Constitution by the people, for despite constant prodding, Bingham proved unable 
to offer an intelligible definition – whether plain or sophisticated – of Privileges and Immunities.  
Indeed, on February 28, 1866, shortly after introduction of the new draft of the Amendment, an 
exchange between Bingham and the experienced lawyer and legal academic Robert Hale, 
Republican of New York, reached its denouement when Hale labeled Bingham’s peroration on 
natural law and that “justice which is the highest duty of nations as it is the imperishable attribute 
of the God of nations” a “calm, lucid, and logical vindication of the amendment . . . [by] an able 
constitutional lawyer.”86  Hale then proceeded to dismantle the inconsistencies and incongruities 
in Bingham’s emotive appeal in favor of his early version of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
mercilessly abused Bingham for not being able to answer consistently whether the Amendment 
created a national police power.
87
  Hale’s label “able constitutional lawyer” was, to borrow a 
phrase from Chief Justice Marshall, “solemn mockery.”88 
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Bingham did not get much clearer after the House took up a revised proposal in the 
spring that ultimately ripened into the familiar and still contested text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s famous Section One.  On May 10th, he offered his final explanation of the 
amendment’s meaning:  
the words of the Constitution that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
“privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states” include, among other 
privileges, the right to bear true allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States, and to be protected in life, liberty, and property.   Next, sir, to the 
allegiance which we all owe to God our Creator, is the allegiance which we owe 
to our common country.
89
    
 
Fuzzy as Bingham’s sentiments may be from the standpoint of those seeking interpretive 
guidance, at the very least they appear to rule out incorporation of Sanford Levinson’s 
insurrectionary Second Amendment
90
 (and James Madison’s Establishment Clause91).  That, 
though, is probably the extent of the wisdom they afford on the question of total incorporation. 
As William Nelson has documented, anti-discrimination was the dominant theme that 
arose during Congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment.
92
  The twentieth century’s 
obsessive attentiveness to the doctrinal limits of procedural due process, substantive due process, 
equal protection, and privileges or immunities was not foreshadowed when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was under consideration in Congress or by the ratifying public out of doors.   
Sections Two through Four of the Fourteenth Amendment—which imposed disabilities on 
former Confederates who could not take the iron-clad oath, diminished the representation of 
states that disenfranchised on account of race, and disowned the Confederate debt—were of 
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cardinal importance from 1866-1868, even though they are now of purely historical interest.   
When contemporary legislators and voters turned their attention to the proposed Section One 
with its Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses, they were far more 
likely to concern themselves with the anti-subordination as an overarching concept than with the 
specific contours of what later became three separate branches of Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Indeed, it was frequently assumed that those concepts were non-technical and 
overlapping, rather than legalistic, rigid, and fully defined.  John Bingham was hardly the only 
member of Congress or of the public unable to offer a completely theorized and consistent 
account of the meaning due process, privileges or immunities, or equal protection.  As Nelson 
argues, the narrow but by no means untenable or even surprising reading the Supreme Court 
gave Privileges and Immunities in The Slaughterhouse Cases initiated a long historical process 
in which the different components of Section One acquired distinct meanings through judicial 
interpretation.
93
  As long as Congress remained committed to Reconstruction, its focus was as 
much on federal legislative remedies for Southern misdeeds as it was on judicially enforced 
disabilities, and after Reconstruction ended, it was many years before the Supreme Court’s shift 
in focus from economic to non-economic liberties accelerated the evolution of doctrinally 
distinct branches of Fourteenth Amendment law.  The Slaughterhouse Cases,
94
 and even the 
classic Harlan dissents of the late nineteenth century,
95
 appear to assume a Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendment working in tandem for general anti-subordination purposes rather than 
the constitutionalization of particular limits on legislative authority when applied with an even 
hand.  
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 and others have doubtless succeeded in 
unsettling a once orthodox understanding that Justice Black
98
 lacked any academically credible 
case for total incorporation.  Yet three particular points Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger relied 
on in rejecting Black’s total incorporation theory remain very difficult for champions of 
incorporation to counter.  If the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the Bill of Rights: 
a.  Why did no member of either House object to the Blaine Amendment that 
would have prohibited state taxes to support religious schools as redundant 
(seeing as, under the incorporation theory, the First Amendment Establishment 




b.  Why were there no objections on incorporation grounds against the decision in 





c.  And why did Congress ratify several constitutions submitted by southern states 





Aynes concedes that these are (at least superficially) hard charges for the 
incorporationists to answer, but suggests perhaps by way of plea in mitigation that the 
contradiction between incorporation and toleration of state violations of provisions of the federal 
Bill of Rights would not have been readily apparent to many during the 1860s and 1870s because 
most people were not thinking in terms of federal judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights 
against the states and those that were did not know the contents of state law.
102
  Aynes’s answer 
was perhaps more satisfactory when he first made it nearly twenty years ago, when the dominant 
paradigm of originalism still focused on the intent of the framers.  After all, a secret intent might 
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be an intent all the same, even if it remained a mystery to the public at large.  But in this age of 
Scalia-esque original public understanding, the failure of the general public to appreciate John 
Bingham’s alleged incorporationist intent is telling indeed.  If the people out of doors did not 
know about incorporation and its intended impact on the laws of their states, how could they 
have understood that their support for ratification amounted to endorsement of the mysterious 
doctrine? 
 Even admitting total incorporation (something I am not inclined to do) leaves the 
question of whether the allegedly incorporated right to arms was understood to vest in 
individuals in their private capacity, or as members of the militia.  Those who stress the former 
argument underestimate the importance of black and integrated militia in the minds of those who 
supported Reconstruction and who voted in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The militia, 
understood in pointedly civic terms, had not wholly morphed (as Akhil Amar maintains
103
) into 
the Ku Klux Klan and like organs of terror by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.  
The volunteers who comprised the Union Army and the citizens (black and white) who served in 
the militia units of Reconstruction governments in the South have far stronger militia credentials 
under terms of the 1792 Militia Act (still on the books in 1866-1868) than the masked night 
riders who rallied for the outlaw cause of violent restoration of a system of racial subordination.  
Legal academics and the general public have lost sight of the extent to which the collapse of 
Reconstruction was a consequence not simply of violence, but of the defeat of black and 
integrated militia loyal to the Republican Party and Reconstruction by extralegal white militia 
loyal to the Democratic Party and Redemption.
104
  The failure of Reconstruction was not (as 
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Woodrow Wilson, Ulrich Bonnell Philips, or William Dunning would have it) that it was tried at 
all, or—as Robert Cottrol or Stephen Halbrook would have it—that it was too statist and 
insufficiently libertarian.
105
  If the federal government had succeeded in preserving the ability of 
black persons and others loyal to Republican governors to bear arms in the lawfully constituted 
state militia established by Reconstruction governments, Reconstruction might have endured.  
Likewise, an integrated police force in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could 
have altered the face of Jim Crow, or perhaps precluded it altogether.
106
    
We cannot know the contours of the history that never was.  But speaking in the spirit of 
the hypothetical past invoked by Amar, Halbrook, and Cottrol, I am skeptical that the 
counterfactual narrative they prefer would have played itself out in quite the halcyon manner 
they suppose, had their chosen parameters actually held sway.  The ability of individual black 
persons to arm themselves in a private capacity may have facilitated the defeat or intimidation of 
the Klan, but it could also have led to a ratcheting up of violence and the coming of a prolonged 
and highly destructive race war.  Perceptions of the likelihood of either scenario depend in large 
part on ones faith in the deterrent effect of guns balanced against their potential to bring 
catastrophic harm in the hands of the passionate, the hateful, or the frightened.  On those 
questions, my inclinations are rather different than the ones John Lott brings to bear in his 
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controversial analysis of public safety in our own times.
107
  In the debates over the relations 
between access to guns and the level of crime, some rely on manipulated figures, others on 
articles of faith, and some few on solid research and reasoning, but there is no shortage of 
authorities for either of the mutually exclusive propositions that more guns mean less crime or 
that more guns mean more death.  When it comes to restoring the original understanding of the 
right to arms during Reconstruction, both camps appear to project backwards into a remade and 
altered historical landscape their favored visions of the present.   
One telling objection to the preferred gun rights vision of a rewritten post-bellum past 
focuses on the practical unenforceability of any legal right in favor of African Americans in the 
old New South that actually existed.  Since post-Reconstruction judicial enforcement of non-
economic individual liberties – particularly enforcement in favor of members of socially 
disadvantaged groups – did not return to the United States until the 1930s at the earliest, it is not 
clear what a reconstructed private right to arms could have done for individuals confronting 
redeemed state governments and white power apparatuses bent on ensuring subordination.  The 
subtext for Halbrook, Cottrol, and company, I suppose, is ultimately not that courts would have 
protected black access to arms had the Privileges and Immunities Clause been properly enforced 
to incorporate a private right to guns, but that death in a gun fight is better than subjugation.  
Cottrol and Halbrook’s vision was rejected by black America in the 1870s:  confronted with the 
reality of the end of Reconstruction, millions of black southerners opted for accommodation 
rather than race-based civil war.
108
  Their grand-children and great-grandchildren lived to see the 
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end of second class citizenship and the coming of formal equality.  Perhaps the accomodationist 
option was less heroic than that favored by the National Rifle Association (and in this and any 
other context, the supposition that the NRA cares deeply for the welfare of black America is 
rather difficult to swallow),
109
 but in the longer term, the strategy of accommodation attained 
results that are at least arguably more desirable than race war to the point of extirpation.  
 The Second Amendment, as originally understood, is a poor basis for recognizing a 
private right to weapons possession.  The Privileges or Immunities Clause of 1868 is a more 
plausible alternative, but one not dictated by original understanding or history.  That said, there 
may well be several viable avenues towards legitimizing judicial intervention to veto legislation 
or executive action adversely impacting the putative right of individuals to own guns for 
purposes of private self-defense.  These might include popular constitutionalism, the Ninth 
Amendment, substantive due process, living privileges and immunities as opposed to privileges 
or immunities frozen in time, or privatistic and defense emanations from various specific 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment.  And perhaps some of these 
theories more accurately explain the result (if not the opinion) in Heller and the likely result in 
McDonald than Justice Scalia’s theory of original meaning.  I have much sympathy for popular 
constitutionalism, but at least on the national level, it is not entirely clear what function popular 
constitutionalism really serves.  Legislative choices cannot long be out of sync with popular 
constitutional values without the electoral and legislative processes bringing the two back into 
harmony, leaving little work for judges who might otherwise be inclined to invalidate legislation 
that does not square with the nation’s constitutional sensibilities.  On the local or regional 
legislative level, the question with respect to popular constitutionalism is whether national norms 
should trump local variations.  The new democratic experimentalists, as well as Louis Brandeis, 
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might answer not to the extent local experimentation is snuffed out, but rights enthusiasts of any 
particular stripe would retort:  experiment with anything you like, just not our rights. 
The American people as a whole feel that there is a right to own guns, and that this right 
applies against the states.  I am confident the Court won’t disappoint them.  My hope is that it 
preserves a wide swath for local regulatory options, including substantial restrictions.  Brandeis’s 
experimentalism appeals to me.
110
  If Stephen Halbrook wants to live in a society with easy 
access to guns, and I want to live in one where access to guns is controlled, with fifty-one 
principal jurisdictions and innumerable municipalities and counties with independent legislative 
authority in the United States, there should be room for each of us.  Of course, many gun 
enthusiasts, Mr. Halbrook among them, will say D.C.’s draconian solution was wrongheaded.   
After all, D.C.—with the toughest gun laws in the country—also has often had the highest 
murder rate in the country.
111
  That may be true, but Hawaii has the lowest murder rate, and it 
also has tough laws.
112
  New York City has strong gun control laws, and a moderate murder rate 
by American standards, lower than that of many less populous states.
113
  Japan, England, and 
Northern Ireland have very few guns at all, and lower murder rates than any American 
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  Germany and France have many guns, but lots of restrictions, and lower murder 
rates than any American jurisdiction.
115
  There seem to me many rational choices democratic 
legislatures could make.  Let them make them.    
What concerns me more is projection,
116
 that is, the desire of some in gun culture states to 
impose their values of easy access and wide ownership on people living in states that have opted 
for tighter controls.  In a somewhat unorthodox maneuver in 2009, gun rights enthusiasts in the 
House of Representatives tried to attach—as a rider on unrelated legislation—a Congressional 
statement proclaiming that the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause protected to ability 
of anyone who carried a licensed firearm in any state to carry that weapon in any other state, 
local laws notwithstanding.
117
  The legislative gambit failed, but gun rights enthusiasts, including 
Alan Gura, lead counsel in Heller and McDonald, are eagerly pursuing a judicial alternative.  
Historically, the beauty of Brandeis-style experimentation in the pluralistic federal republic has 
been that people are free to move to states where the regulatory regime harmonizes with their 
preferences.  But one litigious person being able to impose the value system of one community 
on another by relocating is a different matter.  For those who value easy access to guns, 
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residency in an easy access state is the natural and time-honored solution.  Asking Justice Scalia 
to mandate easy access on your fellow citizens living in jurisdictions where the majority favors 
tight control is wholly distinct and thoroughly anti-democratic approach, and it begs a result 
neither dictated by terms of the Second Amendment nor required by the language of the 
Fourteenth in either the Due Process or Privileges or Immunities Clauses.  It is, in essence, 
dictatorship by the officious libertarian intermeddler.         
Pundits and prognosticators—Cass Sunstein, Mark Tushnet, and Larry Slolum among 
them—have labeled the Heller decision minimalistic, indeed quintessentially minimalistic, in 
keeping with what some describe as the Roberts Court’s commitment to moderation.118  These 
characterizations of Heller invest much capital in Justice Scalia’s disclaimer in favor of 
presumptively valid classes of gun restrictions, allegedly not called into question by the Heller 
holding.  But was Heller at its core really minimalistic?  And is the McDonald decision likely to 
be similarly minimalistic in its implications?  There is ample reason to fear not, as illustrated by 
the claims of prominent gun rights advocates, Alan Gura, Don B. Kates, Stephen Halbrook, 
Nelson Lund, and David Kopel.
119
  As several of these commentators point out, Justice Scalia 
did not do a particularly good job of explaining how the presumptively valid forms of gun 
restriction he appeared to endorse in Heller square with his more general pronouncement that the 
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Second Amendment, as originally understood, protects a private right to carry weapons for 
purposes of confrontation.  To the extent that conflicts arise between his dicta in favor of 
presumptively valid restrictions and his grand theory in favor of gun rights, it is presumably the 
restrictions that will be required to yield.  Both in terms of preferred policies and perceptions of 
constitutional dictates, the claims of the hardcore gun champions named above are radical and 
absolutistic, and the cadre remains committed to litigating until the Supreme Court announces an 
iron clad rule that they deem truly worthy of celebration.   
Little if any legislation—with the possible exception of prohibitions against gun 
possession by convicted felons—would likely stand if the Court embraced the positions favored 
by the NRA’s chosen band of advocates in McDonald.  Once the slave power conspiracy won 
what ultimately proved its greatest victory in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
120
 and the Supreme Court 
announced that the federal government lacked the power to restrict slavery in federal enclaves, 
moderates like Abraham Lincoln immediately suspected that a second Dred Scott decision was 
in the offing, and that the Supreme Court harbored designs of currying further favor with the 
slave power by announcing that the states themselves (including progressive enclaves like 
Wisconisn and Massachusetts) lacked the capacity to interfere with the rights of slaveowners to 
bring their human property where they would, including to communities inimically opposed to 
slavery.
121
  The notion that the black man had no rights the white man need respect threatened to 
expand into the proposition that the black man had no rights any white man or community could 
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respect, even if it wished.  This spring, the nation may well stand on the threshold of another 
second Dred Scott decision, which is to say it faces a bolder and more expansive Heller decision, 
holding that no community has any rights the gun wielding libertarian need heed.  If Alan Gura 
gets all he wants from the high court, a five-justice majority will announce precisely this doctrine 
on the last day of the term in June.  
 Alan Gura’s view, however, is by no means the most radical gun rights view harbored by 
mainstream, influential thinkers in the gun power conspiracy.  In my capacity as a skeptical 
outsider to the gun rights movement, the most startling testimony regarding the unlimited right to 
arms I have heard was uttered by Sandra Froman, one time Chief Counsel and from President of 
the NRA, speaking a mere fifteen miles from NRA headquarters in that sanctum sanctorum of 
the recast and reanimated Second Amendment, George Mason University School of Law in 
Arlington, Virginia.
122
  On October 17, 2007, when Heller was docketed, but not yet argued in 
the Supreme Court, I was among the featured speakers at a Second Amendment conference at 
Mason, home to some of the loudest and proudest NRA spokespersons in the legal academy.
123
   
During the late afternoon panel discussion, a question (perhaps rhetorical) was raised concerning 
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how many persons gathered in the lecture theatre would feel safer if every person in the arena 
were armed.  One member of the audience (I believe David Kopel, perhaps scheduled to appear 
on a panel later that evening) immediately raised his hand to volunteer an affirmative answer.  
But it was another member of the audience, soon identified as Sandra Froman, who offered the 
most elaborate response.  There seemed to be an implicit sense in the room that the individual 
members of an armed populace would need some sort of queue to know precisely when to 
intervene with lethal force to forestall a crazed, violent person doing something drastic, and in 
the aftermath of Virginia Tech all sensed that on academic premises this matter was of 
immediate, pragmatic import.  Before anyone could formulate this question concretely, Froman 
was ready with the announcement that though she no longer spoke for the NRA, she was certain 
a pamphlet and an educational program could be made available to teach right-thinking people 
the signs to look for among those with itchy triggers, so that good citizens would be prepared to 
intervene preemptively before the violence prone should choose to shoot.  For the right-leaning, 
Froman anticipated the best of all possible worlds:  a universally armed community living 
pursuant to a privatized Bush Doctrine, in which the decent folk would know not only that they 
should and could shoot first, but precisely when it was most appropriate.  Froman didn’t descend 
into particulars the time, but those with active imaginations could doubtless quickly conjure 
some of the characteristics and criteria that would make a person more like Iran than Britain on 
the scale of preemption-worthy dangerousness.
124
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 President Froman’s invitation to regress into the Hobbesian state of nature actually 
attempts to bring about one of the outcomes that the Fourteenth Amendment—and the Civil 
Rights Act for which it provided permanent constitutional footing—aimed to preclude.  The right 
of a citizen to governmental protection, and to duty of citizens to show allegiance to the 
government that affords them such protection, were bedrock principles asserted by members of 
39
th
 Congress spanning the entire political spectrum of persons loyal to the Union during debates 
on the Civil Rights Act and the constitutional amendment that it spawned.
125
  The reciprocal 
individual right to protection and governmental duty to protect were founded on natural law, and 
in their domestic dimensions had clear analogues and parallels in the international law concept of 
diplomatic protection enabling and binding states to protect the rights of their citizens against 
violation by foreign sovereigns.
126
  Democratic Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, Senator 
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois (multiple and changing party affiliations), Republican U.S. 
Representative John Marshall Broomall of Pennsylvania, Republican Representative Samuel 
Shellaberger of Ohio, Republican Representative James Wilson of Iowa, and Republican U.S 
Representative Martin Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania all made clear during debates on the Civil 
Rights Act that the reciprocal concepts of protection and duty were central to the constitutional 
compact, and central to citizenship.  Indeed, Hobbes himself had famously made the same point 
after the English Civil War, urging disenchanted royalists to make their peace with the 
Republican government as he himself had done precisely because it offered peace and 
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  Hobbes was no fan of the state of nature, and having lived through a long succession 
of brutal wars in England and on the continent, he preferred peace to anarchy.
128
   Two centuries 
later, Lyman Trumbull’s vision was even less equivocal: 
How is it that every person born in these United States owes allegiance to the 
Government?  Everything the he is or had, his property and his life, may be taken 
by the Government of the United States in its defense . . . and can it be that . . . we 
have got a Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of a 
citizen, but has no power to afford him protection?  Is that all this boasted 
American citizenship amounts to? . . . Sir, it cannot be.  Such is not the meaning 
of our Constitution.  Such is not the meaning of American citizenship.  The 
Government, which would go to war to protect its meanest – I will not say citizen 
– inhabitant . . . in any foreign land whose rights were unjustly encroached upon, 
has certainly some power to protect its own citizens in their own country.  




Trumbull makes patent what is so enticing to Froman:  the claim that the government cannot 
protect me is in fact a claim that I have no duty to the government.  In this light, Froman’s 
violence inflected vision of the good life is perhaps not all that surprising.  The psycho-drama of 
allegiance renounced generally simmers not far below the smooth surface of the gun rights 
movement’s rhetorical invocations of the spirit of ’76.  
 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the craziness of the radical gun rights preference for private violence 
over public security, Second Amendment enthusiasts are in the majority in the country, perhaps 
even in a super-majority.  Why do they fear the democratic process, and local outcomes that do 
not ape their preferences?  Why do they, like the slave-power conspirators of old, demand 
                                                     
127
 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 147-48, 469-70 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., 1996).  On the 
political context in which Hobbes appealed to royalists to avow allegiance to the 
Commonwealth, see QUENTIN SKINNER, HOBBES AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, 178-82, 198-208 
(2008). 
128
 See SKINNER, supra note 127, at 178-82, 198-208. 
129





constitutional protection for anti-social behavior that is under no threat from national popular 
majorities?  Why do they demand, like the slave-power conspirators of old, that dissent from 
their absolutistic vision be read out of the constitutional compact?   Why do they insist on 
perpetualism and absolutism when it comes to the right to guns?  Why does the Froman vision 
have appeal, and why has the NRA, which in theory does not object to enforcement of existing 
reasonable regulations, never encounter a regulation that its members accept as reasonable?  I 
can think of at least two answers, each of which is more than a little troubling.  One explanation 
for the gun community’s absolutists approach is captured best in Stephen Halbrook’s mono-
causal and mono-maniacal The Founder’s Second Amendment: The Origins of the Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms, in which the author sets out his secular case that a private right to gun possession 
is the summa bona of American Revolutionary eschatology.
130
  For Halbrook, the Revolutionary 
War was fought to vindicate the right to arms.  The revolutionaries prevailed without mention of 
foreign or professional assistance because of that celebrated right to arms, and then the 
Constitution was authored to vindicate the right to arms that had been won by the Revolution.   
Later, the Bill of Rights with its capstone Second Amendment was added to remove threats to 
the right to arms that the Constitution created.  There are other, lesser elements to the Bill of 
Rights, and they merit some mention.  First Amendment freedoms, for instance, have a certain 
utility, because they secure the right to discuss the right to arms.  (Halbrook stops short of 
mentioning the right to worship guns free of governmental interference.)  Likewise the Fourth 
Amendment doubly protects the right to arms against unreasonable search and seizure.  And the 
Sixth Amendment ensures that one can have counsel in federal court to vindicate the right to 
arms.  In sum, guns cease in Halbrook’s analysis to be tools, but become the end all and be all of 
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earthly existence.  In a near inversion of Immanuel Kant’s celebrated categorical imperative that 
no person is a mere means to a greater end, people and constitutionalism in Halbrook’s account 
threaten to become bare instruments to protect guns.
131
   
A second rather more disturbing and impious answer to the question of why the NRA has 
launched the most absolutistic, driven, paranoid and obsessive campaign to warp the 
constitutional compact since the days of the slave power sounds in terms of false religion, 
ancestor worship, and idolatry.  Under the gun enthusiasts post-modern version of covenant 
theology, the Founding Fathers (with Constitution-hater Patrick Henry taking front and center 
and Constitution-drafter James Madison fading into the distance)
132
 were a prophetic and indeed 
sainted generation, who received a divine dispensation to cherish, worship, and employ the gun 
in pursuit of a heightened state of libertarian piety, from which later lesser generations have 
tragically fallen away.  As in the Old Testament’s cycles of declension, during which the people 
of God took to serving Baal and lesser false foreign gods in between times of prophetic 
revelation and reaffirmation of God’s Covenant with Israel, the people of America have taken to 
serving liberalism, statism, socialism, and lesser non-gun related rights in these late degenerate 
times.  The mission of the gun rights movement is to restore the nation to its true foundations, 
and to cast off the blasphemous and faddish perversions of the Warren, Burger, and insufficiently 
righteous Rehnquist Courts in favor of true gun-focused and Godly principles.  This sacred duty 
commands obedience; in the eyes of the true believers that obedience is a consequence of 
historical fidelity and Christian faith.  Indeed, in the eyes of the most fervent believers 
restoration of the lost gun-centered Constitution comes close to being a necessary precondition 
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for the Rapture.  Sadly for the rest of us, these modern day Pharisees are quite blind to the 
absurdity of their fervent vision for which neither Holy Scripture, late-eighteenth-century 
political thought, or Reconstruction Era politics provide firm support.
133
    
More sadly still, baring unforeseen and nearly unforeseeable momentary spasms of 
insight among one of the five members of the Heller majority, the United States may well stand 
mere months away from a judicial fiat endorsing a new constitutional dispensation of universal 
and unfettered access to arms utterly unlike any secular or pious understanding that animated the 
national mainstream during the age of independence or during that most Godly epoch of anti-
slavery and national constitutional regeneration that produced the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
nation lives in troubled times, and the triumph of the constitutional freak show looms near at 
hand.  May it prove as fleeting as the slave power conspiracy’s ascendancy after Dred Scott, and 
may its demise come much more gently and with precious little loss of life.  
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MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO, FROM  
GUN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF  
HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW 
 
 
The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller recognized a 
Second Amendment right to possess firearms for purposes of private self-defense, marking the 
first time the high court had acknowledged the existence of a Second Amendment right 
analytically distinct from the right to hold weapons suitable for service in the lawfully 
established militia.  The question of whether the constitutional right to armed self-defense 
applied against state and municipal actors as well as the federal government was left open by the 
Heller Court, and became the subject of much attention and debate over the next two years.  
Shortly after Heller was announced, Otis McDonald, an elderly resident of a high crime 
neighborhood in Chicago, challenged the city’s tough restrictions on hand gun ownership in 
federal district court.  McDonald’s lawyers argued that the right recognized in Heller should be 
construed to limit state and municipal regulatory authority in the same way it limited the power 
of federal governmental actors. 
It may seem self-evident to most non-lawyers today that the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights apply to action by state and local government as well as to action by Congress or federal 
officials.  For much of American history, however, the Supreme Court construed the Bill of 
Rights as binding only the federal government.  The most famous articulation of the old 
understanding that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states is that of Chief Justice John 
Marshall, who in Baron v. Baltimore in 1833 refused to allow a Fifth Amendment claim related 
to the taking of property by a municipal government.  Following the Civil War and 




Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made federal Bill of Rights guarantees 
applicable against the states.  The Supreme Court rejected this argument in The Slaughter-House 
Cases of 1873 (denying claims alleging the unconstitutionality of a monopoly granted by the 
City of New Orleans) and United States v. Cruikshank (decided 1876, refusing to enforce a 
Second Amendment claim against anyone other than the Federal Government).  The Supreme 
Court has never accepted the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the entire Bill of 
Rights against the states, but over the course of the Twentieth Century the Supreme Court 
gradually recognized in piecemeal fashion that particular provisions of the Bill of Rights applied 
to the states and municipalities through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
This process of “selective incorporation” had largely run its course by the early 1970s, with 
almost all provisions of the Bill of Rights held applicable against the states.  Prominent 
exceptions included the Second Amendment right to arms which had at that time not yet been 
enforced against federal action, the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases, and the 
Fifth Amendment right that a criminal trial not commence unless the defendant had first been 
indicted by a grand jury.    
Thus, the McDonald case presented the federal judiciary with the question of whether the 
newly recognized Second Amendment right should join most other provisions of the Bill of 
Rights in limiting state and municipal authority in exactly the same fashion it limited federal 
authority.  The federal trial court rejected McDonald’s challenge to Chicago’s gun control law, 
reasoning that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit [the federal Circuit that 
embraces Illinois] had previously upheld a handgun ban and that Heller had not addressed state 
and municipal restrictions on gun ownership.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court, 




Court cases declining to apply Second Amendment restrictions to the states decided in the late 
nineteenth century before the Supreme Court had begun the process of incorporating Bill of 
Rights guarantees against the states.  The Court of Appeals acknowledged that there was reason 
to question the continuing validity of these precedents, but made clear that any decision to 
overturn Supreme Court decisions must rest with the Supreme Court itself. 
Oral argument in McDonald v. City of Chicago took place in the United States Supreme 
Court on March 2, 2010, with Alan Gura, who successfully represented Heller in his suit against 
the District of Columbia, appearing for the appellant, former Solicitor General Paul Clement 
appearing for amicus National Rifle Association, and James Feldman, who argued over forty 
cases before the Supreme Court during a long career with the Solicitor General’s Office, 
representing the City of Chicago.  The Supreme Court announced its decision on June 28, 
splitting 5-4 on the question of whether the right to hold firearms for purposes of self-defense 
recognized in Heller applied to the states.  Justice Alito wrote the lead opinion, which was joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy.  The four justice plurality held that 
a Second Amendment right to weapons for purposes of self-defense applied against the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Thomas provided the 
fifth vote in favor of applying the right against the states, but maintained in a separate opinion 
that this should be accomplished via the medium of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Justice 
Breyer dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, arguing that Heller 
was wrongly decided, that firearms bans in urban settings were commonplace when the Second 
Amendment was ratified, and that democratic experimentalism cautioned against aggressive 
federal judicial enforcement of a newly minted right that might severely undercut the ability of 




he authored before his retirement, provided a final opportunity for him to engage Justice Scalia 
on the question of when and by what standards judicial review of policy decisions made by 
democratically enacted branches of government is appropriate and legitimate.  Justice Stevens 
chided the originalist reasoning of Justice Alito in McDonald and more particularly of Justice 
Scalia in Heller, and defended in spirited fashion the legal process theory rational that had 
dominated the Court from the late 1930s through the early 1980s.  Justice Scalia answered 
Stevens in an animated concurrence that defended originalist methodology against charges of 
judicial activism.   
Justice Alito’s opinion for the four justice plurality clearly rejected Chicago’s argument 
that the Second and Fourteenth Amendment’s leave state and local government free to issue total 
prohibitions on possession of handguns in the home for private self-defense.  At the same time, 
the four justice plurality and the four dissenters joined in rejecting Alan Gura’s argument that the 
Slaughterhouse Cases should be overturned, and the entire Bill of Rights made applicable against 
the states via the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gura’s bold 
initiative found favor only with Clarence Thomas among the nine.  Respecting matters apart 
from total handgun bans and overturning Slaughterhouse, it is probably fair to say that the 
McDonald plurality left open more questions than it answered.  The plurality endorsed Justice 
Scalia’s formulation regarding the substance of the right to arms first articulated in Heller, 
writing “[i]n Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun 
in the home for the purpose of self-defense.  Unless considerations of stare decisis counsel 
otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an 
American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and the States . . . . We 




Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”[citations omitted].  The plurality also echoed 
Justice Scalia’s tentative list of presumptively valid reasonable restrictions on that right, 
including prohibitions of weapons not in common use (such as machine guns), prohibitions 
against felons or the mentally ill possessing weapons, and prohibitions against carrying weapons 
in certain sensitive places (for instance schools).  But the plurality did not announce a standard 
against which to judge the reasonability of restrictions on the right to arms, endorsing neither 
“rational basis review,” “intermediate scrutiny,” “strict scrutiny” or any other more or less 
permissive or unforgiving formula for judicial review of laws burdening constitutional rights that 
the Court has frequently employed in the past.  Hence, questions such as the constitutionality of 
restrictions on minors carrying guns, carrying guns outside the home or in cars, possession of 
veritable arsenals, and using guns for purposes other than self-defense will be left for lower 
courts to wrestle with on a case by case basis pending eventual further guidance from the 
Supreme Court. 
The McDonald case joined a rich array of constitutional issues and sub-issues.  The 
questions presented in the case engendered heated debate in the general public, among 
politicians, and in the academy.  The five Supreme Court opinions in the case not only reflect 
cross currents of popular and political thinking regarding gun control and the right to arms, they 
also engage fundamental questions regarding the role of the Supreme Court in rights 
enforcement and in adjusting policy choices embraced by political actors responsible to 
democratic majorities.  The five opinions ultimately reflect profoundly different approaches to 
the problem of justifying judicial review under the Constitution.  Issues confronted in the various 
opinions include the binding effects of precedent, notably The Slaughterhouse Cases, in which 




Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Cruikshank, in which the 
Supreme Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not make the Second 
Amendment or any other provision of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.  The five Heller 
opinions wrestle with the legitimacy of “substantive due process” as a vehicle for enforcing 
rights not specifically applicable against the states under the text of the Constitution or not 
mentioned in that text at all, and the closely connected issue of whether constitutional rights 
against governmental actors must have precisely the same scope when applied against state and 
federal authorities.  In the process, the opinions revisit four questions fundamental to the Heller 
case:  (1) what role (if any) the Second Amendment’s Militia Clause plays in circumscribing the 
right to arms, (2) whether the right to arms encompasses a right to self-defense even though the 
latter is not mentioned in the Constitutional text, (3) whether there is a constitutional right to 
self-defense independent of any right implied by the Second Amendment, and (4) whether the 
meaning of the right to arms is frozen in time to reflect the original understanding of the right in 
1791 when the Second Amendment was ratified or in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified. 
For the plurality, Justice Alito unequivocally endorsed Justice Scalia’s controversial 
maneuver of subordinating the Second Amendment’s first thirteen words into an easily dismissed 
“prefatory clause” and concomitant elevation of the Amendment’s closing fifteen words into an 
“operative clause” fully capable of defining the Amendment’s meaning even standing on its own.  
For the McDonald plurality as for the Heller majority then, the Constitution commands that “the 
right of the people, to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed,” and this command ultimately 
applies independent of the “well regulated militia” to which it was coupled in the text ratified by 




emphatically calling for reversal of Heller on the grounds that historians have generally 
dismissed Justice Scalia’s divorce of the right to arms from the militia in Heller as wholly 
incompatible with the late eighteenth century American focus on the militia as a constitutional 
check against a politically and fiscally dangerous professional army.  Justice Sotomayor, who 
had replaced Justice Souter since the decision in Heller, signed Breyer’s opinion, suggesting that 
her addition to the Court did not alter its balance respecting the Second Amendment.  The 
McDonald Court divided on the question of the exclusively military meaning of bearing arms 
along exactly the same lines as it did respecting the importance or otherwise of the Militia 
Clause, with Justice Breyer again calling for Heller to be overturned because a strong majority of 
historians and linguists commenting on Heller have rejected Justice Scalia’s position that the 
predominant meaning of bearing arms in the late eighteenth century was to carry weapons for 
purposes of confrontation, not necessarily in a military capacity. 
For the Heller majority and the McDonald plurality, the original public understanding of 
“keep and bear arms” at the time the Second and Fourteenth Amendments were ratified 
encompassed keeping weapons at the ready for purposes of private self-defense.  For the four 
justices who dissented in each case, however, the constitutional text does not speak to the 
question of weapons possession outside the context of service in the lawfully established militia, 
and this raises the issue of whether a right to armed private self-defense might be implicit in the 
American constitutional system even if it is not commanded directly by the constitutional text.  
For the dissenters, recognition of a right to private self-defense presents a question entirely 
analogous to that presented by the issues of constitutional protection for marriage, family 
relations, sexual privacy, abortion, and same sex intimacy, all of which the Supreme Court has 




Constitution.  Since the retirement of Hugo Black some forty years ago, every justice on the 
Court has at least on occasion accepted the legitimacy of some non-enumerated rights, strong but 
inconsistent protestations from Justices Scalia and Thomas notwithstanding.  Debates have 
focused on what formula or standard might allow the judiciary to constitutionally enforce some 
rights not written into the Constitution, and decline to recognize others asserted by litigants.  For 
more than seventy years, this issue has dovetailed with the question of what elements of the Bill 
of Rights are so important as to merit federal judicial application against the states.  From the 
1930s through the 1970s, in landmark cases including Palko v. Connecticut (1937), Adamson v. 
California (1947), and Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), the Court embraced different formulas for 
assessing which rights to apply against the states.  Application of related but distinguishable 
standards such as “fundamental to ordered liberty” (Palko) and “fundamental to the American 
schemed of justice” (Duncan) suggested very different things respecting the appropriateness of 
foreign reference points in ascertaining whether a putative right merited constitutional inclusion.  
Since the United States stands virtually alone among the states of the world committed to 
constitutionalism and the rule of law in its tolerance of broad access to deadly weapons, any 
transnational frame of reference rooted in abstract considerations of reason or justice or in 
empirical assessment of practices among states would point strongly against recognition of a 
right to weapons possession.  The outcome in McDonald then hinged in part on Justice Alito’s 
rejection of Chicago’s claim that the appropriate standard for decided whether to apply the right 
to arms against the states was the Palko test with its implicit invocation of a world-wide frame of 
reference. 
Quite apart from normative considerations regarding the value of particular rights, 




on the McDonald Court regarding deference to public policy choices of local legislatures.  In 
many respects, the argument in favor of policy making by democratically accountable actors 
revisited arguments against judicial rights enforcement familiar from the debates over 
incorporation during the era of Chief Justice Warren, but Justice Breyer in particular attempted 
to distinguish decisions respecting gun policy and the right to arms form those involving other 
incorporated rights on the grounds of the extreme social cost associated (at least by some 
scholars, observers, and voters) with easy access to guns.  Justice Breyer embraced an argument 
once associated with Justice Louis Brandeis holding that federalism provides a laboratory, and 
that multiple locally tailored approaches to crime control are preferable not only from the stand 
point of legitimacy, but also from the perspective of best practices and democratic 
experimentalism.  Thus, Justice Breyer argued for special solicitude to local preferences given 
the severity of gun violence in urban areas.  
Finally, McDonald is notable as the ultimate installment in a long exchange between 
Justices Stevens and Scalia concerning the philosophies underlying their constitutional 
jurisprudence.  Over the last forty years, Antonin Scalia has emerged as the principal spokesman 
for originalism among jurists and academics.  Justice Stevens meanwhile has remained 
committed to the jurisprudence of legal process theory that was dominant on the Supreme Court 
from the late New Dean through the early 1980s.  For Justice Stevens, McDonald afforded an 
opportunity to offer a final systematic justification of his jurisprudential philosophy and a 
detailed critique of Justice Scalia’s contrary jurisprudence.  Justice Scalia responded with 
perhaps his most detailed defense of originalism since his 1997 book, A Matter of Interpretation.  
The legal process theory endorsed by Justice Stevens was first articulated on the Court by then 




1937.  Justice Stone explained that that judges in constitutional cases should let legislative and 
executive determinations of policy alone unless (1) the government action in question violated 
clear constitutional text, (2) was incapable of correction through the democratic process because 
the process had become warped or corrupted in favor of special interests, or (3) unfairly 
burdened a discreet or insular racial or religious minority who could not hope for redress by 
majoritarian means.  Since Justice Stevens (like Justice Breyer) rejected the majority’s position 
that the Second Amendment plainly protects a right to weapons for private purposes and that it 
was originally understood to do so, he maintained that Chicago’s gun ban did not fall within the 
first Carolene Products category of laws fit for judicial invalidation.  It likewise fell outside the 
second and third Carolene Products categories because gun owners and advocates are not shut 
out of the political process by unfair means or through prejudice.  Justice Scalia’s concurrence 
defended his originalist reasoning in Heller against Justice Stevens attack, and argued that other 
philosophies supporting judicial review and in particular legal process theory allowed judges free 
reign to veto legislative choices in favor of their own political values and preferences.  For 
Justice Scalia, strict judicial adherence to the original understanding of constitutional text 
possessed by the general public at the time of its ratification provides the best although not a 
foolproof guarantee against judicial subjectivity in constitutional adjudication.  For Justice 
Stevens in contrast, the indeterminacy of original understanding and the strong supposition that 
Justice Scalia had clearly departed from the dominant meaning the Second Amendment held 
when it was ratified suggested that the method of originalism was neither neutral nor objective 
and that it should be abandoned in favor of nuanced and honest applications of the legal process 
theory and substantive due process case law developed during the eras of Harlan Fiske Stone, 
Earl Warren, and Warren Burger.  
